What GAO Found In May 2025, GAO identified nine priority recommendations for the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Since then, HUD has not implemented these recommendations. In June 2026, GAO identified an additional two priority recommendations and removed the priority designation from one recommendation, bringing the total to 10. GAO is highlighting the following two areas that warrant timely and focused attention: Reducing fraud and fragmentation in federal disaster recovery and Improving financing and availability of manufactured housing. By addressing GAO's recommendations in these areas, HUD could improve service delivery to disaster survivors and communities, improve the effectiveness of recovery efforts, and reduce the federal government's fiscal exposure; and promote the availability and affordability of manufactured homes. Taking action to implement all of GAO's open priority recommendations would help HUD enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of its operations. Why GAO Did This Study Priority open recommendations are the GAO recommendations that warrant priority attention from heads of key departments or agencies because their implementation could save large amounts of money; improve congressional or executive branch decision-making on major issues; eliminate mismanagement, fraud, and abuse; or make progress toward addressing a high risk or duplication issue, among other benefits. Since 2015, GAO has sent letters to selected agencies to highlight the importance of implementing such recommendations. For more information, contact Daniel Garcia-Diaz at GarciaDiazD@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The Department of Labor's (DOL) Veterans' Employment and Training Service (VETS) closed 5,433 Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) complaints from fiscal year 2021 through fiscal year 2025, according to GAO’s analysis of USERRA complaint data. The number of complaints increased each year, reaching its highest level in fiscal year 2025 (1,380 complaints), the same year VETS experienced a 23 percent reduction in its complaint investigation staffing levels. During this period, VETS closed USERRA complaints within 90 days on average, the general time frame specified in statute. Most complaints were closed for administrative reasons, including a service member choosing not to pursue the complaint, or were not substantiated by the evidence. Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) Complaints by Closure Types, Fiscal Years 2021–2025 VETS investigations staff expressed concern about the amount of time spent on complaints ineligible for USERRA coverage. VETS investigations staff also spent time on complaints that were not substantiated, which includes cases where an investigator determined an employer would have taken the same action (e.g., denied a promotion) against a service member regardless of uniformed service or protected activity. From fiscal year 2021 through fiscal year 2025, “not eligible” and “not substantiated” complaints represented about 10 percent (540 of 5,433 complaints) and about 30 percent (1,632 of 5,433 complaints) of total closed complaints, respectively. VETS provides numerous resources on its website to help educate service members, but investigations staff said the resources are inadequate because they are optional. Also, GAO found that navigating the large number of resources could be challenging for some service members. DOL’s Fiscal Year 2026–2030 Strategic Plan includes a strategy for VETS to educate service members and others on their employment rights. By reviewing existing resources and identifying and implementing options to streamline or modify them, VETS could help service members better understand their eligibility under USERRA before submitting complaints and the standards required to demonstrate that an adverse employer action constitutes a violation. VETS’s national office provides standardized training to new investigators, and regional offices provide additional training. VETS staff from two of the three selected regions GAO interviewed said they developed region-specific training because the recurring training from VETS’s national office does not meet their needs. These region-specific training activities have differed in focus and frequency. Assessing investigator training needs and addressing identified gaps would help VETS better identify and deliver training to its staff to support them in investigating USERRA complaints to better protect service members’ employment rights. Why GAO Did This Study U.S. military readiness depends on service members who are prepared to serve when called. USERRA seeks to protect the civilian careers of service members by ensuring that they are not disadvantaged in their employment because of their military obligations. Under USERRA, service members are entitled to be reemployed in the civilian jobs they left to serve in the uniformed service. However, some service members have faced challenges retaining or resuming their civilian employment. The Senator Elizabeth Dole 21st Century Veterans Healthcare and Benefits Improvement Act includes a provision for GAO to review VETS’s processing of service members’ complaints alleging their USERRA rights have been violated. This report examines, among other things, trends in USERRA complaint investigations data from fiscal year 2021 through fiscal year 2025 and challenges in the investigation process. GAO reviewed VETS documentation and USERRA complaint data, and interviewed VETS national office officials and staff from three regions selected based on factors such as workload and number of staff.

What GAO Found Agencies can use more than 100 federal data sources—or a combination of them—to verify if recipients meet the eligibility criteria for federal programs throughout the award life cycle (which includes pre-award screening, post-award monitoring, and payment validation). As of September 2025, these included 28 data sources in the Do Not Pay working system (DNP) or designated for inclusion in DNP. However, weaknesses in data interoperability may hinder agencies’ ability to efficiently determine award and payment eligibility. Data interoperability is the ability to share and disseminate standardized data in a way that is efficient, consistent, and accessible across different systems and users, for which high-quality data are essential. Without it, the risk of improper awards or payments increases, and the potential use of artificial intelligence and advanced analytics to assist agencies in making eligibility determinations is limited. GAO found that, for more than 30 years, several laws and guidance have established general requirements related to data interoperability but have not established specific requirements for enforcing interoperability, such as for recipient eligibility data, throughout the federal government. Many of the data sources GAO identified, including those in DNP, were created to comply with legal requirements or to manage specific federal programs—not to support eligibility determinations for other agencies. GAO also found a variety of obstacles and challenges that can affect the interoperability of the nine selected data sources that agencies may use for eligibility determinations (see figure). Summary Comparison of Key Elements GAO Assessed to Eligibility Data Interoperability Needs and Observations GAO also found that insufficient or improperly documented validation rules contributed to data quality issues. All nine selected data sources had data quality issues (e.g., missing, invalid, and duplicate data), and seven data sources had inconsistences between them, such as overlap in mutually exclusive data. These data quality issues undermine data reliability and interoperability for agencies seeking to make eligibility determinations. To determine the extent to which eligibility and award data could be linked to help agencies identify whether potentially ineligible entities had received federal awards, GAO partially linked two data sources—System for Award Management (SAM) entity information and SAM Exclusion records—with USAspending.gov awards based on the unique entity identifiers (UEI). Most USAspending.gov award recipient UEIs could be linked to SAM entity information. However, most SAM Exclusion records, which identify parties excluded from receiving federal benefits and awards, such as contracts, did not have a UEI because this data source does not always require them. For the SAM Exclusion records with a UEI, GAO identified 2,074 awards to recipients that were listed in the data source at the time of the transaction. However, these matches by themselves do not indicate that the awards were improper or involved fraud, waste, or abuse. Making this determination requires specific evaluation of each case. The inability to fully analyze SAM Exclusions and USAspending.gov data is an example of government-wide issues with data matching for recipient eligibility determinations. While analysis based on unique identifiers can support eligibility determinations, such identifiers might not always be required or available. Improved data interoperability—including standardized data elements and increased interoperability of data elements, such as names and addresses across data sources and agencies—could enable more comprehensive and efficient data matching. This would improve the government’s ability to identify potentially ineligible recipients. In addition, several federal agencies and cross-agency groups support best practices for data management and interoperability. However, there is no data governance agency designated to establish and enforce mandatory data interoperability requirements to support recipient eligibility determinations. This has led to fragmented and inconsistent data management efforts that rely on agencies’ voluntary adoption. Congress could help improve government-wide data interoperability for recipient eligibility data by assigning a single agency a lead role in establishing and implementing data interoperability requirements for recipient eligibility data sources. Based on its role supporting agencies in their efforts to prevent and detect improper payments and operating systems that collect, validate, and use financial, award, spending, and payment data, the Department of the Treasury could be assigned the explicit authority to establish and implement mandatory government-wide data standards and interoperability requirements for recipient eligibility data sources. Treasury could then work with the Chief Data Officer (CDO) Council and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to implement the requirements. Not having a data governance agency will contribute to unreliable reporting and inefficiencies as agencies attempt to determine recipient eligibility, and it will limit the government’s ability to leverage artificial intelligence and advanced analytics to identify and prevent improper awards and payments. Why GAO Did This Study Government agencies are responsible for ensuring that data, including those needed to determine whether entities are eligible to receive federal awards and funds, are interoperable and reliable. Having interoperable data among agencies and data sources is crucial to improving the federal government’s efforts to detect and prevent improper payments. The Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 requires executive agencies to take actions to reduce improper payments, such as using DNP to ensure that they make awards and payments only to eligible recipients. GAO was asked to review how the government can better leverage USAspending.gov and other data sources to help enhance monitoring of federal spending and potential fraud, waste, and abuse. This report describes (1) federal data sources agencies may use to verify award recipient’s eligibility, (2) the extent to which selected eligibility data sources are interoperable, and (3) the extent to which eligibility data can be matched with USAspending.gov post-award information to analyze potentially ineligible recipients. To conduct this review, GAO reviewed laws, regulations, OMB guidance, and relevant federal agencies’ websites and documentation to identify federal data sources that agencies can use to determine award recipients’ eligibility; reviewed laws, regulations, policies, and OMB guidance related to data interoperability to identify requirements; judgmentally selected nine eligibility data sources that were publicly available, in DNP or designated for inclusion in DNP, and included information about entities; reviewed agencies’ data dictionaries and documentation of validation processes about the selected eligibility data sources for consistency with interoperability practices GAO identified; tested data for fiscal years 2023 and 2024 for data quality issues, such as missing and invalid values, consistency, and comparability based on specifications established by the data owners and GAO’s professional judgment; interviewed officials at Treasury, the General Services Administration, and the Department of Health and Human Services’ Office of Inspector General because they own the selected data sources; and linked SAM data sources with USAspending.gov award information using UEI.

What GAO Found The Office of National Drug Control Policy’s (ONDCP) Drug-Free Communities (DFC) Support Program provides grants for community-based coalitions focused on drug use prevention efforts for youth 18 and under. In the 2025 evaluation report, it is claimed that the DFC program is meeting its strategic goal of reducing substance use among youth. However, that report states that it is not possible to establish a causal relationship between substance use changes in communities and the DFC program. Selected statements on the Effectiveness of the Drug-Free Communities Support Program from the June 2025 National Cross-Site Evaluation Report GAO found significant limitations in the program data—inconsistencies and unclear data sources. By law, coalitions have certain flexibility in how they collect data. Moreover, ONDCP’s cross-site evaluations have not transparently described its methodologies. Including the complete methodology would allow one to better understand and assess the results of the evaluation. Researchers have long reported on thechallenges for documenting causality for community-based programs. However, available data provides insights on coalitions’ efforts to reduce substance use among youth. ONDCP has taken some steps to effectively administer the DFC program, including working to ensure new coalitions meet program requirements and have access to mandatory training. In addition, ONDCP has established an internal controls framework to help ensure grantee compliance. However, ONDCP has not consistently enforced compliance with the statutory requirement that DFC coalitions maintain the involvement of all community sectors. Establishing and maintaining community drug prevention partnerships is a critical factor to the success of the DFC program. Further, ONDCP lacks transparency in its budget process. Enhanced budget disclosures would allow appropriators and program decision-makers to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the DFC program’s financial position. Why GAO Did This Study The U.S. faces multiple challenges related to illicit drugs and declared the opioid epidemic as a national public health emergency since 2017. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention data indicated 1,413 drug overdose deaths occurred among those age 18 and under in 2023. The DFC program focuses on preventing and reducing youth substance use. In 2020, GAO designated drug misuse a high-risk issue and added it to the 2021 High-Risk Series. The SUPPORT Act includes a provision for GAO to review ONDCP’s programs and operations, including the DFC program, every 4 years. This report examines the extent to which (1) the DFC program has met key program goals; and (2) ONDCP has effectively managed the DFC program. For this report, GAO conducted a survey and site visits selected by geography and size, and analyzed annual evaluations of the DFC program, management protocols, and budget data for fiscal years 2018 through 2025. GAO also interviewed agency officials and contractors responsible for program evaluations.

What GAO Found In May 2025, GAO identified four priority recommendations for the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Since then, FDIC has implemented one of those recommendations, bringing the total to three. GAO is highlighting the following two areas that warrant timely and focused attention: Strengthening bank supervision, and Addressing blockchain technology risks. Addressing GAO's recommendations in these areas could help FDIC mitigate threats to independence and ensure that supervisory escalation decisions are independent and evidence-based, and identify and respond to blockchain-related risks in a timely manner. Taking action to implement all of GAO's open priority recommendations would directly support FDIC's mission. Why GAO Did This Study Priority open recommendations are the GAO recommendations that warrant priority attention from heads of key departments or agencies because their implementation could save large amounts of money; improve congressional and/or executive branch decision-making on major issues; eliminate mismanagement, fraud, and abuse; or make progress toward addressing a high risk or duplication issue, among other benefits. Since 2015, GAO has sent letters to selected agencies to highlight the importance of implementing such recommendations. For more information, contact Daniel Garcia-Diaz at garciadiazd@gao.gov.

What GAO Found In May 2025, GAO identified 17 priority recommendations for the Small Business Administration (SBA). Since then, SBA has implemented three of those recommendations, bringing the total to 14. GAO is highlighting the following two areas that warrant timely and focused attention: Improving oversight of COVID-19 pandemic programs Addressing cybersecurity and IT management challenges Addressing GAO's recommendations in these areas would help SBA more strategically manage program fraud risks and respond to cybersecurity and IT management risks. Taking action to implement all of GAO's open priority recommendations would help enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of operations across SBA. Why GAO Did This Study Priority open recommendations are the GAO recommendations that warrant priority attention from heads of key departments or agencies because their implementation could save large amounts of money; improve congressional or executive branch decision-making on major issues; eliminate mismanagement, fraud, and abuse; or make progress toward addressing a high risk or duplication issue, among other benefits. Since 2015, GAO has sent letters to selected agencies to highlight the importance of implementing such recommendations. For more information, contact Daniel Garcia-Diaz at GarciadiazD@gao.gov.

What GAO Found Recent conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East prove that robotic and autonomous systems (RAS) are disrupting naval warfare and challenging traditional naval superiority. To provide more adaptable, dispersed operations, the Navy intends to shift away from its World War II-era operating model, which was based on closely knit battle groups comprised of several traditional platforms, such as planes, ships and submarines. According to Navy strategic documents, a hybrid fleet is necessary to enable this shift and would incorporate smaller, more numerous, and distributed capabilities—including RAS capabilities—as a complement to larger, more individually powerful, traditional capabilities. In this context, RAS capabilities could allow naval forces to take on greater operational risk while maintaining a tactical and strategic advantage. The Navy plans to spend billions of dollars on researching and developing enabling technologies for RAS. In March 2025, GAO found that the Navy had not taken steps to address key challenges to developing RAS capabilities quickly despite critical needs for RAS implementation. For example: Inconsistent leadership and priorities impeded RAS investments. Inconsistent senior leadership and shifting priorities impeded the Navy’s progress establishing an organizational structure for RAS and making efficient investments to achieve goals. Domain- and platform-centric approaches impeded progress of RAS. Without consistent leadership to advocate for RAS investments, the Navy’s organizational structure and processes for requirements, resourcing, and acquisition generally remained siloed by domain and focused on traditional platform approaches. Under this approach, RAS compete for resources with traditional ships, submarines, and aircraft carriers—many of which are priority major weapons acquisition programs—leaving little funding available to develop and field RAS. Navy’s Existing Domain- and Platform-centric Approach and Challenges to Developing RAS Capabilities. Iterative approaches could accelerate RAS development. Commercial companies are driving a rapid pace of RAS development that greatly outpaces development timelines of traditional Navy platforms. In 2021, Navy leadership published the Unmanned Campaign Framework to address organizational barriers and adapt its development processes to expedite development of RAS capabilities. The Framework identified a desired shift to development processes to expedite development that could help the Navy promote iterative development approaches in line with leading practices. However, as of March 2025, the Navy had yet to implement these changes. Portfolio management and formalized stakeholder roles could improve coordination. To better position itself to get RAS capabilities to the warfighter with speed, GAO found the Navy needs to optimize investments in RAS and enabling technologies by managing RAS capabilities as a portfolio. Navy officials also told us a lack of formalized RAS stakeholder responsibilities continued to create inefficiencies and confusion. Without rapid action from the Navy’s most senior leaders to address these challenges, the Navy risks not meeting the fleet’s urgent needs. Why GAO Did This Study A House Report accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 includes a provision for GAO to review the Navy’s efforts to develop technologies for autonomous surface vessels and autonomous undersea vessels. In response to this provision, GAO provided information in a classified report. This Snapshot summarizes GAO’s findings and recommendations from the March 2025 classified report and omits classified information related to the Navy’s strategic plans, RAS, and enabling technologies.

What GAO Found From fiscal year 2021 through the first half of fiscal year 2025, the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE)’s Integrity Committee (IC) received 16,245 complaints, resulting in 460 cases for review. The IC also completed 15 reports of investigations during that period. Integrity Committee’s Intake, Review, and Investigations Processes GAO found that IC intake processes did not consistently comply with documented policies. To the IC’s credit, GAO estimates that 97 percent of complainants received an immediate response acknowledging complaint receipt. However, although required by policy, GAO found the IC lacked a process for legal counsel to conduct secondary reviews of program manager decisions on potentially frivolous complaints. Without such reviews, cases with merit could go uninvestigated, thereby undermining the IC’s work. GAO also estimates that 24 percent of cases met all time frame requirements for opening and review. The remaining 76 percent did not always meet timeliness requirements for, among other things, providing legal analyses for IC member review before meetings. Additionally, the IC did not always document required information in case summaries, including recusals of members with conflicts of interest. Without adherence to time frame and documentation requirements, members risk inconsistently handling cases and not fully evaluating them due to reduced review time and incomplete information. GAO’s review of five investigations completed between October 2020 and March 2025 found that --none was completed within the 150-day time frame required by law. Instead, investigation length for the five reviewed investigations ranged from 427days to 1,246 days. Although mandated to do so, the IC did not provide updates to Congress in some instances when investigations exceeded 150 days; --the IC conducted limited oversight to ensure that assisting Offices of Inspectors General (OIG), who were responsible for performing investigations, complied with CIGIE’s Quality Standards for Investigations. This oversight was hampered by assisting OIGs not providing required monthly status updates to the IC in 37 of 90 instances; and --the IC’s final investigative reports did not always reflect the conclusions reached by the assisting OIG and lacked detailed explanations for differences. Why GAO Did This Study The Inspector General community serves a critical role across the federal government by detecting and preventing fraud, waste, and abuse in federal agencies and helping ensure integrity and effectiveness in agency programs. Given this important role, the leadership in each OIG is held to the highest standards of professional conduct. The Integrity Committee within CIGIE is responsible for investigating noncriminal allegations against senior-level OIG personnel. GAO was asked to assess the IC’s policies related to its processes. This report addresses the extent that the IC processes for (1) intake, (2) review, and (3) investigation of complaints comply with applicable policies and standards required by the IG Act of 1978, as amended. GAO reviewed the IC’s policies and procedures and interviewed IC personnel and personnel from two OIG offices. GAO also analyzed a generalizeable sample of opened cases and a judgmental, nongeneralizeable sample of completed investigations from fiscal years 2021 through the first half of fiscal year 2025.

What GAO Found In 2016, Congress strengthened the role of an existing office within the Department of Defense (DOD) to oversee and advocate for training and equipping special operations forces assigned to the Special Operations Command (SOCOM). That office, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict known as ASD(SO/LIC), is also responsible for determining whether acquisition programs are within budget. ASD(SO/LIC) cannot effectively conduct program oversight, in part, because DOD policy has not fully enabled it to perform its acquisition-related responsibilities. For example, GAO found disagreement between ASD(SO/LIC) and SOCOM officials regarding the former’s access to some programs’ information and meetings. This resulted in ASD(SO/LIC) not getting information to help perform its responsibilities. Collaboration between ASD(SO/LIC) and SOCOM to document clear protocols for the former’s access to this information could enhance its ability to monitor acquisitions and fulfill its statutory role. Example of a Special Operations Forces Acquisition: AC-130J SOCOM reported mixed success meeting cost and schedule goals for its costliest acquisition programs. GAO found that, while one of nine selected programs reported cost growth, most reported delays, which can, over time, result in increased costs. SOCOM’s acquisition policy requires programs to report, in an online portal, current information—including cost estimates—relative to program goals. GAO found that officials for eight selected programs that must maintain such information did not do so, in part, because the command’s acquisition policy did not specify how frequently they needed to. Having ready access to current cost estimates in the portal could help support officials’ efforts to identify potential cost growth risks or opportunities to reallocate resources. Most SOCOM programs GAO reviewed that experienced delays reported using fewer leading practices for iterative product development than programs not experiencing delays. Opportunities exist for programs to more consistently adopt these practices. By updating acquisition policy to reflect and encourage adoption of the practices, SOCOM could further improve its programs’ ability to achieve the speed and innovation needed to meet the needs of special operations forces. Why GAO Did This Study SOCOM is a relatively small organization within DOD, accounting for under 2 percent of the defense budget. SOCOM is responsible for preparing and equipping special operations forces. A congressional committee report includes a provision for GAO to review ASD(SO/LIC)’s oversight of SOCOM acquisitions. This report examines (1) how ASD(SO/LIC) performs its acquisition oversight responsibilities and related challenges it faces, (2) the extent to which the costliest SOCOM weapons acquisition programs met cost and schedule goals, among other things, and (3) the extent to which these programs have taken steps to facilitate speed and innovation in product development. GAO reviewed ASD(SO/LIC) responsibilities in statute and policy; analyzed documentation for nine, of over 80, of SOCOM’s costliest weapons acquisition programs, including cost and schedule data; assessed program efforts to adopt leading product development practices; and interviewed relevant officials.

What GAO Found The Department of Veterans Affairs’ (VA) Veterans Health Administration (VHA) offers menopause care—treatments to manage symptoms of menopause—at its medical facilities through a wide array of treatment options, including medications and medical services. Primary care and gynecology providers are the key clinicians for veterans seeking to address menopause symptoms and can refer to other specialists such as mental health and physical therapy as needed. Common Menopause Symptoms To assist those providing menopause care, VHA is developing a clinical practice guideline. It is intended to provide evidence-based recommendations for providers on how to assess, diagnose, and treat menopause. However, the guideline was not complete at the time of GAO’s review. As part of the guideline development process, VHA plans to identify related performance measures. However, officials from the Office of Women’s Health, the sponsoring office for the guideline, could not confirm whether or how they plan to monitor the performance measures. Officials said it is difficult to make plans for monitoring before the recommendations and measures have been identified. Using performance measures to monitor implementation of the guideline’s recommendations could help VHA better achieve the objective of providing equitable, high-quality, and comprehensive health care services at all VHA facilities. VHA has developed patient education about menopause care, which include brochures and a website to help educate women veterans on menopause care. However, this information may not be reaching many women veterans. More than half (60 percent) of the 348 women veterans who responded to GAO’s questionnaire reported that they had not encountered any VHA menopause resources. VHA facility officials reported challenges finding time to discuss menopause education and print brochures. VHA does not have a strategy to ensure that menopause education is regularly communicated to veterans. This information would help women become more knowledgeable about the changes occurring in their bodies and would help them be more empowered to approach their providers about their symptoms. Furthermore, this could help VHA better meet its goal of providing women veterans with comprehensive health care. Why GAO Did This Study Almost half of women veterans served by VHA are aged 45-64, the age range most likely to experience menopause, or the permanent cessation of menstruation. According to VHA research, veterans may experience worse menopause symptoms compared to non-veterans due to aspects of their service. GAO was asked to review VA’s provision of menopause care. This report examines how VHA offers menopause care and educates veterans about menopause, among other topics. GAO analyzed VHA data on menopause care from fiscal years 2019 through 2024. GAO interviewed VHA officials with roles related to menopause care and officials from six VHA medical facilities, selected to represent variation in geographic area, among other criteria. GAO also administered an online questionnaire and conducted discussion groups with women veterans about their experiences with VHA menopause care. Their responses are not generalizable to all women veterans but provide perspectives about VHA’s menopause education efforts and care offerings.

What GAO Found Veterans Health Administration (VHA) medical facility officials are responsible for reviewing the clinical care delivered by their providers when concerns arise. GAO identified 104 providers with clinical care concerns (such as practicing in a manner that is unsafe or inconsistent with industry standards of care) at five selected VHA medical facilities between January 2020 and July 2024. GAO found these facilities did not consistently adhere to VHA policy when conducting quality reviews, or reporting providers to state licensing boards or the National Practitioner Data Bank. All five facilities also had missing or incomplete review documentation. As of March 2026, VHA has developed some mandatory training for facility staff related to credentialing providers, but not any on quality review and reporting processes. By failing to follow VHA policy, facilities increase the risk that these processes are conducted incorrectly and that these providers may continue to provide unsafe care to veterans. State Licensing Board Reporting Process for VHA Providers, as of July 2024 Related to reporting, GAO also found these five facilities did not initiate processes to determine whether seven providers should have been reported to state licensing boards or the National Practitioner Data Bank. Completing the review process for these providers will provide VHA assurance that any identified quality concerns will be properly assessed and that the providers who should be reported are reported. Timely reporting helps reduce the risk that other VHA facilities or community hospitals and clinics hire providers with unreported clinical care issues, thereby potentially putting patients at risk. In addition, GAO found that VHA oversight of review and reporting processes at medical facilities was limited in ensuring adherence to VHA policy requirements. Specifically, VHA’s oversight methods—which include a tracking tool and an annual facility self-assessment and audit—are not designed to assess adherence with all timeliness and documentation requirements. These limitations prevent VHA from comprehensively and consistently overseeing processes for monitoring provider clinical performance and ensuring safe, quality health care for veterans. Why GAO Did This Study VHA is responsible for ensuring providers deliver safe care to veterans at its more than 170 medical facilities. However, VHA has faced challenges ensuring providers with clinical care concerns undergo timely and documented reviews, and are reported to external entities when appropriate. GAO was asked to examine VHA processes for reviewing concerns about providers’ clinical care. This report assesses (1) selected VHA medical facilities’ adherence to VHA policies for reviewing and reporting providers with clinical care concerns; and (2) VHA’s oversight of quality review and reporting processes for providers with clinical care concerns. GAO reviewed VHA policy documents and interviewed VHA officials. GAO also selected a non-generalizable sample of five VHA medical facilities (based on factors such as facility complexity) and identified providers with clinical care concerns from January 2020 through July 2024. This time frame included the most recent facility meeting minutes and allowed for reviews and reporting to be completed. For each provider, GAO reviewed available documentation and interviewed local and regional VHA officials.

What GAO Found The National Guard Bureau (NGB) collects and tracks Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) data from all three National Guard components—NGB, Army National Guard, and Air National Guard. NGB reports FOIA data to the Department of Defense (DOD). NGB officials stated they provide Army National Guard and Air National Guard FOIA data to the Army and the Air Force, respectively. The National Guard tracks data on FOIA requests received, processed, and backlogged through various systems (see figure). Freedom of Information Act Tracking Systems GAO found discrepancies in the accuracy of reported data that officials responsible for reporting National Guard FOIA data were unable to explain. Specifically, GAO found that the numbers of FOIA requests received, processed, and backlogged by the Army National Guard differed between Army National Guard and NGB data for fiscal years 2016 through 2024, in part because there is no single, standardized process across the National Guard components for verifying the accuracy of FOIA data. Moreover, FOIA managers that improperly log FOIA requests and the absence of tools to verify data entries have affected the accuracy of reported data. Without a standardized process to verify the accuracy of National Guard FOIA data, such as the number of FOIA requests received and processed or the extent of backlogs, NGB may continue to inaccurately report FOIA data and hinder transparency for Congress and the public. National Guard FOIA officials identified challenges with insufficient staffing and inconsistent communication that have affected the timely processing of FOIA requests. However, NGB has not fully addressed these challenges. For example, NGB has not analyzed its headquarters workforce needs to know how many full-time equivalent staff are currently needed to process FOIA requests in a timely manner and address backlogs. NGB has not developed a plan to improve communication between NGB and officials responsible for processing FOIA requests in the field through a shared online environment. Addressing data discrepancies and identified challenges can help DOD and the NGB report data more accurately and process FOIA requests more efficiently. Why GAO Did This Study FOIA enables the public to request access to government records and information from any federal executive branch agency. Each year, hundreds of thousands of FOIA requests are filed. For example, NGB continues to face challenges processing such requests within the 20-day time frame that FOIA requires. House Report 118-529 includes a provision for GAO to review the National Guard’s FOIA program. This report evaluates the extent to which (1) NGB and DOD have taken steps to ensure the accuracy of reported FOIA data, including request backlogs; and (2) NGB has identified and addressed challenges associated with the processing of FOIA requests. GAO reviewed NGB and DOD policies on FOIA processing. It also analyzed National Guard FOIA data for fiscal years 2016 through 2024 and distributed a survey to Army and Air National Guard FOIA officials asking about policies and factors that affect timely processing of requests, among other issues. GAO also interviewed NGB and military service officials.

What GAO Found Given the trauma survivors of human trafficking have experienced, they may need behavioral health services, including mental health care services, such as therapy, or substance use disorder treatment. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) fund grant programs that help provide access to such services. In fiscal year 2025, HHS awarded approximately $7.5 million for two key trafficking survivor services programs and DOJ awarded approximately $45 million for two key programs. The programs assisted approximately 2,600 survivors and 11,300 survivors in that year, respectively, helping them access services. GAO’s review of HHS’s two key grant programs found that the agency followed leading practices in assessing how programs perform. HHS did this by, for instance, setting long-term and measurable near-term goals with targets and time frames that communicated what the agency expected the programs to achieve. For example, to assess its long-term goal to provide services for survivors, HHS set a near-term goal for a grantee to deliver services to 50 survivors in a given fiscal year. DOJ also followed leading practices for its minor survivor assistance program, but did not do so for its adult program. Specifically, DOJ did not set measurable near-term goals for what it expects its adult program to achieve. By setting such near-term goals with targets and time frames, DOJ would be better positioned to assess the effectiveness of its adult program and the progress it makes toward supporting the needs of adult human trafficking survivors. GAO’s analysis of literature and interviews with selected HHS and DOJ grantees and selected stakeholders identified factors that can affect human trafficking survivors’ access to behavioral health services. Such factors included shortages of providers specializing in treating survivors of human trafficking. These are longstanding and complex issues, some of which are beyond federal control. HHS and DOJ officials said they are aware of the factors and have taken actions—such as increasing human trafficking training for behavioral health providers—to help improve survivors’ access to services. Factors That Can Affect Access to Behavioral Health Services for Survivors of Human Trafficking Why GAO Did This Study Human trafficking is a crime that involves compelling or coercing a person to provide labor or engage in commercial sex acts. In 2024, the National Human Trafficking Hotline identified nearly 12,000 human trafficking cases in the United States. The Trafficking Victims Prevention and Protection Reauthorization Act of 2022 includes a provision for GAO to study the accessibility of behavioral health services for survivors of human trafficking in the United States. This report (1) describes the key HHS and DOJ programs that fund behavioral health services for trafficking survivors, (2) evaluates how HHS and DOJ assessed the performance of key programs, and (3) describes factors that can affect survivors’ access to services and federal efforts to improve access. GAO reviewed HHS and DOJ documentation and interviewed agency officials. GAO selected four key programs whose grantees reported providing the largest amount of behavioral health services in recent years and interviewed 15 grantees selected to obtain variation in the amount of services provided and location. GAO analyzed fiscal year 2025 grantee performance data for the four programs, the most recent available. GAO evaluated HHS and DOJ steps for assessing the performance of the programs. GAO also conducted a literature search and interviewed six selected stakeholders, including representatives from survivor organizations and a researcher.

What GAO Found The Governmentwide Treasury Account Symbol Adjusted Trial Balance System (GTAS) is the central platform federal agencies use to submit standardized data for government-wide financial reporting. GTAS collects budgetary and proprietary data; validates them; and interfaces with other federal systems to support transparency, accountability, and fiscal oversight. Federal laws, including the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990, the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996, and the Digital Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014 (DATA Act), require agencies to report standardized financial data. These laws assign implementation responsibilities to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Department of the Treasury, which issue guidance on budget formulation, technical instructions on GTAS reporting procedures, U.S. Standard General Ledger crosswalks, and attribute requirements. Together, this guidance governs how agencies complete various accounting, validation, and reporting procedures. Through a combination of manual and automated interfaces, GTAS exchanges data with fiduciary authoritative source agencies and major government-wide accounting systems, including the following: Central Accounting Reporting System (CARS) DATA Act Broker Government Invoicing (G-Invoicing) OMB Max Simplified Overview of Selected Data Inflows to and Outflows from GTAS Why GAO Did This Study GTAS plays a central role in the financial management and transparency of the U.S. federal government. It supports a wide array of government financial operations, helping to ensure the accurate reporting of intragovernmental transactions, cash flow, and other financial activities. Federal entities use GTAS as a key system to report financial and budgetary execution information to Treasury. Treasury, in coordination with OMB, uses this information to prepare the annual financial report of the U.S. government. The financial report provides the President, Congress, and the public with a comprehensive view of the federal government’s finances—its revenue, debt, and expenditures. The Government Management Reform Act of 1994 includes a provision for GAO to annually audit the consolidated financial statements of the U.S. government. Because of the importance of GTAS in preparing these financial statements and ensuring the accuracy and completeness of the data, GAO conducted this review to provide a system overview. This report describes the (1) laws and guidance relevant to government-wide financial reporting requirements and the use of GTAS for that purpose, (2) major government-wide accounting systems that interface with GTAS, and (3) data flow and validation processes of GTAS. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed applicable laws, Treasury and OMB guidance, and GTAS system documentation. GAO also discussed GTAS data transmission and validation processes with Treasury officials. Treasury stated the agency did not have any comments on the report. For more information, contact Paula M. Rascona at RasconaP@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The federal government is on an unsustainable fiscal path that poses serious economic, national security, and societal challenges if not addressed. Nearly every year this century, the government has spent more than it collected in revenue. To finance these deficits, the government has had to borrow by issuing debt. If current spending and revenue policies continue, the nation’s fiscal outlook is projected to deteriorate further, as debt accumulates at a faster rate than the economy grows. GAO projects that under current revenue and spending policies, debt held by the public will reach its historical high of 106 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) by 2029 and grow to 251 percent of GDP in 2056. Debt Held by the Public Projected to Grow Faster than the Economy Projected deficits are driven by projected growth in program spending—largely from Social Security, Medicare, and other federal health care programs—and in interest costs. Under current policy, spending on net interest will be the fastest growing portion of the federal budget and represent an increasingly large share of total spending. The magnitude of policy changes needed to create a sustainable fiscal future for the federal government requires a coordinated strategy that includes fiscal rules to encourage fiscal discipline (and as an alternative to the debt limit); builds consensus about how to reduce annual deficits; addresses financing gaps in the Social Security and Medicare trust funds before they are depleted in 2032 and 2033, respectively; and considers other opportunities to improve fiscal responsibility. Congress and the administration will need to make difficult budgetary and policy decisions to address the key drivers of debt and improve the government’s fiscal outlook. The longer actions are delayed, the more dramatic they will need to be. Why GAO Did This Study GAO produces this annual fiscal health report to examine the current fiscal condition of the federal government and its future fiscal outlook, absent policy changes in revenue and program spending. The report is based on the results of GAO's fiscal simulation using information available as of February 2026. This report presents GAO’s projections—under current policy—of (1) federal debt; (2) primary deficits (the gap between program spending and revenue); (3) interest costs and (4) revenue and spending changes needed for a sustainable fiscal outlook.

What GAO Found Since 2021, F-35 sustainment costs have continued to increase, but the F-35 has not met performance goals and performance has trended down. Across the fleet from fiscal year 2021 through fiscal year 2025: The mission capable rate (percentage of time the aircraft can perform one of its tasked missions) declined from 67 percent to 44 percent. The full mission capable rate (percentage of time the aircraft can perform all of its missions) declined from 38 percent to 25 percent. In response, the F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) updated its sustainment strategy, which it refers to as the Global Support Solution (GSS) Reset. The GSS Reset requires an estimated $13.7 billion more than previously planned through fiscal year 2031 and seeks to address challenges GAO previously identified, including a lack of spare parts and heavy reliance on contractors. GAO found that multiple risks threaten JPO’s ability to achieve GSS Reset goals. For example, JPO will be reliant on the private sector to deliver more than $7 billion in additional parts and other material. But capacity constraints persist for key parts. Estimated costs for the F-35 also continue to increase. As a result, the U.S. military services will annually face a more than $1 billion gap between the projected costs to sustain their F-35s and their affordability goals by the mid-2030s. GSS Reset is a positive step toward addressing sustainment challenges, but risk mitigation plans would better position JPO to attain GSS Reset goals. Further, JPO’s use of contract incentives did not achieve F-35 readiness goals, due in part to JPO paying incentive fees for performance that did not align with service requirements (see figure). Until JPO ensures the future use of incentives better achieves desired performance, it risks rewarding contractor performance that does not help meet program goals. Minimum Full Mission Capable Rate (FMC) Requirements for Contractors to Receive a Portion of Incentive Fees Compared with Service Requirements, 2020–2023 Why GAO Did This Study The F-35 aircraft is the Department of Defense’s (DOD) most costly weapon system, with lifetime sustainment costs for the United States alone estimated at $1.6 trillion, as of 2024. DOD operates and sustains over 800 U.S. F-35s and plans to buy about 1,700 more aircraft by the mid-2040s. DOD uses the F-35 to perform a wide range of missions. It is vital to the success of U.S. combat operations and homeland defense, according to DOD. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, as amended, includes a provision for GAO to conduct an annual review of F-35 sustainment efforts. This report assesses the extent to which JPO has evaluated the performance of its sustainment strategy and managed sustainment responsibilities with contractors to achieve goals, among other objectives. GAO analyzed performance metrics, cost information, and sustainment contract incentive fee data for, among other things, full mission capable-related goals from 2020 through 2023, the last contract in which that metric was incentivized. GAO also reviewed relevant program documentation and interviewed DOD officials and contractor representatives.

What GAO Found The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) uses dozens of systems to schedule appointments, manage referrals, and monitor wait times for veterans. The department is also in the process of replacing its primary health information system—the Veterans Health Information Systems and Technology Architecture (VistA)—by deploying a new electronic health record system with Oracle Health. However, the rollout of the new system has been delayed due to technical and performance issues. Some of those scheduling systems and tools are commonly used across the department by many VistA facilities. Schedulers at the handful of facilities that have the new Oracle Health system also have an additional set of scheduling systems and tools available. For example: VistA facilities. Almost allVA medical facilities use the VistA health information system, which is over 30 years old. These facilities use multiple VistA applications, in addition to other systems, for scheduling health care appointments and managing referrals for specialty care. Both schedulers and veterans must navigate a complex environment when using VA’s systems to schedule appointments. VA facility staff are required to open multiple applications to schedule a single appointment. They must also run reports in different systems to identify veteran self-scheduled and self-canceled appointments and appointment requests. Oracle Health facilities. Due to difficulties in rollout, very few facilities have begun to use the new Oracle Health system. These facilities have another set of scheduling systems, as well as some of the same systems VistA facilities use for scheduling appointments and managing referrals. In addition, veterans have experienced issues requesting an appointment online, getting confirmation once an appointment is scheduled, and receiving duplicative appointment reminders. This complex systems environment presents challenges for VA and for veterans scheduling appointments. VA officials acknowledge that some challenges are the result of operating multiple platforms (VistA and Oracle Health) as well as having multiple versions of VistA. VA is taking steps to address these challenges. VA initiated efforts to modernize its scheduling systems, which included several concurrent efforts to improve scheduling-related systems across VA’s medical facilities. For example, one of these efforts is intended to allow provider-based scheduling, which is the ability for VA schedulers to see a provider’s schedule across multiple modalities (in-person, telephone, telehealth) in a single scheduling application. According to VA officials, the department is also working to standardize veteran appointment self-scheduling at VistA and Oracle Health sites. GAO has reported for many years on VA’s challenges concerning its scheduling systems and their impact on delivering care to veterans. Although VA has generally agreed with GAO’s recommendations, it has not yet fully implemented them. Doing so would aid VA’s progress toward providing timely, quality care to veterans. Why GAO Did This Study The VA schedules tens of millions of health care appointments for veterans each year. To do so, it uses a patchwork of systems that have been developed in ways that make scheduling—with both Veterans Health Administration (VHA) and non-VHA providers—difficult for veterans and staff. In addition, VA has experienced information technology (IT) challenges related to the outdated, inefficient nature of systems and its efforts to modernize its health information system. VA health care was added to GAO’s High Risk List in 2015, where it remains today. GAO was asked to testify on its key prior work on VA scheduling and the systems involved, as well as the related challenges for VA providers, staff, and veterans, and how VA plans to address those challenges. GAO summarized the results of five prior reports.

What GAO Found In May 2025, GAO identified 14 priority recommendations for the Department of the Interior. Since then, Interior has implemented one of those recommendations. In May 2026, GAO identified an additional 2 priority recommendations and removed the priority status from one recommendation, bringing the total to 14. GAO is highlighting the following two areas that warrant timely and focused attention: Improving oversight of oil and gas activities, and Conducting strategic workforce planning and oversight. Addressing GAO's recommendations in these areas would enhance Interior's ability to oversee oil and gas development—which provides billions of dollars of revenue—and help Interior develop strategies to close skill gaps and better understand the resources it needs to improve its overall capacity and fulfill its trust responsibility. Taking action to implement all of GAO's open priority recommendations would help enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of operations across Interior. Why GAO Did This Study Priority open recommendations are the GAO recommendations that warrant priority attention from heads of key departments or agencies because their implementation could save large amounts of money; improve congressional and/or executive branch decision-making on major issues; eliminate mismanagement, fraud, and abuse; or make progress toward addressing a high risk or duplication issue, among other benefits. Since 2015, GAO has sent letters to selected agencies to highlight the importance of implementing such recommendations. For more information, please contact Allison Bawden at BawdenA@gao.gov.

What GAO Found In May 2025, GAO identified 35 priority recommendations for the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Since then, HHS has implemented four of those recommendations. In May 2026, GAO identified an additional seven priority recommendations, bringing the total to 38. GAO is highlighting the following two areas that warrant timely and focused attention: Strengthen Medicare and Medicaid program integrity and oversight; and Improve public health program oversight and coordination. Taking action to implement GAO's open recommendations in these areas would help increase the efficiency and effectiveness of key federal health care programs and funding. It would also help officials understand how prepared jurisdictions are to respond to public health emergencies. Addressing all of GAO's open priority recommendations could significantly improve HHS's operations. Why GAO Did This Study Priority open recommendations are the GAO recommendations that warrant priority attention from heads of key departments or agencies because their implementation could save large amounts of money; improve congressional and/or executive branch decision-making on major issues; eliminate mismanagement, fraud, and abuse; or make progress toward addressing a high risk or duplication issue, among other benefits. Since 2015, GAO has sent letters to selected agencies to highlight the importance of implementing such recommendations. For more information, please contact Jessica Farb at farbj@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The Air Force’s metrics for aircraft availability and mission capability do not provide a complete picture of the KC-135 and KC-46A tanker fleet’s ability to meet its primary refueling mission. The tanker fleet did not meet the Air Force’s availability and capability standards from fiscal year 2019 through fiscal year 2025, but these metrics do not specifically account for the aircraft’s ability to meet the primary refueling mission. The Air Force also calculates a “fully mission capable” (FMC) rate to measure the fleet’s ability to meet all its missions, which decreased substantially during that 7-year period. According to Air Force officials, while FMC is a clear indicator of an aircraft’s ability to meet its primary refueling mission, it excludes non-FMC aircraft that may be able to meet the refueling mission but not other missions. Without metrics and standards focused on the aerial refueling mission specifically, the Air Force risks not having a clear understanding of the fleet’s ability to meet key operational requirements. Air Force officials identified sustainment risks for the KC-135 and KC-46A fleets, but the Air Force has not comprehensively assessed these risks or developed a plan to mitigate them. The sustainment risks included shortages of critical parts and skilled maintainers and infrastructure limitations. The Air Force has taken some actions to address these risks, including identifying alternative sources for parts and upgrading infrastructure. However, conducting a comprehensive assessment of risks associated with sustaining the fleet and developing a mitigation plan to address these risks based on their likelihood or impact would help the Air Force target scarce resources to areas of greatest risk and enhance the health of the aerial refueling tanker fleet. Aerial Refueling Tanker Sustainment Risks Why GAO Did This Study The Air Force’s aerial refueling tanker fleet—capable of transferring fuel from airborne tankers to aircraft while in flight—is the largest in the world and plays a critical role in air mobility operations. House Report 118-529, accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025, included a provision for GAO to assess the Air Force’s refueling capabilities and sustainment of the aerial refueling fleet. Among other objectives, this GAO report addresses the extent to which the fleet meets the Air Force’s current and future needs, and the extent to which the Air Force has assessed risks and developed mitigation plans associated with sustaining the KC-135 and KC-46A aerial refueling aircraft. GAO reviewed Air Force data on the composition and performance of the aerial refueling fleet, reviewed agency documentation, contacted 16 units across 11 bases, and interviewed relevant Department of Defense and Air Force officials. This is a public version of a sensitive report GAO issued in May 2026. This version omits information DOD deemed to be Controlled Unclassified Information.