What GAO Found In May 2025, GAO identified 79 priority recommendations for the Department of Defense. Since then, the Department has implemented 17 of those recommendations. In June 2026, GAO identified an additional seven priority recommendations and removed the priority designation from 16 recommendations, bringing the total to 53 priority recommendations. GAO is highlighting the following three areas that warrant timely and focused attention:  Sustaining U.S. military readiness,  Ensuring weapon system acquisition and modernization, and  Improving financial and fraud risk management. Addressing GAO's recommendations in these areas would support combat readiness by maintaining the Department's current weapon capabilities; address challenges with its high-risk weapon systems acquisition; and contribute to the Department's goal of an unmodified financial audit. Taking action to implement all of GAO's open priority recommendations would help enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of operations across the Department. Why GAO Did This Study Priority open recommendations are the GAO recommendations that warrant priority attention from heads of key departments or agencies because their implementation could save large amounts of money; improve congressional and/or executive branch decision-making on major issues; eliminate mismanagement, fraud, and abuse; or make progress toward addressing a high risk or duplication issue, among other benefits. Since 2015, GAO has sent letters to selected agencies to highlight the importance of implementing such recommendations. For more information, contact Cathleen A. Berrick at berrickc@gao.gov

What GAO Found The increasing number and complexity of disasters demonstrates the need to ensure that the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) workforce can meet its core mission to help people before, during, and after disasters. In response to 2025 presidential directives, many federal agencies have taken steps to reduce the size of their workforces. In fiscal year 2025, FEMA employed about 25,134 employees, on average. However, over 4,300 employees separated from FEMA in fiscal year 2025—a 55 percent increase in separations from fiscal year 2024 (see figure). These separations have resulted in a loss of institutional knowledge and experienced personnel, according to FEMA officials, and have exacerbated longstanding workforce challenges. In 2025, FEMA rescinded its strategic plan. As a result, the agency has no overall strategic direction on which to base workforce planning—a systematic and continuous process for identifying the size and composition of a workforce needed to achieve an agency’s mission. Without a strategic plan that outlines clear goals and objectives, FEMA cannot effectively determine its future workforce needs, potentially putting its mission at risk. In addition, GAO found that FEMA did not base its 2025 and 2026 workforce reduction decisions, proposed future workforce actions, or workforce policy changes on the results of a workforce analysis—an assessment of the current state of the workforce and a forecast of future organizational requirements. FEMA took these actions without assessing whether it had the necessary staffing capacity to meet its mission, including its statutory requirements. Without workforce planning, FEMA is not positioned to determine whether it has the right number of people with the right skills in the right positions at the right time to meet its mission. Further, for more than a decade, GAO has identified challenges FEMA has encountered in maintaining a sufficient workforce to effectively meet its mission. Although FEMA has made progress towards addressing some of these challenges, actions by Congress would provide additional accountability to ensure that FEMA maintains a workforce capable of meeting its mission while addressing long-standing workforce management challenges. Percentage of Headquarters and Regional FEMA Staff Separations Due to Voluntary Workforce Reduction Programs, Jan. 20, 2025–Jan. 10, 2026 Why GAO Did This Study FEMA has long-standing workforce management challenges that make supporting disaster response and recovery difficult. As such, GAO added strengthening FEMA’s disaster workforce and capacity to its High Risk List in February 2025. GAO was asked to review FEMA’s ability to provide effective staffing for disaster response and recovery and how FEMA is addressing any workforce challenges. This report examines (1) how FEMA’s workforce changed in 2025 and 2026; (2) the extent to which FEMA has strategic direction to identify workforce needs; and (3) the extent to which FEMA has assessed the ability of its workforce to meet its mission needs. GAO evaluated FEMA’s workforce planning efforts against key practices for workforce planning and analyzed data on FEMA’s workforce size and composition. GAO also reviewed documentation related to (1) workforce changes and decisions in 2025 and 2026 and (2) FEMA’s strategic direction. Lastly, GAO interviewed FEMA officials in headquarters and all 10 regions.

What GAO Found The Department of Justice (DOJ) routinely forms task forces to investigate national security issues and criminal activity, including various forms of trafficking, terrorist threats, and violent gang activity. Through these task forces, DOJ law enforcement agencies partner with thousands of nonfederal officers from state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement agencies. Number and Types of Active Department of Justice Task Forces, as of April 2026 All four of the DOJ components GAO reviewed—the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF); Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the U.S. Marshals Service—use training to communicate task force officer roles and responsibilities. This training includes the DOJ components’ legal authorities and policies, including how to conduct federal investigations or exercise federal law enforcement authorities. However, ATF, DEA, and FBI allow nonfederal officers to engage in task force operations (e.g., serve warrants) before they have completed their initial task force officer training. Requiring nonfederal task force officers to complete training on relevant legal authorities and policies before engaging in task force operations would ensure components achieve the intent of their training and reduce the risk that officers will participate in task force operations without fully understanding the federal authorities they were deputized to exercise. ATF, DEA, FBI, and the U.S. Marshals Service policies require federal supervision of nonfederal task force officers, such as reviewing investigative reports and monitoring performance. These policies also require employees to report allegations of misconduct by nonfederal task force officers to their management. However, GAO found the four DOJ components do not have guidelines and criteria for field managers (such as the special agent in charge of a field office) to apply in adjudicating such allegations. By establishing guidelines field managers can use to adjudicate misconduct allegations, such as the conditions under which nonfederal officers should be removed from a task force, DOJ components can ensure they are applying the same criteria across their task forces. In the absence of such guidelines, there is increased risk of inconsistent adjudications, which could jeopardize the integrity of task force operations and erode public trust in task force effectiveness. Why GAO Did This Study DOJ deputizes nonfederal officers to serve on federal task forces to obtain valuable insights into regional or local criminal activity and assist the investigative work of DOJ’s federal law enforcement officers. GAO was asked to review DOJ task force policies for nonfederal officers. This report addresses, among other things, the extent to which DOJ components have policies and procedures to (1) communicate task force roles and responsibilities and (2) supervise nonfederal task force officers. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed component-level policies, task force agreements, and laws; and interviewed officials from the four components DOJ identified as leading task forces. To identify policies and procedures implemented at the field- and task force-levels, GAO reviewed documents and interviewed members of a nongeneralizable sample of eight task forces, based on task force type and location.

What GAO Found Ten of the 13 B-52 modernizations are experiencing cost, schedule, or performance challenges. The Air Force’s most expensive B-52 modernization effort, the Commercial Engine Replacement Program (CERP) will likely continue to face significant challenges as the Air Force plans to begin production with little to no developmental flight testing. While the Air Force analyzed and accepted increased risks from this approach in 2023, since then CERP costs increased by about $3 billion and initial operational capability was delayed more than 15 months. Department of Defense (DOD) policy states cost estimates should consider risk and include an analysis that identifies and evaluates alternative courses of action that may reduce cost and risk. Reassessing these risks would better inform decision-makers as they consider when to begin production. B-52 Transporting an X-15 Rocket Research Aircraft in 1959 In addition, as the Air Force develops its 13 modernizations, it is not consistently using digital engineering tools that provide decision-makers real-time data to assess overall performance allowing them to make timely and well-informed decisions. DOD issued guidance in 2023 stating programs in development should incorporate digital tools, such as digital twins, when it’s practical, beneficial, and affordable. The Air Force has not assessed the potential use of digital engineering on all B-52 modernizations. As a result, the Air Force may be missing opportunities to take advantage of efficiencies that digital engineering can provide, including avoiding future sustainment and supportability challenges. The Air Force conducts planned maintenance on B-52s at a repair depot about every 4 years and has developed analyses to ensure it has sufficient capacity to perform planned modernization. However, the current maintenance plans assume that the Air Force will complete CERP and install new engines on time and do not account for risks from further schedule delays. B-52 maintenance is already struggling with finding sufficient parts for the current engines. Without planning for the possibility of engine delays from CERP, the Air Force risks falling behind on planned B-52 maintenance, which could impact readiness. Why GAO Did This Study The B-52 bomber is an aircraft capable of performing conventional and nuclear missions. The B-52 was originally introduced in 1955 with a projected lifespan of 20 years. The Air Force has since extended the aircraft’s lifespan through 2050. To maintain the B-52’s strategic edge, the Air Force is projected to spend an estimated $21 billion for modernizations including new engines, radar, and communications. A Senate report included a provision for GAO to assess B-52 modernization. This report addresses, among other things, the extent to which (1) B-52 modernizations are meeting their cost, schedule, and performance goals, and (2) the Air Force has developed plans to ensure sufficient depot capacity for the modernizations. This is a public version of a sensitive report issued in July 2026. DOD deemed some schedule and mission capable information sensitive, and GAO omitted it from this report. To conduct this review, GAO evaluated Air Force acquisition and sustainment documentation. GAO conducted site visits to the B-52 program office, depot, and logistics center. GAO also analyzed data and interviewed officials on depot performance, spare part and support equipment needs, and B-52 availability.

What GAO Found The Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 (IRA) provided about $41.5 billion in supplemental appropriations to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for grants and other investments to reduce air pollution and enhance national climate resilience. EPA primarily used the appropriations to create new grant programs and has awarded hundreds of grants. In 2025, EPA terminated grants funded by $30 billion of IRA appropriations and several grant recipients were challenging the terminations in court as of June 2026. Of the roughly $11.5 billion in appropriations unaffected by the terminations and related litigation, Public Law 119-21, commonly known as the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA), rescinded the budget authority for about $1.2 billion that EPA had not yet obligated. As of March 2026, EPA was overseeing about $10.2 billion in appropriations it obligated before OBBBA was enacted and which are not affected by ongoing litigation. EPA has expended about $686 million of these obligated funds. Status of About $11.5 Billion in Appropriations Provided to EPA in the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 (IRA), as of March 2026 Note: Percentages exceed 100 percent because expenditures are a subset of obligations. The unobligated balance reflects the amount EPA has not yet obligated from the appropriations unaffected by OBBBA’s rescissions. EPA’s obligations are mostly for competitive grants, and state governments received the largest number of grants. Of the about $10.2 billion in total obligations, EPA obligated about $8.6 billion from fiscal years 2023 to 2026 for efforts to reduce air pollution across the country, including replacing certain heavy-duty vehicles with emissions-free equivalents such as battery-electric or hydrogen fuel cell vehicles, deploying emissions-free equipment at U.S. ports, and improving energy efficiency in commercial and public buildings. EPA used the agency’s standard policies and procedures when it reviewed and selected recipients for competitive grants. Specifically, GAO found that EPA followed its competition policy by providing notice to potential applicants of its program goals, eligibility requirements, and evaluation criteria. EPA reviewers ranked the merit of eligible applicants using points-based scoring systems and made recommendations to agency selection officials, who made the final selection decisions. GAO found that EPA is using its standard processes for overseeing recipients’ use of funds. EPA requires that grant recipients submit periodic performance reports. According to the agency, it plans to conduct an additional level of oversight for all its IRA grants through an in-depth assessment at least once during their performance periods. EPA officials stated they are assessing the agency’s resource needs in light of staff reductions that have occurred since January 2025 and are using contractor support to fill in gaps where necessary. Why GAO Did This Study The appropriations provided by the IRA constitute a significant increase in funds available to EPA, which typically have been about $9 billion per year. GAO was asked to review EPA’s use of IRA appropriations, including any related changes to the agency’s staffing. Additionally, the IRA includes a provision for GAO to support oversight of the distribution and use of IRA appropriations. This report provides information about EPA’s use and oversight of the $10.2 billion the agency obligated and the processes EPA used to make funding decisions. GAO reviewed EPA obligations and expenditures data through March 2026. GAO also reviewed legal requirements, relevant EPA documents, and recipients’ single audit reports. GAO interviewed selected grant recipients based on factors such as geographic variation, as well as EPA officials. For more information, contact J. Alfredo Gómez at gomezj@gao.gov.

What GAO Found Various federal land and water management agencies and Tribes have entered into shared decision-making agreements. Under these agreements, Tribes provide substantive input on federal natural and cultural resource management decisions over many years. The relevant federal agencies are the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, the Interior, and their subcomponents. The subcomponents include the U.S. Forest Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and National Park Service. GAO identified five lessons learned from the implementation of shared decision-making agreements between federal agencies and Tribes. Five Lessons Federal Agency and Tribal Officials Learned from Implementing Shared Decision-Making Agreements These lessons are important for various reasons. For example, with respect to developing mutual understanding and trust, tribal officials party to an agreement said agency staff met with them in person, had open minds, and treated them with respect. This encouraged candid conversations and helped participants better understand one another’s perspectives. In developing and implementing shared decision-making agreements, there are key questions related to each lesson learned that would be useful for federal agencies and Tribes to consider. For example, Does the agreement or supporting documents clearly identify how the parties will implement the agreement? Have parties taken concerted efforts to understand each other’s approaches to natural and cultural resource management, and recognize constraints on their participation, such as legal limitations? Have parties identified existing policies and procedures that can create challenges to working together, such as contrasting definitions or differing timelines? Have parties identified the appropriate knowledge and skills federal staff need to implement the agreement? Have parties determined what resources are available? Why GAO Did This Study Federal agencies manage public lands and waters, including national forests and parks, that are tribal ancestral territories and have special importance to Tribes. Agencies collaborate with Tribes to help achieve their missions and fulfill the unique federal trust and treaty responsibilities. GAO was asked to examine issues related to agencies developing and implementing shared decision-making agreements with Tribes. In a January 2026 report, GAO reported on factors that affected development of shared decision-making agreements. This report identifies lessons that federal agencies and Tribes learned during the implementation of shared decision-making agreements for managing public lands and waters. It also includes related key questions. GAO reviewed information collected in interviews with the parties to shared decision-making agreements discussed in the previous report (GAO-26-106626). GAO analyzed statements related to implementing agreements, and identified lessons learned, their importance, and related key questions. For more information, contact Anna Maria Ortiz at OrtizA@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is responsible for planning, designing, and constructing much of the nation’s federally funded flood risk management infrastructure. The Corps usually does not request funds for disaster response during the annual budget cycle but instead receives supplemental appropriations for such activities after a disaster has occurred. In fiscal year (FY) 2004 through FY 2025, Congress appropriated more than $60 billion to the Corps for disaster response through 19 post-disaster supplemental appropriations acts and $450 million through annual appropriations acts. Post-Disaster Supplemental Appropriations to the Corps for Disaster Response, FYs 2004–2025 If necessary to address disasters, the Corps can transfer funds from certain other appropriations accounts to the Flood Control and Coastal Emergencies account, which funds the Corps’s disaster work. The Corps has transferred about $910 million into this account since FY 2004. Officials said they reimburse funds transferred once they receive an appropriation. The Corps spent more than $34 billion on disasters from FY 2006 through FY 2025. Because the Corps has historically received “no-year” appropriations that are available for obligation indefinitely, the Corps does not have to immediately expend funds. Disaster spending during this period included activities related to preparedness (such as supplies and equipment, planning, and training), emergency response, and project repair. After a disaster, the Corps gathers information by assessing damage to projects. The Corps may use this information to support flood risk management and emergency response. This includes activities such as improving flood risk management models and informing early warnings systems and evacuation protocols. The Corps has also used this information to make decisions about modifications to damaged projects to provide greater protection and improve resilience, such as increasing the height of a levee. The Corps’s Emergency Response to Natural Disasters program has exercised its authority under P.L. 84-99 to modify several projects. Why GAO Did This Study Many of the nation’s dams and levees were built over 50 years ago and, like other aging infrastructure, may be more vulnerable to failure, especially given the rise in the number of disasters and increasing challenges related to delivery of federal disaster assistance. The Thomas R. Carper Water Resources Development Act of 2024 includes a provision for GAO to analyze Corps disaster preparedness and response activities. This report provides information on how Corps disaster response and praeparedness activities have been funded since FY 2004 and how the Corps uses information about the effects of natural disasters when making decisions on flood risk management projects. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed budget requests, appropriations acts, and Corps expenditure data and reviewed Corps documents, including agency guidance and webpages. GAO is reporting expenditure data from post-disaster supplemental appropriations beginning in FY 2006 rather than FY 2004 because that is when the Corps began using specific codes in its financial system of record to link expenditures to post-disaster supplemental appropriations acts. GAO also examined publicly available information on levees and dams and interviewed Corps officials. For more information, contact Rachel Frisk at FriskR@gao.gov.

The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) maintain the Financial Audit Manual (FAM). For more information, please visit the main FAM page, or contact Dawn B. Simpson at SimpsonDB@gao.gov.

What GAO Found Emerging infectious diseases are infections that are new (e.g., COVID-19) or have existed but are reappearing in an area (e.g., measles), according to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). As the federal lead for public health, HHS partners with thousands of entities at all levels of government to conduct surveillance for emerging infectious diseases; doing so through continuous data collection, analysis, and sharing of health data needed to plan for and respond to such threats. Experts on a roundtable GAO convened suggested a range of actions that the federal government could take to improve U.S. emerging infectious disease surveillance. GAO categorized experts’ suggestions across four areas related to collaboration, data, methods, and communication (see table). Four Areas with Examples of Federal Actions Experts Suggested to Improve Emerging Infectious Disease Surveillance Collaboration Data Quality and Infrastructure Surveillance Methods Communication Increase coordination by creating a multisectoral, multidisciplinary leadership group Strengthen data quality by identifying, developing, and using standards for surveillance data Optimize surveillance by evaluating cost-effectiveness of surveillance systems and methods Improve awareness and perception of public health and surveillance by developing a communication strategy Source: GAO analysis of statements made by a roundtable of 18 experts. | GAO-26-107610 A key theme in experts’ suggested actions for improvement was to unify efforts between animal and human health sectors, in recognition that emerging diseases often affect both. For example, experts suggested that a multisectoral, multidisciplinary leadership group should be created to direct surveillance planning and activities across federal agencies, including those responsible for both human and animal health. Such a group could address a lack of centralized authority to direct cross-agency surveillance activities leading to inconsistent collaboration that hinders the effectiveness of U.S. surveillance for emerging infectious diseases. Officials from HHS and other federal departments, such as the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), which has responsibility for animal health, highlighted existing efforts that they thought were related to expert-suggested actions. For example, HHS officials cited the U.S. One Health Coordination Unit as an existing effort related to the expert-suggested action to create a multisectoral, multidisciplinary leadership group to improve federal collaboration. The actions suggested by experts offer HHS and stakeholders a chance to assess tradeoffs and feasibility in expanding current efforts or exploring new approaches for infectious disease surveillance, while considering past recommendations by GAO and others. These actions also provide HHS an opportunity to determine if any of the suggestions assist the department in its leadership and coordination of public health emergencies, an area GAO placed on its High-Risk List in January 2022. Why GAO Did This Study Emerging infectious disease outbreaks have increased in incidence and impact, posing an ever-present threat to national health, security, and economic interests. Some emerging infectious diseases can become highly transmissible and capable of wide, uncontrollable spread in human populations potentially leading to pandemics. With factors such as increased global interconnectedness, animal-to-human disease transmissibility risk, and disease virulence contributing to this threat, there is heightened concern that an emerging infectious disease may develop into a widespread outbreak with significant consequences. The CARES Act includes a provision for GAO to monitor and report on the federal pandemic response. This report describes (1) how HHS has conducted surveillance of emerging infectious disease threats and (2) actions experts suggested for the federal government to improve surveillance of emerging infectious diseases. GAO convened a roundtable of 18 experts in April and May 2025 to discuss actions to improve public health surveillance for emerging infectious disease threats. GAO contracted with the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine to help identify experts representing a range of perspectives including former federal officials and animal and human health professions. Their comments reflected solely their views. GAO also reviewed documents and interviewed officials from HHS, USDA, and public health associations, among others. For more information, contact Mary Deningan-Macauley at deninganmacauleym@gao.gov.

What GAO Found In August 2025, GAO identified 14 priority recommendations for the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). Since then, OPM has implemented three of those recommendations. In July 2026, GAO removed the priority status from three recommendations, bringing the total to eight. GAO is highlighting the following three areas that warrant timely and focused attention: Preventing improper payments, Strengthening IT management, and Managing the federal workforce. Addressing GAO’s recommendations in these areas could help prevent up to an estimated $1 billion per year in improper payments for those ineligible to receive federal health insurance benefits, reduce costs on duplicative or unnecessary software licenses, and improve agencies’ ability to attract top talent to the federal government. Taking action to implement all of GAO’s open priority recommendations could help enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of operations across OPM. Why GAO Did This Study Priority open recommendations are the GAO recommendations that warrant priority attention from heads of key departments or agencies because their implementation could save large amounts of money; improve congressional and/or executive branch decision-making on major issues; eliminate mismanagement, fraud, and abuse; or make progress toward addressing a high risk or duplication issue, among other benefits. Since 2015, GAO has sent letters to selected agencies to highlight the importance of implementing such recommendations. For more information, contact Cardell Johnson at JohnsonCD1@gao.gov.

What GAO Found In May 2025, GAO identified eight priority recommendations for the Department of Commerce (Commerce). Since then, Commerce has implemented one of those recommendations. In July 2026, GAO added one priority recommendation, bringing the total to eight. GAO is highlighting the following two areas that warrant timely and focused attention: Improving planning for the decennial census, and Protecting personally identifiable information. Addressing GAO's recommendations in these areas could improve census cost and accuracy, particularly for hard-to-enumerate populations, and help Commerce protect personally identifiable information from unauthorized access, tampering, or loss. Taking action to implement all of GAO's open priority recommendations would help enhance mission delivery, risk management, and the efficiency and effectiveness of operations across Commerce. Why GAO Did This Study Priority open recommendations are the GAO recommendations that warrant priority attention from heads of key departments or agencies because their implementation could save large amounts of money; improve congressional and/or executive branch decision-making on major issues; eliminate mismanagement, fraud, and abuse; or make progress toward addressing a high risk or duplication issue, among other benefits. Since 2015, GAO has sent letters to selected agencies to highlight the importance of implementing such recommendations. For more information, contact Cardell Johnson at JohnsonCD1@gao.gov

What GAO Found As of March 31, 2025, the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Office of Environmental Management (EM) awarded 57 task orders across nine contracts since implementing the End State Contract Model (ESCM) in fiscal year 2020. The ESCM uses task orders for contractors to achieve a stated outcome, or “end state,” to move sites toward completion, manage cost and schedule performance, and reduce DOE’s environmental liability. About half (29) included defined end states and the remainder were for support work or cleanup work that did not yet have a defined end state. EM has not consistently achieved intended results for selected task orders GAO reviewed. Of the nine selected task orders completed as of March 31, 2025, three did not define end states and six defined them but were inconsistent in achieving them. For example, three task orders with defined end states reduced or carried over scopes of work post-award, resulting in contractors completing less work to achieve modified end states. The extent to which EM reduced costs for these task orders is unclear because of inconsistent documentation. Further, EM headquarters did not provide adequate oversight to ensure task orders achieved end states. Without this oversight, EM cannot assess how well it is meeting program goals. EM did not fully use contract incentives to manage costs. As a result, post-award changes to task order requirements led to over $500 million in cost growth. Selected Task Orders with Greatest Cost Growth, as of March 31, 2025 Dollars in thousands   Cleanup site Task order (TO)  Total cost growth  Total cost growth, percent Idaho National Laboratory   TO 3 Integration and Mission Continuity (Phase 1) $42,054 6.29% TO 3.2 Integration and Mission Continuity Hybrid Task Order (Phase 2) $75,553 11.74% Nevada National Security Site TO 2 Environmental Operations $75,793 149.61% Oak Ridge Reservation       TO 3 End States Phase-In $216,661 45.17% TO 6-1 Y-12 Operations and Cleanup End States $23,871 6.05% TO 8-1 Environmental Management Disposal Facility Early Site Prep $1,559 6.48% TO 9-2 Outfall 200 Mercury Treatment Facility Construction and Commissioning End State $25,811 138.89% Source: GAO analysis of Federal Procurement Data System and Strategic Integrated Procurement Enterprise System data and Office of Environmental Management information. | GAO-26-107745 Note: Dollar amounts are rounded to the nearest thousand. For the purposes of this review of task orders, GAO analyzed cost growth based on increases in contract value.  EM’s task orders have different incentives for cost performance, some of which can reduce risk of cost growth. Of the task orders reviewed, those types that put more risk on the contractor generally had the lowest cost growth. EM more frequently used contract types that put more risk on EM, and these experienced the greatest cost growth. Until EM takes steps to address task orders’ cost performance, EM may miss opportunities to better manage cost growth. Why GAO Did This Study EM is responsible for cleaning up 15 sites across the U.S. that are contaminated from decades of nuclear weapons production and energy research. To conduct this work, EM has awarded ESCM contracts since fiscal year 2020. GAO previously found that EM experienced challenges implementing end state task orders and that stakeholders had concerns about fair pricing for cleanup work because of lack of competition among contractors. Since 1990, GAO has designated DOE contract management as a high-risk area. A congressional committee report includes a provision for GAO to evaluate EM’s implementation of the ESCM. This report examines (1) the status of ESCM task orders issued since fiscal year 2020 and the role of contractors in defining end states, (2) the extent to which selected ESCM task orders have achieved intended results, and (3) the extent to which EM is using selected ESCM task orders to manage contract cost performance. GAO reviewed data for all ESCM task orders awarded as of March 31, 2025, evaluated contract documents for 19 selected task orders, and interviewed EM officials. GAO also conducted site visits to the Hanford and Savannah River cleanup sites.

What GAO Found Many countries are undertaking efforts to manage, treat, and dispose of nuclear waste. Several have taken actions that accelerated cleanup, reduced risks, and resulted in cost savings—lessons that could inform the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Environmental Management (EM) efforts. For example: The United Kingdom (UK) saved a total of at least £2 billion (equivalent to $2.6 billion as of March 2026) by implementing a risk-informed approach to managing its nuclear waste. This approach helped minimize how much waste would need disposal in a repository for waste low in radioactivity. Canada has prioritized accelerating cleanup activities at key nuclear waste sites. As a result, it expects to complete cleanup activities at one of these key sites nearly 30 years ahead of schedule. France and the UK have used test facilities that replicate operating facilities to address technical issues and train employees. These efforts have saved each country significant money and minimized disruptions to cleanup efforts. Decommissioned Nuclear Boilers Diverted for Recycling Instead of Disposal in the United Kingdom’s National Low Level Waste Repository EM engages with other countries about nuclear cleanup, but this engagement is limited and not done strategically to identify alternative approaches that could reduce costs and risks at EM’s 15 cleanup sites in the United States. For example, EM participates in international working groups but does not disseminate lessons learned from other countries to EM’s decision-makers. GAO and other organizations have long reported on challenges facing the EM cleanup mission, including that EM does not have a fully risk-informed approach to cleanup. EM site officials told GAO they want more opportunities to engage with other countries, but EM headquarters officials stated that they typically teach other countries, rather than learn from them. Until EM more strategically engages with other countries to identify and evaluate alternative nuclear cleanup approaches, EM will continue to miss opportunities to employ new approaches that its decision-makers could use to reduce risks and costs across the EM complex. Why GAO Did This Study Many countries have nuclear waste resulting from activities such as weapons production, nuclear power generation, and medical uses. Efforts to address this waste can be costly, take decades, and present common challenges. EM is responsible for cleaning up 15 sites across the United States contaminated by nuclear weapons production and energy research. EM has estimated that its cleanup mission could cost between $641 billion and $840 billion and take until 2100. Senate Report 118-188 includes a provision for GAO to report on EM’s efforts to leverage other countries’ lessons learned for managing nuclear waste. This report examines (1) selected countries’ nuclear waste management approaches from which EM could learn, and (2) the extent to which EM has considered other countries' approaches for nuclear waste cleanup. GAO reviewed documents for six selected countries: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, and the UK. GAO interviewed officials from five of these countries and visited selected sites in France and the UK. GAO analyzed documents and interviewed officials from EM headquarters and received written responses from all 15 EM sites about their international engagements.