What GAO Found U.S. Border Patrol and Air and Marine Operations (AMO), within U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), are responsible for securing U.S. borders between ports of entry in the land, air, and maritime environments. CBP uses aircraft, vessels, and surveillance technology—such as cameras, radar sites, and sensors—in its efforts to secure the northern border (see figure). CBP also participates in task forces with other agencies such as U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement to support its efforts. From fiscal year 2019 through fiscal 2024, Border Patrol apprehensions along the northern border increased, with sharp increases in 2023 and 2024. Apprehensions subsequently decreased in fiscal year 2025 and have generally remained consistent at these reduced levels as of April 2026, according to CBP’s publicly reported data. Examples of U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Surveillance Technology Along the Northern Border GAO previously reported that CBP has faced longstanding challenges addressing staffing gaps. In 2026, GAO found that the number of Border Patrol agents on the northern border decreased from fiscal year 2019 through fiscal year 2024. Although the number of authorized agents increased, the number of agents assigned to and working in these sectors decreased by about 6 percent. There was also a decrease in the staffing rate for Law Enforcement Information Systems Specialists who monitor surveillance technology. GAO recommended that CBP develop and implement a plan to address this staffing gap, which could help the agency better carry out its responsibilities. In 2019, GAO found that CBP did not have measures to assess its effectiveness at securing the northern border between ports of entry. Border Patrol had performance measures that assessed security in remote areas, but the measures did not include data from maritime border areas. Two AMO measures included data across all border areas and were not specific to the northern border. GAO recommended that Border Patrol and AMO each develop and implement such measures to better assess operations on the northern border. Why GAO Did This Study CBP, within the Department of Homeland Security, has primary responsibility for securing the nearly 4,000-mile border between the U.S. and Canada. Key security threats along the northern border include terrorism, contraband smuggling—specifically, the bidirectional flow of illicit drugs—and violations of U.S. immigration law such as migrant smuggling. CBP received billions of dollars in the 2025 law commonly known as the One Big Beautiful Bill Act and the 2026 Secure America Act to hire and train additional personnel. According to CBP, the One Beautiful Bill Act funding alone will support hiring an additional 5,000 CBP officers, 3,000 Border Patrol agents, and 200 AMO agents. This statement is based primarily on GAO’s June 2019 and February 2026 reports. It discusses CBP’s (1) resources across the northern border, (2) staffing in the region and related challenges, and (3) performance measures for assessing its effectiveness at securing the northern border.

What GAO Found The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Coast Guard leadership have made a case that the service needs transformation. Since 2019 GAO has reviewed four Coast Guard reform efforts and identified steps the service took to incorporate leading practices as well as gaps in key areas. For example, in prior reviews of Coast Guard sexual misconduct and modernization of mission planning and reserve component reform efforts, GAO found that the Coast Guard did not fully assess its workforce needs. Additionally, for two of the reform efforts, the Coast Guard did not fully establish goals and outcomes, making it difficult to determine if the reforms had the intended effects. According to GAO’s review of Force Design 2028 foundational documents, the Coast Guard has taken some steps to implement leading practices in its current reform effort but gaps remain. For example, the service has assigned leaders to its reform efforts and focused on addressing long standing challenges, including workforce and technology and contracting and acquisitions. However, GAO’s review also found that certain goals are not well-defined. For example, the execution plan states that the service will delegate decision-authority to maximize mission impact. However, the document does not describe how the Coast Guard will measure this effort or know when it achieves its reform goals. Further, how proposed reforms align with Coast Guard missions is unclear, and there is no performance plan or other mechanism to assess the results. Coast Guard Force Design 2028 Foundational Documents and Initial Update The Coast Guard has received significant funding to carry out its modernization reform efforts. Therefore, incorporating leading practices throughout the duration of the Coast Guard’s reform efforts is important. Specifically, updating its foundational modernization documents and developing an evaluation plan and mechanisms for assessing the effectiveness of its actions would better ensure that Coast Guard management, Congress, and the public has the information needed to evaluate whether its actions—which are using billions of taxpayer dollars—are helping to mitigate identified challenges pertaining to the service’s organization, people, technology, and contracting and acquisitions. Why GAO Did This Study The U.S. Coast Guard—a multi-mission military service—is facing a readiness crisis, according to DHS and Coast Guard leadership. In May 2025, DHS announced an effort called Force Design 2028 to modernize operations and capabilities. The effort aims to transform the Coast Guard into a more capable and agile force to meet future challenges across four areas—organization, people, technology, and contracting and acquisition. For fiscal year 2026, Congress appropriated about $13.5 billion to the service. Congress also included nearly $25 billion in Coast Guard funding for fiscal year 2025 in the law commonly known as the One Big Beautiful Bill Act—the largest single commitment of funding in Coast Guard history. The service has stated that this funding supports the intent of Force Design 2028. This statement focuses on (1) key themes from GAO work evaluating prior Coast Guard reform efforts, and (2) our assessment of the Coast Guard’s recent modernization reform efforts. This statement is based on reports GAO has issued since 2018 on prior Coast Guard reform efforts and some of its mission and management activities. GAO also analyzed Coast Guard Force Design 2028 documentation and compared them to selected leading practices for agency reform.

What GAO Found Most lobbyists demonstrated compliance with the requirements of the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, as amended (LDA). For example, for the third and fourth quarters of 2024 and the first and second quarters of 2025, GAO estimates that 94 percent of lobbyists who filed quarterly lobbying disclosure (LD-2) reports had documentation confirming income and expenses related to lobbying, 84 percent of lobbyists who reported lobbying the Senate had documentation confirming related lobbying activities, and 93 percent of semiannual contribution (LD-203) reports included all reportable political contributions. These findings are generally consistent with GAO’s findings since 2016. By law, lobbyists are also required to report certain criminal convictions, such as those involving bribery or fraud, among others. None of the 247 individuals listed as lobbyists on the quarterly disclosure reports GAO reviewed appeared to have relevant convictions to disclose, based on analyzing criminal background records. Therefore, GAO did not identify any related reporting violations. The figure below describes the typical filing and enforcement processes. Typical Lobbying Disclosure Process GAO found that most lobbyists reported some level of ease in complying with quarterly reporting requirements and understanding terms, such as lobbying activities, associated with these requirements. Based on referrals from the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia (USAO) contacts lobbyists who have not filed their lobbying disclosure and contribution reports. For filing years 2016 through 2025, the office received 12,391 referrals for lobbyists who failed to file these reports. As of December 2025, about 46 percent of these referrals were closed as in compliance after lobbyists filed required reports. To improve compliance, the office takes various enforcement actions, such as emailing or calling lobbyists. GAO found that the number of enforcement actions taken based on referrals, as well as the percentage of referrals brought into compliance, have generally increased in recent years after earlier declines. Why GAO Did This Study The LDA requires lobbyists to file LD-2 reports and LD-203 reports, among other requirements. The law includes a provision for GAO to annually audit the extent of lobbyists’ compliance with the act. This report is GAO’s 19th annual review under the provision and (1) determines the extent to which lobbyists demonstrated compliance with federal lobbying reporting requirements, (2) identifies lobbyists’ perspectives on challenges or potential improvements to compliance with quarterly reporting requirements, and (3) describes the resources and authorities available to the USAO and efforts the office has made to improve enforcement. GAO reviewed a stratified random sample of 101 LD-2s filed for the third and fourth quarters of calendar year 2024 and the first and second quarters of calendar year 2025. GAO also reviewed a random sample of 160 contribution reports from year-end 2024 and midyear 2025. This methodology allowed GAO to generalize to the population of 71,497 quarterly disclosure reports with $5,000 or more in lobbying activity and 35,735 contribution reports, respectively. In addition, GAO interviewed 95 lobbyists from the sample of quarterly disclosure reports to obtain their views on any compliance challenges or potential improvements to aid compliance. GAO also reviewed referrals data from the USAO and interviewed officials. GAO provided a draft of this report to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for review. DOJ did not provide comments. For more information, contact Lisa Van Arsdale at VanarsdaleL@gao.gov.

What GAO Found In May 2025, GAO identified 17 priority recommendations for the Department of Justice (DOJ). Since then, DOJ has implemented three of those recommendations. In June 2026, GAO identified an additional four priority recommendations, bringing the total to 18. GAO is highlighting the following two areas that warrant timely and focused attention: Managing the federal prison system, and Protecting national security. Addressing GAO's recommendations in these areas would help ensure the successful reintegration of incarcerated people into the community and save millions of dollars in taxpayer funds; and enhance Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of Homeland Security efforts to share information about domestic terrorism threats; Taking action to implement all of GAO's open priority recommendations would help enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of operations across DOJ. Why GAO Did This Study Priority open recommendations are the GAO recommendations that warrant priority attention from heads of key departments or agencies because their implementation could save large amounts of money; improve congressional or executive branch decision-making on major issues; eliminate mismanagement, fraud, and abuse; or make progress toward addressing a high risk or duplication issue, among other benefits. Since 2015, GAO has sent letters to selected agencies to highlight the importance of implementing such recommendations. For more information, contact Jason L. Bair at BairJ@gao.gov.

What GAO Found In June 2025, GAO identified 21 priority recommendations for the Department of Transportation (DOT). Since then, DOT has implemented three of those recommendations. In June 2026, GAO identified an additional six priority recommendations and removed the priority status from two recommendations, bringing the total to 22. GAO is highlighting the following three areas that warrant timely and focused attention: Addressing workforce gaps, Improving grants management, and Integrating emerging technologies. Addressing GAO's recommendations in these areas would enhance DOT's efforts to: assess and address its mission-critical staffing and skills gaps; strengthen implementation of its grant programs, which provide billions of dollars yearly to improve the nation's infrastructure; and develop comprehensive plans to ensure the safe integration of emerging technologies—such as drones and automated vehicles—into the nation's transportation systems. Taking action to implement all of GAO's open priority recommendations would help enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of operations across DOT. Why GAO Did This Study Priority open recommendations are the GAO recommendations that warrant priority attention from heads of key departments or agencies because their implementation could save large amounts of money; improve congressional and/or executive branch decision-making on major issues; eliminate mismanagement, fraud, and abuse; or make progress toward addressing a high risk or duplication issue, among other benefits. Since 2015, GAO has sent letters to selected agencies to highlight the importance of implementing such recommendations. For more information, contact Heather Krause at KrauseH@gao.gov.

What GAO Found In August 2025, GAO identified 32 priority recommendations for the Department of the Treasury. Since then, Treasury has implemented four of those recommendations, bringing the total to 28, as of June 2026. GAO is highlighting the following three areas that warrant timely and focused attention: Reducing fraud and improper payments, Ensuring cybersecurity and information privacy, and Improving federal financial management. Addressing GAO's recommendations in these areas would enhance Treasury's efforts to effectively recover overpayments of COVID-19 Emergency Rental Assistance funds made by grantees; improve the ability of Treasury and the financial services sector to address cyber-related risks; and help ensure that Congress and the administration have ready access to complete and reliable financial information. Taking action to implement all of GAO's open priority recommendations could lead to significant improvements in Treasury's operations. Why GAO Did This Study Priority open recommendations are the GAO recommendations that warrant priority attention from heads of key departments or agencies because their implementation could save large amounts of money; improve congressional and/or executive branch decision-making on major issues; eliminate mismanagement, fraud, and abuse; or make progress toward addressing a high risk or duplication issue, among other benefits. Since 2015, GAO has sent letters to selected agencies to highlight the importance of implementing such recommendations. For more information, contact Cardell Johnson at JohnsonCD1@gao.gov.

What GAO Found In May 2025, GAO identified three priority recommendations for the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). Since then, OCC has not implemented any of these recommendations. GAO is highlighting the following three areas that warrant timely and focused attention: Analyzing regulations, Financial technology lending, and Addressing blockchain technology risks. Addressing GAO's recommendations in these areas could help OCC assess whether its rules have had their intended effects and inform future rulemaking, provide lenders greater certainty about their compliance with fair lending and other consumer protection laws, and identify and respond to blockchain-related risks in a timely manner. Taking action to implement all of GAO's open priority recommendations would directly support OCC's mission. Why GAO Did This Study Priority open recommendations are the GAO recommendations that warrant priority attention from heads of key departments or agencies because their implementation could save large amounts of money; improve congressional and/or executive branch decision-making on major issues; eliminate mismanagement, fraud, and abuse; or make progress toward addressing a high risk or duplication issue, among other benefits. Since 2015, GAO has sent letters to selected agencies to highlight the importance of implementing such recommendations. For more information, contact Dan Garcia-Diaz at garciadiazd@gao.gov.

What GAO Found In May 2025, GAO identified three priority recommendations for the Social Security Administration (SSA). Since then, SSA has not implemented any of those recommendations. In June 2026, GAO identified one additional priority recommendation, bringing the total number to four. GAO is highlighting the following three areas that warrant timely and focused attention: Preventing potential overpayments, Making service delivery more efficient, and Managing information technology (IT) investments cost-effectively. Addressing GAO's recommendations in these areas would better position SSA to strengthen internal controls to prevent potential overpayments of Disability Insurance benefits, improve access for individuals applying online for Social Security benefits, and make sound strategic IT investment decisions and identify opportunities for efficiency and cost savings. Taking action to implement all of GAO's open priority recommendations would help enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of SSA's operations. Why GAO Did This Study Priority open recommendations are the GAO recommendations that warrant priority attention from heads of key departments or agencies because their implementation could save large amounts of money; improve congressional and/or executive branch decision-making on major issues; eliminate mismanagement, fraud, and abuse; or make progress toward addressing a high risk or duplication issue, among other benefits. Since 2015, GAO has sent letters to selected agencies to highlight the importance of implementing such recommendations. For more information, contact Cindy Brown Barnes at brownbarnesc@gao.gov.

What GAO Found In response to the Secretary of Defense’s direction in a May 2025 memorandum, the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) made several organizational and staffing changes. These included creation of a Technical Director position and a space and strategic warfare area; elimination of Senior Executive Service-level Deputy Director positions; and significant reductions in civilian positions, including Action Officers responsible for assessing individual weapon system programs. Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation Staffing Levels Before and After May 2025 Memorandum Note: DOT&E staff figures above include administrative staff in addition to warfare area staff. The figure does not include totals for military staff. The organizational and staffing changes reduced DOT&E’s capacity to oversee operational and live fire test and evaluation for the 173 DOD weapon system programs on its oversight list in 2025. According to DOT&E Action Officers, the significant workforce reductions resulted in them being assigned more programs, programs in warfare areas for which they lack subject matter expertise, or both. They also said the workforce reductions and resulting loss of subject matter expertise increase the risk of weapon systems being delivered to the warfighters with undocumented operational shortfalls. Other actions further affected DOT&E’s oversight activities. For example, the work stoppage on a support contract disrupted access to test and evaluation data for about 2 months, and reductions to secure workspaces created challenges for Action Officers’ oversight activities involving classified information. The staff reductions since May 2025 constrain the depth and breadth of oversight that DOT&E can provide for DOD’s weapon systems. This includes oversight of major defense acquisition programs and others, such as middle tier of acquisition programs—a growing area within DOD. DOT&E Action Officers expressed concern to GAO that the military departments could potentially use the middle tier of acquisition pathway to avoid certain operational and live fire testing requirements. As of June 2026, DOT&E is conducting an analysis of its workforce and workload in response to congressional inquiry. Why GAO Did This Study For more than four decades, DOT&E has provided oversight and guidance for operational testing of DOD’s weapon systems. The Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum on May 27, 2025, directing DOT&E to immediately eliminate non-statutory or redundant functions within the organization and reduce its workforce. Senate Report 119-39 to accompany the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 includes a provision for GAO to review recent reorganization activities within DOT&E. GAO briefed the congressional defense committees on its preliminary findings in May 2026. This report examines (1) changes to DOT&E's organizational structure in response to the May 2025 memorandum; (2) the extent to which the reorganization actions affect DOT&E's ability to provide oversight of major defense acquisition programs to meet statutory requirements; and (3) the extent to which the reorganization actions affect DOT&E's ability to provide oversight for additional programs on its oversight list, such as middle tier of acquisition or classified programs. For more information, contact Shelby S. Oakley at oakleys@gao.gov.

What GAO Found In July 2025, GAO identified 11 priority recommendations for the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA). Since then, NTIA has implemented one of those recommendations, bringing the total to 10 as of June 2026. GAO is highlighting the following three areas that warrant timely and focused attention: Managing radio-frequency spectrum, Managing IT and cybersecurity risks to spectrum infrastructure, and Managing federal broadband programs. Addressing GAO's recommendations in these areas would enhance NTIA's efforts to collaborate with other federal agencies; better ensure the success of its IT modernization efforts; and improve the financial sustainability of the agency's grant programs. Taking action to implement all of GAO's open priority recommendations would help NTIA enhance the effectiveness and security of its programs. Why GAO Did This Study Priority open recommendations are the GAO recommendations that warrant priority attention from heads of key departments or agencies because their implementation could save large amounts of money; improve congressional and/or executive branch decision-making on major issues; eliminate mismanagement, fraud, and abuse; or make progress toward addressing a high risk or duplication issue, among other benefits. Since 2015, GAO has sent letters to selected agencies to highlight the importance of implementing such recommendations. For more information, contact Andrew Von Ah at vonaha@gao.gov.

The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) maintain the Financial Audit Manual (FAM). For more information, please visit the main FAM page, or contact Dawn B. Simpson at SimpsonDB@gao.gov.

The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) maintain the Financial Audit Manual (FAM). For more information, please visit the main FAM page, or contact Dawn B. Simpson at SimpsonDB@gao.gov.

The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) worked jointly on this revision of the Federal Information System Controls Audit Manual (FISCAM), marking a major milestone in partnership and a shared commitment to strengthening and clarifying audit guidance. For more information, please visit the main FISCAM page, or contact Dawn B. Simpson at simpsondb@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) reported approximately $1 billion in cumulative estimated improper payments—including overpayments, underpayments, and unknown payments—across the Beneficiary Travel (BT) Program from fiscal years 2018 through 2024. During that period, 10 cases of fraud related to the BT Program were adjudicated. The cases involved at least 892 fraudulent claims and totaled at least $219,000. Most of the cases involved beneficiaries that fraudulently reported addresses. VA has implemented data systems partly to mitigate fraud and improper payment risks in the BT Program. Examples include automatically verifying certain claim information before claims can be processed and flagging claims for further review if information is missing or does not appear to meet eligibility requirements. GAO tested specific areas of risk for improper payments or fraud and found VA potentially made improper payments from fiscal years 2018 through 2023 totaling over $10 million in these areas. Specifically, GAO found instances in which VA potentially improperly paid beneficiaries who provided ineligible departure addresses, such as post office boxes rather than residential addresses; VA potentially made duplicate payments to special mode transportation (SMT) vendors for the same invoice; and VA staff manually modified BT claims, resulting in potentially improper payments to beneficiaries and SMT vendors, such as instances in which SMT vendors were paid amounts that exceeded the claimed amount. Ineligible Departure Addresses May Result in Improper Payments Since GAO’s analysis, VA has made changes to prevent potential duplicate and improper payments. For example, VA began transitioning to a new system for processing certain SMT invoices and implemented new controls to prevent overpayments. However, VA has not ensured that existing controls have been implemented effectively, such as ensuring that staff use acceptable documentation to verify residential addresses to reduce the risk of improper payments. VA also has not monitored and evaluated its new controls to ensure they are operating effectively to reduce the risk of improper payments. Why GAO Did This Study VA reported spending over $2.3 billion in fiscal year 2025 to reimburse eligible veterans and others for certain necessary transportation costs associated with veteran health care through the BT Program. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023, includes a provision for GAO to examine potential fraud and improper payments in this program. Among other things, this report examines VA’s reported improper payments and adjudicated fraud in the BT Program and indicators of potential improper payments or fraud in the BT Program identified from selected data sources and VA’s controls to mitigate related risks. GAO reviewed relevant VA documents and adjudicated fraud cases and interviewed knowledgeable officials. To identify instances of potential improper payments, GAO analyzed information from VA’s data systems used to process BT claims from fiscal years 2018 through 2023, the most recent full fiscal year for which data were available at the time of GAO’s analysis. Further, GAO compared VA’s efforts against leading practices from GAO’s Fraud Risk Framework, BT Program requirements, and VA’s financial policies.

What GAO Found Safety and sanitation conditions have been long-standing concerns at fishing access sites that the federal government developed, beginning in the 1950s, for four Tribes with treaty fishing rights in the Columbia River Basin. In 2011, the federal government completed its development of 31 sites, 29 of which are administered by the Department of the Interior. As of February 2026, Interior’s Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) Northwest Regional Office had spent $17.3 million since 2020 to assess site conditions and design and construct sanitation and safety improvement projects. A 2022 site assessment identified several urgent sanitation and safety issues across the sites, including dilapidated restrooms, outdated fish-cleaning stations, and the accumulation of abandoned property. Some sanitation projects have been completed while others are in the design phase. The improvement projects include water line replacement, well drilling, and restroom construction. According to Interior officials, safety infrastructure has not been improved due to funding constraints, but there are plans to add security features such as lights and cameras over the next few years. Fish-Cleaning Stations at Columbia River Fishing Access Sites in June 2025 BIA uses a facility management system to track reoccurring operations and maintenance (O&M) needs and to allocate both annual O&M and project-based funding for its fishing access sites. However, regional BIA officials said the system may not include all BIA-administered sites due to incomplete data, making those sites ineligible for funding. Including the remaining sites in the system could help BIA better inform funding decisions. Additionally, Interior’s O&M funding formula does not account for grounds and structures unique to fishing access sites, such as fish-cleaning stations and wastewater treatment systems. Updating BIA’s O&M funding formula, in consultation with Tribes, could help ensure that all property at the sites is factored into funding decisions for each site. Finally, BIA faces challenges completing improvements at the sites due to unclear policies and implementation guidance that cause inefficient communication, unclear roles, and unleveraged resources, such as overly narrow pools of staff who may conduct needed inspections. Updating policies and developing implementation guidance could facilitate actions to help improve conditions at fishing access sites for tribal members and site users and ensure agency-wide compliance with health and safety standards. Why GAO Did This Study Four Tribes—the Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation, the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation, the Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of Oregon, and the Nez Perce Tribe—signed treaties with the United States in 1855 that reserved the right to fish along the Columbia River. However, beginning in the 1930s, construction of federal dams in the area submerged traditional tribal fishing sites and hindered Tribes' ability to exercise their treaty rights. To help mitigate the dams’ impacts on these rights, the U.S. government created fishing access sites. Since the 1960s, the four Treaty Tribes have expressed concerns about federal construction and maintenance of the sites. These concerns included health hazards and lack of sanitation facilities. Deferred maintenance and heavy usage have caused significant wear and tear on the sites’ infrastructure over several decades. The 2019 Columbia River In-Lieu and Treaty Fishing Access Sites Improvement Act (Pub. L. No. 116-99) authorized Interior to assess current sanitation and safety conditions of lands that were set aside as fishing access sites. It also included a provision for GAO to evaluate whether Interior's actions improved these sites. This report examines Interior’s efforts to identify and assess sanitary and safety conditions, consult with the Tribes and coordinate with other entities, improve conditions at the sites, and manage future needs. GAO reviewed laws, regulations, agency documents, funding data, interviews, and project reports, and applied agency policy and GAO internal control and collaboration criteria to findings. GAO visited 13 fishing access sites and conducted outreach to the four Tribes.

What GAO Found One in three older Americans dies with Alzheimer’s disease or a related dementia. A 2011 law created the National Alzheimer’s Project, which has been reauthorized through 2035. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has led the National Alzheimer’s Project, which encompasses a range of federal agencies and activities to address Alzheimer’s disease and related dementias. The law did not provide appropriations for the project. The project has contributed to numerous key achievements in combatting Alzheimer’s disease and related dementias. For example, research related to the project has led to the first two approved treatments aimed at slowing disease progression for early-stage Alzheimer’s disease. The project also contributed to areas such as diagnostic testing and risk reduction, among others. An Advisory Council was established as part of the project to develop recommendations to HHS and others to improve project efforts. HHS provides periodic updates on recent federal actions informed by some of these recommendations, but having more detailed information on the implementation status of individual recommendations would help the council identify remaining gaps and focus future recommendations to improve project efforts. HHS collects updates on agency efforts to assess the project’s progress. While HHS has set long-term goals for the project, such as reducing risk of Alzheimer’s, it has not followed other key practices for performance management. Specifically: Setting near-term goals: HHS has not set near-term goals in alignment with the project’s long-term goals (e.g., reducing risk of Alzheimer’s disease). Near-term goals are tangible, measurable results that the agency expects the National Alzheimer’s Project to achieve. Setting project-level near-term goals would help HHS assess the progress of the project as a whole. Information collection and use: Without near-term goals, HHS is unable to collect the information needed to assess progress and inform management decisions to adjust project efforts, as appropriate. Furthermore, HHS cannot effectively communicate progress to project stakeholders. HHS officials noted that resource constraints may make it challenging to follow these key practices. However, doing so would help HHS more effectively assess its progress towards the project’s goals, determine whether and where changes may be necessary, and more clearly communicate the results of this assessment. Clearly communicating the extent of progress would in turn help stakeholders better understand the returns on federal investments in the project and is particularly important given that the project is spread across multiple agencies and activities. Why GAO Did This Study The number of individuals with Alzheimer’s and related dementias in the U.S. is expected to nearly double by 2050. GAO was asked to review the National Alzheimer’s Project. This report describes the project’s achievements to date and examines HHS efforts to provide updates on council recommendations and assess project progress. To do this work, GAO reviewed HHS project documentation, including HHS’s updates to the National Plan and Advisory Council recommendations. GAO interviewed HHS officials and recent non-federal members of the Advisory Council, selected based on factors including their background and role on the council. GAO also interviewed non-federal stakeholders engaged in this issue, including groups representing health care providers, state aging and disability agencies, caregivers, and patients. GAO also evaluated project efforts against GAO’s prior work on key practices for performance management.

What GAO Found The Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) met increasingly frequent and large drawdown directives. Since 1985, the Department of Energy (DOE) has released more than 500 million barrels of crude oil from the SPR. More than half of the amount released through 2025 was for emergencies—such as wars—and nearly 70 percent of all releases occurred from 2014 through 2025. A 180-million-barrel emergency release in 2022 after Russia invaded Ukraine tested the SPR’s capabilities, as it was both the largest drawdown ever and occurred in the context of an extended backlog of deferred maintenance. In March 2026, DOE began a 172-million-barrel emergency release planned in response to the war in Iran. U.S. Crude Oil Held in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve 1985–2025 The SPR’s operational capability to meet mission demands is at risk. DOE has completed some life extension work, triaged major maintenance needs, and continued to monitor and assess risks to the SPR. However, investments in the SPR are again not keeping pace with the aging reserve’s needs, resulting in a growing backlog and looming operational limitations—as in 2014 when DOE last identified the need to invest in a life extension project. DOE has identified concerns that significant remaining issues with aging SPR infrastructure will increasingly limit the SPR’s capability to meet fill or drawdown directives. Congress and DOE lack a unified long-term plan for the SPR. DOE last completed a long-term strategic review of the SPR in 2016, after Congress directed it to do so. Since then, DOE has drafted but not completed several similar reviews. Congress has not mandated a timeline or requirements for the next long-term plan or set a target SPR size. Without an updated long-term plan or target size for the SPR, DOE and Congress are making operational and investment decisions amidst uncertainty about what the SPR is capable of at present, what it should be capable of in the future to meet changing U.S. needs and obligations, and what investments and other actions may be required to bridge any gaps. Relatedly, DOE has not reassessed the technical and performance criteria that establish the SPR’s operational requirements for drawdown and fill rates to reflect significant changes in crude oil markets over the last three decades. Doing so would inform congressional and DOE strategic planning and investment decisions for the SPR to better ensure it can meet U.S. energy security needs and obligations. Why GAO Did This Study In the aftermath of international oil embargoes, Congress authorized DOE to create the SPR in 1975 to reduce the impact of disruptions in petroleum supplies. Members of Congress, GAO, and others have long raised questions about the SPR’s optimal size and configuration to meet evolving energy security needs and international obligations. Additionally, in 2015 Congress directed DOE to begin a large project to extend the operational life of the aging SPR infrastructure, after DOE found in 2014 that a large portion of it required replacement. GAO was asked to review DOE’s management of the SPR. This report assesses the extent to which (1) the SPR has met mission demands, (2) DOE has ensured its operational capability, and (3) DOE has completed long-term plans in consultation with Congress. GAO reviewed legal and policy requirements, analyzed DOE data and documents, interviewed agency officials and contractors, and visited SPR sites in Texas and Louisiana.

What GAO Found To strengthen the United States’ and its foreign partners’ security, the U.S. government sells or provides defense articles and services to more than 100 foreign governments and international organizations that request them. The Department of Defense (DOD), with other agencies, uses technology release and foreign disclosure policies and procedures—the TRFD processes—to determine whether to share sensitive military technology and intelligence with foreign partners. Generally, the TRFD processes start when a foreign partner submits a request to DOD. Designated officials manage the request to obtain approval from the relevant military departments and interagency stakeholders. Example of Items Procured Through Technology Release and Foreign Disclosure Processes DOD officials identified operational challenges affecting the execution of the TRFD processes and described steps DOD is taking to mitigate them. According to officials, weighing the national security implications of releasing sensitive technology is inherently time consuming and specialized. Moreover, decision-making is distributed among multiple stakeholders, with different authorities, which may complicate coordination among these processes. To facilitate coordination, DOD is taking some mitigating steps and considering establishing a knowledge repository system to track TRFD policies and decisions. DOD has taken steps to enact reforms of the TRFD processes. In November 2025, according to officials, DOD began implementing TRFD reforms that, according to officials, it intended to complete within a year. Officials also said that DOD was tracking progress on the reforms and, as of May 2026, had completed 26 of 33 reform action items. While DOD will likely undertake additional TRFD reforms in the future, it is on track to complete the current efforts by November 2026 because of support from senior DOD leadership and effective prioritization of the reforms, according to officials.  Why GAO Did This Study In recent years, Congress and others have raised questions about the transparency and accountability of the TRFD processes. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 required DOD to submit a report to Congress assessing various aspects of the TRFD processes. In December 2024, DOD submitted the report. In addition, in April 2025, Executive Order 14268 directed DOD to implement TRFD reforms as part of an effort to facilitate foreign military sales. The joint explanatory statement accompanying the 2025 NDAA included a provision for GAO to conduct an independent assessment of DOD’s TRFD reform initiative. This report describes (1) DOD’s TRFD processes, (2) challenges related to the TRFD processes and steps DOD is taking to mitigate them, and (3) DOD’s progress in implementing organizational reforms proposed in its December 2024 report and directed in Executive Order 14268. GAO reviewed documents from DOD, including DOD’s Security Assistance Management Manual. In addition, GAO met with DOD officials and attended a course for foreign disclosure officers. For more information, contact James Reynolds at reynoldsj@gao.gov.

This Scroll-Driven Narrative tells the story of how pharmaceutical companies and the federal government work together to turn ideas into innovative medical treatments. It is a companion to GAO’s report Biomedical Research: NIH Should Publicly Report More Information about the Licensing of Its Intellectual Property, GAO-21-52. This product highlights key themes from GAO’s prior work—particularly the lack of publicly available information on licensing of intellectual property developed through National Institutes of Health (NIH) research. It also highlights recommendations from GAO’s prior work and NIH efforts to implement them. For more information, contact Candice N. Wright at wrightc@gao.gov.

What GAO Found Four selected agencies—the Departments of State, Transportation, Veterans Affairs (VA), and the Small Business Administration (SBA)—varied in their efforts to implement and ensure contractor compliance with three key cloud security practices. Specifically, one agency had fully implemented all three practices for two of its systems and one agency had fully implemented the practices for one of its systems. The agencies partially implemented the practices for the remaining five systems (see figure). Agencies’ Implementation of Key Cloud Security Practices aDue to sensitivity concerns, GAO is not disclosing the names of the selected systems in this report. Systems are identified by their cloud service model. For example, agencies fully performed continuous monitoring for three of the eight selected systems. Although most of the agencies developed and implemented a plan for continuous monitoring, they did not always review continuous monitoring deliverables from the provider. Agencies fully implemented the practice regarding service level agreements for five out of eight systems. For the remaining three systems, agencies’ agreements did not consistently define performance metrics, including how they would be measured and the enforcement mechanisms. Fully implementing the key practices will support the agencies’ efforts to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of agency information in their cloud systems. For example, without a robust continuous monitoring program, the agencies may have diminished ability to identify and mitigate control deficiencies and emerging threats. Additionally, the agencies may not promptly detect unauthorized access attempts or anomalous activity, leaving critical systems and data exposed to compromise. Why GAO Did This Study Federal agencies are faced with the need to accelerate their adoption of cloud services while ensuring the systems that support their missions are secure. Consequently, working with cloud service providers to effectively implement information security controls is a vital part of reducing risks to agency systems. The Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 includes a provision for GAO to periodically evaluate federal agencies’ information security policies and practices. This report assesses the extent to which selected agencies are ensuring contractor compliance with key cloud computing security practices. To do so, GAO selected four agencies (State, Transportation, VA, SBA) based on their number of cloud authorizations, excluding agencies profiled in recent GAO reports. GAO reviewed two cloud systems at each agency, each of which represented a range of services. GAO administered a standard set of questions, compared documentation on the implementation of key cloud-related practices for each system identified in federal policies and guidance, and interviewed agency officials. GAO rated each agency as having fully, partially, or not implemented each practice for the selected systems.