What GAO Found  GAO performed agreed-upon procedures solely to assist the Secretary of the Senate in ascertaining whether information from the Senate Gift Shop and the Senate Disbursing Office supported the Senate Gift Shop Revolving Fund’s (Fund) fiscal year 2024 receipts and disbursements. The procedures that GAO agreed to perform were related to the Senate Gift Shop’s processes over (1) daily receipts, weekly deposits, and monthly reconciliations for the Fund’s receipts and (2) purchasing, invoice payment, and monthly reconciliations for the Fund’s disbursements. The Secretary of the Senate is responsible for the sufficiency of these agreed-upon procedures to meet its objectives, and GAO makes no representation in that respect. The report provides details on the agreed-upon procedures and the results of performing each of the procedures. The Secretary of the Senate in an email response stated that she had no comments on the report. Why GAO Did This Study The Chair and Ranking Member of the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration requested that GAO perform procedures on the Fund’s fiscal year 2024 receipts and disbursements. The Senate Gift Shop is under the authority of the Secretary of the Senate and is responsible for offering members, staff, and the general public the opportunity to purchase Senate memorabilia and gifts. Sales receipts are deposited into the Fund at the Senate Disbursing Office and then used to purchase inventory items for resale, supplies, and other services. For more information, contact: Cheryl E. Clark at clarkce@gao.gov.

What GAO Found Retirement plan sponsors, typically a person’s employer, share participant information, including personally identifiable information (PII), with service providers, such as asset managers and record keepers, who help administer the plan. However, these providers may also use PII and other information to market financial products and services or, in some cases, sell this information, according to GAO’s review of 31 service provider privacy disclosures (see figure). As more entities gain access to participant data, the chance that their information may be inadvertently exposed increases, putting participants at greater risk of identity theft or other fraudulent activity. Service providers that GAO interviewed noted, however, that greater use and sharing of participant information helped them to more effectively target products and services that might benefit participants. 31 Retirement Plan Service Provider Policies on Sharing or Selling Participant Data Selected service provider privacy disclosures that GAO reviewed did not consistently incorporate leading privacy practices. Fair Information Practice Principles emphasize key data privacy protection principles, such as transparency in data practices and restrictions to prevent unauthorized uses of personal information. All 31 disclosures described their policies for the collection and use of personal information, in alignment with the principle related to transparency. However, many of the disclosures did not fully align with other principles. For instance, most disclosures (19 of 31) did not indicate that additional consent would be sought before sharing or otherwise using personal information beyond originally specified purposes, contrary to the principle related to use limitation. Federal agencies and states have taken some steps to protect consumer data privacy, but the Department of Labor (DOL) has not taken actions against retirement plans for sharing participant data. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended (ERISA) does not address data privacy explicitly, but DOL officials said that the agency believes that ERISA’s duties of prudence and loyalty should sufficiently deter plan sponsors and service providers from unauthorized uses of participant data. In addition, DOL issued cybersecurity guidance in April 2021 that discussed data privacy as a component of cybersecurity. However, DOL’s guidance does not include detailed information about good practices for sharing data about plan participants. Additional guidance would better position plan sponsors and service providers to understand acceptable uses of participant data and the circumstances in which they should obtain permission to use or disclose information about participants, particularly given potentially differing state requirements. Why GAO Did This Study About 126 million Americans participated in defined contribution retirement plans, with assets totaling over $9 trillion, as of 2023 (most recent data). As the number of participants and the volume of assets grow, so too does the importance of ensuring responsible handling of participants’ data. However, participants have filed several lawsuits alleging that service providers used their data for targeted marketing. GAO was asked to review retirement plan data privacy. This report examines (1) how selected retirement plans use and share participant data, (2) how selected service provider policies incorporate leading privacy practices, and (3) how federal agencies and selected states protect consumer data privacy as it applies to retirement plans. GAO assessed publicly available privacy disclosures from a nongeneralizable sample of 31 service providers selected based on size, among other factors. GAO identified the extent to which selected disclosures allowed participant data to be shared or sold for targeted marketing and compared the disclosures to recognized data privacy guidance. GAO also reviewed privacy disclosures from six selected plan sponsors. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations and interviewed officials from DOL and other federal agencies, among others. GAO also assessed state privacy laws and obtained information from officials in three selected states on the laws’ applicability to retirement plans.

What GAO Found The Departments of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and Veterans Affairs (VA) jointly operate the HUD-Veterans Affairs Supportive Housing (HUD-VASH) program. Veterans experiencing homelessness receive HUD housing vouchers and VA case management delivered through local VA medical centers. VA has faced challenges hiring and retaining enough case managers. In fiscal year 2024, more than one-quarter of medical centers with two or more case managers had at least 20 percent of these positions unfilled (see figure). Factors contributing to vacancies included staff burnout and turnover. GAO analysis of VA data shows that annual case manager turnover ranged from 20 percent to 26 percent in fiscal years 2020–2024. Stakeholders at all eight sites GAO visited described periods of high turnover and persistent vacancies. The effects of insufficient staffing include reduced services for veterans and delays in admitting new participants. HUD-VASH Case Manager Staffing Levels in Fiscal Year 2024, by VA Medical Center Each dot represents a VA medical center’s staffing level for the Housing and Urban Development-Veterans Affairs Supportive Housing (HUD-VASH) program. VA has taken steps to improve case manager hiring but has not consistently collected data on reasons that prevented veterans from entering HUD-VASH. Of 174,045 instances of veterans not being referred to the program in 2020–2024, VA did not document the reason in 151,296 (87 percent), according to GAO’s analysis. With more complete data on the reasons, VA could better assess its unmet need, adjust hiring strategies, and allocate case managers accordingly. VA then would be better positioned to serve more veterans. HUD launched the Tribal HUD-VASH pilot program in fiscal year 2016 to test a new approach to serving American Indian/Alaska Native veterans and had served over 1,100 veterans as of April 2025, according to HUD. HUD’s program design aligns to some extent with leading practices GAO identified in prior work. For example, HUD communicated with stakeholders at all stages of the program. But HUD has not clearly defined the program’s objectives or how it will measure progress toward them. HUD also has not implemented an evaluation plan. By fully incorporating leading practices, HUD could help ensure it has the information needed to make informed decisions about the program. Why GAO Did This Study HUD estimated that 32,882 veterans experienced homelessness on a single night in January 2024. Some policymakers note that this population faces significant barriers, including high housing costs. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 includes a provision for GAO to review VA case management and the availability of affordable housing for veterans experiencing homelessness. This report examines, among other things, challenges reported by VA staff and stakeholders related to (1) hiring and retaining case managers for HUD-VASH, and (2) implementing Tribal HUD-VASH. GAO analyzed data on HUD-VASH case managers for fiscal years 2020–2024; reviewed VA and HUD policies and guidance; and reviewed HUD documentation on the Tribal HUD-VASH program. GAO interviewed officials from VA and HUD and housing and service providers at eight sites GAO visited (selected for geographic diversity and prevalence of veteran homelessness).

What GAO Found In recent years, while homeowners insurance premiums increased slightly nationwide, premiums grew more rapidly in certain areas of the country. Premiums as a percentage of 2023 median household income were highest in Florida, Louisiana, and Oklahoma. The average U.S. homeowners insurance premium rose 3 percent in 2019–2024, after adjusting for inflation. But rates in parts of certain states, particularly southern coastal areas at high risk of wind damage, increased 25 percent or more. Estimated Total Change in Homeowners Insurance Premiums After Inflation, 2019–2024 The risk of different types of natural disasters can affect premiums to varying degrees. For example, GAO found that homes in areas with a high risk of wind damage had premiums about 58 percent higher than similar homes in areas with a medium level of wind risk. Moving from a medium to high level of wildfire risk was associated with an 8 percent increase in premiums. Increased risk of natural disasters also can reduce the availability of homeowners insurance. Insurance is state-regulated. The time state regulators take to review requests to raise premiums varies, reflecting differences in regulations and regulator priorities. In 2020–2024, the longest median approval times were in Colorado (331 days) and California (305 days). Some homeowners in states in which regulators take longer to approve premium changes tend to have more difficulty obtaining insurance than in other states. Some states have undertaken efforts to improve the availability and affordability of homeowners insurance, and legislation was introduced in Congress to support these efforts. GAO identified federal policy options that could improve the availability or affordability of the insurance. Stakeholders GAO surveyed expressed the strongest support for options that encourage mitigation, such as tax deductions or credits for building or upgrading homes to better withstand natural disasters. Stakeholders expressed mixed views on direct federal insurance or reinsurance programs and had concerns about federal costs and private market effects. Why GAO Did This Study Homeowners insurance plays a critical role in helping Americans recover from natural disasters, such as hurricanes and wildfires. But insurers have experienced rising losses from such disasters and homeowners in some areas experienced reduced affordability and availability of insurance. That is, insurance prices were greater than some homeowners could afford, and some were not able to obtain insurance. GAO was asked to review issues related to homeowners insurance. This report examines trends in insurance availability and affordability, how insurance is priced and regulated, and views on federal policy options to increase availability and affordability. GAO analyzed 2019–2024 data on private homeowners insurance and 2014–2023 information on insurers of last resort. GAO reviewed reports from government agencies, insurance industry groups, and consumer advocacy organizations. GAO interviewed representatives of the Federal Insurance Office, four insurance industry groups, three consumer advocacy organizations, and four state insurance regulators. GAO also sent a structured questionnaire on proposed policy options to 15 organizations, selected to obtain a range of views. GAO received responses from four industry associations, three consumer organizations, and three state regulators, for a 67 percent response rate. GAO also visited four states to speak with regulators and other stakeholders. For more information, contact Alicia Puente Cackley at CackleyA@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (Innovation Center) was established within the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) to test new approaches to health care delivery and payment—known as models—for use in Medicare or Medicaid. From 2011 through 2024, the Innovation Center obligated $11.4 billion for its activities. These included the testing of 70 models—24 of which were actively being tested as of January 2025. Total annual obligations peaked at $1.3 billion in fiscal year 2015 and have since decreased by nearly 40 percent to $789 million in fiscal year 2024. According to officials, these trends reflect the number of models the Innovation Center tests, among other factors. Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (Innovation Center) General Process for Model Development and Testing Of 70 models tested, the Innovation Center has expanded four models to be implemented nationwide. These four models achieved net savings during the testing period. In addition to expanding certain models, the Innovation Center has also incorporated elements into Medicare and tested successor models that iterate upon previous concepts. The Innovation Center uses selected performance management practices to regularly assess the performance of its efforts to test new health care delivery and payment approaches. For example, in May 2025, the Innovation Center established new long-term goals to outline the agency’s vision for its activities. It also developed corresponding near-term goals, including performance measures with targets and time frames. The Innovation Center uses this information to evaluate its progress toward its long-term goals, according to officials, and plans to regularly assess the outcomes of its activities against these near-term goals. Why GAO Did This Study In 2010, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act established the Innovation Center to test new health care delivery and payment approaches to reduce federal health spending. In 2012 and 2018, GAO reported on the Innovation Center’s progress in testing models, use of resources, and its assessment of its overall performance. GAO was asked to update its earlier work. In this report, GAO (1) describes the Innovation Center’s obligations from 2011 through 2024 and how it obligated the funds to develop and test models; (2) describes the outcomes of model testing; and (3) examines the extent to which the Innovation Center follows selected practices of performance management to assess its performance. GAO reviewed obligations data from fiscal years 2011 through 2024, reviewed model documentation and performance information, and compared efforts against selected performance management practices. GAO interviewed officials from the Innovation Center and CMS’s Office of the Actuary. For more information, contact Leslie V. Gordon at GordonLV@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The Minority Business Development Agency’s (MBDA) mission is to promote the growth and competitiveness of minority business enterprises. These enterprises are statutorily defined as being at least 51 percent owned, operated, and controlled by one or more socially or economically disadvantaged individuals. MBDA supports these enterprises through a network of business centers designed to expand their access to capital, contract opportunities, and markets. In 2024, there were 39 active business centers. MBDA’s responsibilities include assessing business centers’ performance against annual program goals and monitoring their compliance with statutory and program requirements. GAO’s review of performance information for a sample of seven centers found that most reported exceeding annual goals in 2024. MBDA monitoring includes reviews of centers’ performance and financial reports and site visits by MBDA staff. In 2023, MBDA initiated performance improvement plans for five of the 39 centers for issues such as submitting incomplete reports. MBDA’s Key Activities for Monitoring and Enforcing Compliance at Business Centers Following executive orders issued in February and March 2025, MBDA and business centers lost access to the agency’s performance data platform, nearly all MBDA staff were placed on administrative leave, and cooperative agreements with business centers were terminated. In May 2025, staff reductions and some agreement terminations were rescinded by a preliminary injunction order issued by a federal district court. According to MBDA officials, the agency retained its performance data. In November 2025, the same court issued an order vacating agency actions under the March executive order and a permanent injunction prohibiting the federal government from implementing the executive order. However, in January 2026 the defendants, including MBDA, appealed the November 2025 decision. The appeal was pending as of February 27, 2026. Why GAO Did This Study The Minority Business Development Act of 2021 includes a provision for GAO to review MBDA’s programs, including business center compliance with program requirements. This report describes MBDA programs, its assessment and oversight of business centers, and the effects of executive orders issued in early 2025. GAO analyzed agency documents, notices of funding opportunity, and performance reports; reviewed laws, executive orders, and research literature; and interviewed MBDA officials, business center operators, and advocacy organizations. GAO also reviewed 2024 performance data for a nongeneralizable sample of seven business centers (selected in part for geographic diversity) and analyzed compliance and enforcement activity in 2021–2024. For more information, contact Courtney LaFountain at LaFountainC@gao.gov.

What GAO Found Teacher professional development is generally associated with higher student test scores, according to meta-analyses GAO reviewed. However, research is mixed about which specific elements of teacher professional development contribute to these higher scores. For example, one of the three meta-analyses that reviewed coaching—one specific element of teacher professional development—found a generally positive association between coaching and student test scores, while the other two meta-analyses found no association. Most teachers (67 percent) said collaborative learning opportunities with other teachers improved their teaching or their students’ learning, according to a nationally representative RAND survey of K-12 public school teachers from school year 2022–23. Similarly, teachers who responded to GAO’s nongeneralizable questionnaire said collaborative professional development was useful for their classroom teaching. For example, respondents said professional learning communities helped them share resources, exchange ideas, or reflect on teaching practices or issues in the classroom. Title II, Part A (Title II-A)—a formula grant program in the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, as amended (ESEA)—provides federal funds to states and school districts for activities such as teacher professional development. State and local officials from the three states and nine school districts GAO spoke with said that Title II-A’s flexibility and straightforward requirements helped them meet their communities’ educational needs. For example, New Mexico officials described using Title II-A funds to train school district officials on mentoring and recruitment, build a statewide cadre of mentors, and train teachers for leadership and administrative positions. In addition, officials from six of nine school districts reported that requirements applicable to Title II-A—which include that professional development be “data-driven” and “sustained (i.e., not stand-alone, one-day, or short-term workshops),” among others—helped to ensure that professional development is high quality or effective (see figure). Selected Requirements for Professional Development Under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, as Amended Why GAO Did This Study Congress appropriated about $2.2 billion in Title II-A grants each year from fiscal years 2022 through 2024, making it the second largest formula grant program in the ESEA. GAO was asked to review whether Title II-A funds were being used in a manner likely to raise student achievement. This report describes (1) the elements of professional development that research finds to be effective, (2) the elements of professional development that teachers find most useful, and (3) the experiences of selected states and school districts using Title II-A to support effective instruction. GAO reviewed five meta-analyses that measured the effectiveness of teacher professional development and five U.S. Department of Education studies of randomized controlled trials of teacher professional development programs. In addition, GAO analyzed RAND’s nationally representative American Instructional Resources Survey reports from school years 2022–23 and 2023–24 and developed and disseminated a questionnaire to teachers understand the professional development elements they find useful. GAO also interviewed officials from the New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee state educational agencies and nine school districts to understand how these states and districts used Title II-A funds to improve instruction. GAO selected these states and school districts based on characteristics such as the level of state Title II-A funds received, geographic distribution, and urbanicity. For more information, contact Jacqueline M. Nowicki at nowickij@gao.gov.

What GAO Found Section 961 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act directs the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to annually assess and report on (1) internal supervisory controls to oversee the work SEC staff perform and (2) procedures staff must follow in performing examinations, investigations, and securities filing reviews. Effective supervisory controls and staff procedures help ensure that SEC’s Divisions of Corporation Finance, Enforcement, and Examinations, and Office of Credit Ratings conduct their work with competence and integrity. GAO determined that SEC’s framework for assessing the effectiveness of internal supervisory controls aligned with federal internal control standards. GAO also found that in fiscal year 2024, SEC’s three divisions and one office implemented processes generally consistent with this framework. However, GAO identified needed improvements: The Division of Enforcement did not always apply specific, measurable testing standards to evaluate whether controls were operating effectively. Using such standards would reduce the need for evaluators to use professional judgment to interpret ambiguous evidence, enabling them to draw clearer and more objective conclusions. The Division of Corporation Finance did not have documented controls for supervisors to verify how staff conducted filing reviews. Instead, supervisors used undocumented oversight protocols. Establishing and using documented supervisory controls is important for ensuring consistent application of guidance and improving the quality of information available to investors. GAO found that the divisions’ and office’s assessments of staff procedures generally were consistent with applicable SEC guidance. However, the Division of Enforcement and the Office of Credit Ratings did not document several assessment steps in their plans, as SEC guidance recommends. Doing so would help communicate responsibility for the assessment and retain organizational knowledge. SEC’s section 961 Working Group—a staff-level coordination group for section 961 compliance—updated its guidance to encourage the divisions and office to adopt a framework for monitoring and revising staff procedures and to evaluate that framework. Adopting and evaluating such frameworks would help the divisions and office better identify and revise ineffective staff procedures. As encouraged by the 961 Working Group, the Division of Examinations performed an evaluation for the fiscal year 2024 assessment, but the other divisions and office did not. As a result, they missed opportunities to help ensure that SEC carries out its examinations, investigations, and filing reviews consistently. Why GAO Did This Study Section 961 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act contains a provision for GAO to report on SEC's internal supervisory control structure and staff procedures at least every 3 years. Among its objectives, this report examines the extent to which SEC in fiscal year 2024 (1) assessed the design and operating effectiveness of its internal supervisory controls, and (2) assessed the effectiveness of its staff procedures. GAO analyzed SEC’s policies and guidance for conducting section 961 assessments and developing and monitoring staff procedures, reviewed records supporting the fiscal year 2024 assessment processes, and interviewed SEC officials.

What GAO Found Since January 2025, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has implemented significant personnel management changes in response to executive orders and other direction from the administration. Key changes include offering voluntary departure incentives, requiring employees to work in the office full time, and removing references to diversity, equity, and inclusion from SEC policies and procedures. About 18 percent of employees left SEC during the fiscal year ending September 30, 2025. Most employees who departed took a voluntary departure incentive, and according to SEC, it did not conduct any involuntary terminations in response to executive actions in 2025. SEC also paused its leadership development program in 2025, in part due to uncertainty about the availability and timing of future advancement opportunities. SEC Employee Departures, Fiscal Year 2025 SEC’s 2024 Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey results were positive overall and showed improvement in prior challenge areas, such as performance management and communication across divisions and offices. GAO interviews with SEC employees in May and June 2025 highlighted positive practices in these areas, such as supervisors’ use of formal and informal feedback to recognize performance. However, employees GAO spoke with raised concerns about the effect of workforce reductions (48 of 61 employees) and the cancellation of routine telework (43 of 61 employees). For example, 33 of the 61 said that departing employees had either unique knowledge or specific subject-matter expertise, resulting in a loss of institutional knowledge. A few employees (8 of 61) stated that as of the time of the interviews, they believed SEC had not yet experienced the full effects of these departures. SEC has made efforts to manage and assess the effects of its 2025 workforce changes. For example, it has taken steps to manage the effects of staff departures, including holding meetings with division and major office heads to identify skill and resource gaps and adjusting the targeted ratio of employees per senior officer. In December 2025, SEC also submitted a staffing plan that identified positions for potential hiring for each division and office. As SEC continues to address the effects of recent workforce changes, GAO will monitor its efforts through its triennial reports. Why GAO Did This Study SEC relies on a highly skilled workforce to carry out its mission as the primary regulator of the U.S. securities markets. That mission is to protect investors; maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets; and facilitate capital formation. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act contains a provision for GAO to report triennially on the quality of SEC’s personnel management. GAO’s previous four reports (GAO-13-621, GAO-17-65, GAO-20-208, and GAO-23-105459) identified several challenges and included 11 recommendations, all of which SEC has addressed. This report addresses (1) key personnel management changes SEC has implemented since GAO’s 2022 report, (2) employees’ views on SEC’s personnel management, and (3) steps SEC has taken to manage and assess the effects of recent personnel management changes on its mission. GAO reviewed SEC documents and workforce data and interviewed SEC officials. GAO also analyzed SEC employee responses to the Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey from 2022 through 2024 (the latest available) and interviewed a nongeneralizable sample of 61 SEC employees in nine mission-critical divisions and offices. For more information, contact Michael E. Clements at clementsm@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) launched its Cyber Workforce Dashboard in 2023 as a government-wide application for managing the cybersecurity workforce. The intended purpose of the Dashboard was to provide a comprehensive government-wide view of federal cyber workforce data and to allow agencies to benchmark their workforce data against other agencies. However, five of six selected agencies and OPM, the administrator of the Dashboard, reported they were not using the Dashboard. The General Services Administration was the one agency using it, primarily for workforce planning. All six selected agencies reported limitations with the Dashboard, including communications with OPM, access, functionality, and use of data. OPM reported many of the same types of limitations in managing the effort. Number of Office of Personnel Management’s Cyber Workforce Dashboard Limitations Experienced by the Six Selected Agencies Given the lack of use, the Dashboard is not meeting its intended purpose for the six selected agencies. Further, OPM does not know the extent of non-use by the almost 20 other federal agencies that have access to the Dashboard. Additionally, OPM has not solicited feedback on it. Regarding costs, according to OPM officials, the funds spent on the Dashboard effort since its inception were minimal and therefore not covered by a separate budget line item. Officials added that they did not have an estimate of exact costs or future planned costs. Without information on the extent of use among the more than 20 federal agencies, OPM is limited in knowing whether it should continue or terminate the effort. Expeditiously collecting and analyzing such information, soliciting feedback from agencies, and determining costs are essential to determining the future of the Dashboard. Why GAO Did This Study The Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Office of the National Cyber Director (ONCD), and prior GAO reports have stated that the federal government faces a persistent shortage of cyber and IT professionals. Building and maintaining a talented cyber workforce is one of the federal government’s most important challenges. The Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 includes a provision for GAO to periodically evaluate federal agencies’ information security policies and practices. This includes evaluating agencies’ cybersecurity workforce management policies and applications, such as the Dashboard. This report (1) describes the Dashboard, (2) describes how selected federal agencies are using the Dashboard to support their workforce planning efforts, and (3) determines the extent to which the Dashboard is meeting its intended purpose. GAO randomly selected six agencies, divided into three tiers based on their reported fiscal year 2025 IT spending. GAO interviewed relevant OPM and agency officials and reviewed Dashboard documentation and usage metrics that OPM initially gathered after the Dashboard was launched. GAO also analyzed applicable guidance, best practices, and relevant Dashboard documentation.

What GAO Found In March 2026, GAO reported on the impact of recent staffing reductions on the Department of Education’s oversight of its student loan servicers. In February 2025, Education stopped assessing student loan servicers on accuracy and call quality due to lack of staff capacity, according to Education officials. Prior to discontinuing these quarterly assessments, Education assessed servicers on these metrics for two quarters. These assessments were intended to measure whether servicers were (1) keeping complete and accurate records for borrowers and (2) providing borrowers good customer service. The decision to stop these assessments occurred shortly after the administration began issuing presidential directives and guidance on downsizing the federal workforce in January 2025. Education reported that between January and December 2025, the number of staff at its Office of Federal Student Aid (FSA) decreased from 1,433 to 777. Prior to FSA discontinuing this oversight, most servicers did not meet the performance standards for accuracy and faced corresponding financial penalties of about $850,000. FSA continued to assess servicer performance on the other performance metrics, which it characterized as less labor intensive to monitor. Student Loan Servicer Performance on Accuracy Metric In March 2026, GAO recommended that Education assess servicer accuracy and call quality. Education disagreed, stating that it uses other methods to assess servicer performance. GAO maintains these other methods are not effective substitutes. Moreover, GAO maintains these two assessments are important to protect borrowers and help the government avoid overpaying servicers for poor performance. GAO also made other recommendations in prior work to help Education strengthen accountability. For example, implementing GAO’s 2019 recommendations to improve verification of borrower income and family size information could help reduce the risk of fraud and error in certain repayment plans and potentially save over $2 billion. Similarly, implementing GAO’s 2017 recommendation to update the formula for measuring colleges’ financial condition could help protect taxpayers against the financial risk of college closures. Finally, implementing GAO’s 2016 recommendation to improve tracking of borrower complaints could help Education better track trends and ensure the program effectively meets borrower needs. Education has taken some steps to address these recommendations; however, the agency needs to do more to implement them and strengthen accountability in higher education. Why GAO Did This Study In fiscal year 2025, about 10.5 million students received over $131 billion in federal student aid to help them pursue higher education. Education is responsible for maintaining accountability and protecting the federal investment in higher education. Education’s responsibilities include overseeing colleges, federal student aid, and the servicers that help administer the student loan program. Education’s responsibilities have grown substantially in recent years based on changes to the size and complexity of the federal student loan program, which now exceeds $1.6 trillion in outstanding loans. This testimony summarizes the findings and recommendations from key GAO reports issued from 2016 through 2026. It includes recent work examining the impact of staffing reductions on Education’s oversight of student loan servicers (GAO-26-108534) and other prior work examining higher education accountability issues (GAO-19-347, GAO-17-555, and GAO-16-523). GAO also updated the status of related recommendations.

What GAO Found Many agencies rely on the General Services Administration (GSA) to manage facilities for them. The Federal Buildings Fund (Buildings Fund) was established for real property management and associated activities. GSA collects rent from tenant agencies; deposits it into the Buildings Fund; and uses that money for real property acquisition, operation, maintenance, and disposal. Through the appropriations process, Congress sets annual limits on how much of this funding GSA can obligate to various activities. GAO’s work has highlighted the impact of uncertain funding on real property management: Capital projects. Obtaining upfront funding for large projects—such as constructing, purchasing, or renovating federal buildings—has been a challenge for federal agencies. Congressional spending limits require GSA to first use available funds to pay for other needs, including leasing, operations and maintenance, and debt costs, making funding for large capital projects less available and potentially costing more in the long run. Maintenance and repair. Agencies’ backlog of deferred maintenance and repairs has grown by billions of dollars in recent years due, in part, to funding constraints. Deferring maintenance can worsen the condition of agencies’ assets and lead to premature replacement, significantly increasing costs. Consolidation and disposal. Federal agencies have struggled to determine how much space they need to fulfill their missions and identify the funding to consolidate operations, reconfigure spaces, and prepare unneeded property for disposal. Funding uncertainty can result in missed opportunities to eliminate leases and consolidate agencies into federally owned space, costing the federal government hundreds of millions of dollars. GAO has identified actions Congress and federal agencies could take to better manage real property and address funding-related challenges. For example: Disposal of underused buildings.GAO recommended that the Office of Management and Budget and GSA take steps to address challenges with federally underused space, including assisting agencies in monitoring building utilization and reducing underutilized space. Adopting alternative budgetary structures. GAO reported on different budgetary structures as options that could help Congress and agencies make more prudent fiscal decisions. For example, Congress could modify the Buildings Fund to exclude certain major renovations or grant tenant agencies the authority to manage buildings they occupy. GAO has identified issues Congress may wish to consider when granting additional budgetary authorities, including ensuring agencies have the necessary real property expertise. Why GAO Did This Study The federal government’s real property holdings are vast and diverse, costing billions annually to occupy, operate, and maintain. GAO designated federal real property as high risk in 2003 because of large amounts of underused property and the considerable difficulty agencies have faced in disposing of unneeded holdings. Historically, the Buildings Fund has not generated sufficient revenues to meet all real property needs. This statement discusses: 1) the status of the Buildings Fund, 2) the impacts of funding uncertainty on federal real property management, and 3) some options to address funding challenges. This statement is primarily based on GAO’s prior work on the Buildings Fund and real property management, as well as updated information from GSA revenue and occupancy data, agency budget documents, GSA statements on its budget, and legislative proposals.

What GAO Found Based on the limited procedures GAO performed in reviewing the independent public accounting firm's (IPA) fiscal year 2025 audit of the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute's (PCORI) financial statements, GAO did not identify any significant issues that it believes require attention. Had GAO performed additional procedures, other matters might have come to its attention that it would have reported. The IPA provided an unmodified audit opinion on PCORI's fiscal years 2025 and 2024 financial statements. Specifically, the IPA found that PCORI's financial statements were presented fairly, in all material respects, in accordance with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles. Further, for fiscal year 2025, the IPA did not identify any deficiencies in internal control that it considered to be material weaknesses or any reportable noncompliance with the selected provisions of laws, regulations, contracts, and grant agreements it tested. PCORI concurred with the IPA's conclusions. GAO's review of PCORI's fiscal year 2025 financial statement audit, as differentiated from an audit of the financial statements, was not intended to enable GAO to express—and it does not express—an opinion on PCORI's financial statements or conclude on the effectiveness of its internal control over financial reporting. Furthermore, GAO does not express an opinion on PCORI's compliance with provisions of applicable laws, regulations, contracts, and grant agreements. The IPA is responsible for its reports on PCORI dated February 11, 2026, and the conclusions expressed therein. GAO provided a draft of its report to PCORI and the IPA for review and comment. PCORI's Chief Financial Officer provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated in the final report. An IPA partner responded that the IPA had no comments on the draft report. Why GAO Did This Study This report presents the results of GAO's review of PCORI's fiscal year 2025 financial statement audit. PCORI is a federally funded, nonprofit corporation that is neither an agency nor establishment of the U.S. government. PCORI's purpose is to help patients, clinicians, policymakers, and others make informed decisions about health and health care options. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act requires PCORI to obtain an annual financial statement audit from a private entity with expertise in conducting financial audits. The act includes a provision for the Comptroller General of the United States to review the audit and report the results to the Congress annually. GAO's objective was to review the results of PCORI's fiscal year 2025 financial statement audit. To satisfy this objective, GAO (1) read and considered various documents relating to the IPA's independence, objectivity, and qualifications; (2) analyzed key IPA audit documentation; (3) read PCORI's fiscal years 2025 and 2024 financial statements, the IPA's audit report on the financial statements, and the IPA's report on internal control over financial reporting and compliance; and (4) met with IPA representatives and PCORI management officials. For more information, contact Cheryl E. Clark at clarkce@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The Network of Central Banks and Supervisors for Greening the Financial System (NGFS) is an international network of central banks and financial supervisors that works to address climate risk management in the financial sector. Its steering committee forms working groups, which in 2024 issued 19 publications, including updates to climate-scenario analyses and guidance on sustainable investment. NGFS is funded by voluntary, in-kind member contributions and external project support. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve (Federal Reserve), Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) joined NGFS in 2020, 2021, and 2022, respectively, to better understand climate-related financial risks and collaborate internationally. They withdrew in 2025, generally citing (1) changed agency priorities, (2) a determination that continued participation was inconsistent with their statutory mandates to ensure safety and soundness of financial institutions, and (3) NGFS’s increasing focus on broader environmental risks. The banking agencies participated in NGFS meetings and working groups, responded to surveys, and reviewed draft publications. Costs related to NGFS participation were for staff time and did not include providing funding to NGFS, according to GAO’s document review and interviews with officials. Officials reported that the agencies shared limited information with NGFS, did not provide nonpublic supervisory data or adopt NGFS recommendations, and retained records in accordance with agency retention policies. NGFS-related records are confidential and not disclosed, except as compelled by law, according to the NGFS charter. Federal Reserve, FDIC, and OCC Participation in 2022–2024 NGFS Working Groups   Federal Reserve OCC FDIC Workstreams               Supervision ✓ ✓ ✓ Scenario design and analysis ✓ ✓ ✓ Monetary policy ✓     Net zero for central banks ✓     Task forces     Adaptation       Capacity building and training   ✓ ✓ Biodiversity loss and nature‑related risks ✓ ✓ ✓ Expert networks     Legal ✓ ✓   Research ✓ ✓   Data ✓ ✓   Source: GAO analysis of Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve), Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and Network of Central Banks and Supervisors for Greening the Financial System (NGFS) information. | GAO-26-108020 Notes: The Workstream on Supervision incorporates climate-related risks within regulatory practices. The Workstream on Net Zero for Central Banks integrates sustainability into corporate operations. The Task Force on Adaptation promotes measures to respond to climate-related variables, which moderate harm or take advantage of opportunities. Why GAO Did This Study Established in 2017, NGFS serves as a forum for sharing best practices and conducting analysis on climate risk management in the financial sector. It has advocated for mobilizing capital for low-carbon investments. As of January 2026, it had 149 members from more than 92 countries. GAO was asked to examine the banking agencies’ membership in NGFS. This report describes why the Federal Reserve, OCC, and FDIC joined and later withdrew, and the extent to which the agencies participated in activities and shared information with NGFS while they were members. GAO reviewed the NGFS charter, annual reports, and publications. GAO also reviewed agency documentation on NGFS membership, activities, and records retention policies. In addition, GAO reviewed written responses from NGFS and interviewed representatives from the three banking agencies, and three industry and climate change organizations. For more information, contact Michael E. Clements at clementsm@gao.gov.

What GAO Found GAO found (1) the financial statements of the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) and of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) Resolution Fund (FRF) as of and for the years ended December 31, 2025, and 2024, are presented fairly, in all material respects, in accordance with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles; (2) the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) maintained, in all material respects, effective internal control over financial reporting relevant to the DIF and to the FRF as of December 31, 2025; and (3) with respect to the DIF and to the FRF, no reportable instances of noncompliance for 2025 with provisions of applicable laws, regulations, contracts, and grant agreements GAO tested. In commenting on a draft of this report, FDIC stated that it was pleased to receive unmodified opinions for the 34th consecutive year on the DIF's and the FRF's financial statements. FDIC also noted that GAO reported that FDIC maintained effective internal control over financial reporting and that there was no reportable noncompliance with tested provisions of applicable laws, regulations, contracts, and grant agreements. FDIC reiterated its commitment to sound financial management. Why GAO Did This Study Section 17 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, as amended, requires GAO to audit the financial statements of the DIF and of the FRF annually. In addition, the Government Corporation Control Act requires that FDIC annually prepare and submit audited financial statements to Congress and authorizes GAO to audit the statements. This report responds to these requirements. For more information, contact: M. Hannah Padilla at padillah@gao.gov.

What GAO Found Constructing offshore wind projects requires numerous oceangoing vessels (offshore wind vessels). Under the Jones Act and other coastwise laws, vessels used for some U.S. offshore wind activities must be U.S. flag—built and registered in the U.S. and largely crewed by domestic mariners. GAO identified more than 300 unique vessels involved in the construction of three selected U.S. offshore wind projects in the Atlantic Ocean. About 80 percent were U.S.-flag. These U.S.-flag vessels were generally smaller and conducted support activities like ferrying workers and surveying cable routes. About 20 percent of the vessels were foreign-flag; many were large, specialized vessels for which there were no U.S.-flag counterparts. GAO estimated that a similar number of foreign and domestic mariners worked across the vessels for the three selected projects, since the larger, more complex foreign-flag vessels required more mariners. A Foreign Vessel Installing Turbines at a U.S. Offshore Wind Project Note: Wind turbine installation vessels often have “legs” capable of extending to the seafloor, allowing the vessel to become a fixed platform. Fifty new offshore wind vessels, according to the American Clean Power Association, had been delivered, were under construction, or were on order at U.S. shipyards. Constructing all these vessels could generate revenue at almost 20 shipyards across a dozen states. Most are for support vessels, but U.S. vessel owners also invested in two larger, specialized U.S.-built installation vessels. None of the vessel construction was financed using Maritime Administration assistance programs. According to vessel owners GAO interviewed, that was, in part because the application process took too long. Maritime Administration officials said their review process takes, at best, 6 to 9 months. The vessel owners said it often takes much longer. They also said additional vessel construction was unlikely given a lack of future projects. Why GAO Did This Study Concerns over the state of U.S. commercial shipbuilding have grown in recent years. Proponents of offshore wind suggest the demands of the industry may provide opportunities to invest in new vessels at U.S. shipyards. Since 2010, the Department of Interior (Interior) has granted about 40 offshore wind leases to commercial developers. Five projects were under construction, as of December 2025. In 2025, the White House took steps to suspend offshore wind development pending review. GAO was asked to review the extent to which the U.S. maritime industry is constructing U.S. offshore wind projects. This report discusses (1) the extent to which U.S.-flag vessels and domestic mariners were used at selected offshore wind projects and (2) investments in U.S.-built offshore wind vessels, including any use of Maritime Administration financial assistance programs. GAO selected three offshore wind projects under construction as of August 2025 and analyzed developer-provided data on the vessels used as of November 2025. GAO estimated the range in number of mariners on these vessels based on vessel specifications and discussions with the U.S. Coast Guard and a mariners’ union. GAO reviewed an August 2025 study on investments in offshore wind vessels by the American Clean Power Association; spoke with 11 vessel owners and 11 stakeholders identified based on their expertise; reviewed relevant laws; and interviewed officials from the Maritime Administration, Interior, Department of Energy, and Department of Homeland Security. For more information, contact Andrew Von Ah at VonAha@gao.gov.

What GAO Found GAO convened a panel of experts who identified privacy risks and challenges associated with the use of artificial intelligence (AI), which align with GAO’s prior reporting on AI use. For example, the experts noted that using AI may reveal sensitive information in raw data sets, potentially exposing personal and private information, among other privacy risks. At the same time, the experts identified several challenges that federal agencies face in addressing these risks. These include the lack of technology to implement AI with appropriate privacy protections and the potential performance tradeoff when adjusting or removing certain data for the sake of privacy. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB)’s government-wide AI guidance does not fully address all the identified privacy-related risks and challenges. Specifically, OMB’s guidance does not specify the types of known privacy-related risks that agencies should consider when establishing policies to address privacy in AI. OMB’s guidance provides direction on addressing two challenges identified by the panelists: the need for enhanced skills among the federal workforce to effectively implement AI and the ability to accelerate and scale the implementation of AI systems with privacy protections. However, the guidance does not fully address the remaining eight challenges. Extent to Which the Office of Management and Budget’s Government-wide Guidance Addressed 10 Selected Expert-identified Privacy-related Challenges When Using Artificial Intelligence (AI), as of January 2026 Given the risks and challenges, additional guidance from OMB could help ensure agencies take appropriate steps to protect the privacy of sensitive data when using AI. OMB could also use existing mechanisms, such as the Chief AI Officer Council or Federal Privacy Council, as forums for interagency information-sharing about strategies or best practices for addressing AI-related privacy challenges. Without this additional direction, risks are increased that agencies’ use of AI would disclose sensitive data, or compromise privacy in other ways. Why GAO Did This Study AI is rapidly evolving and has significant potential to transform society and people’s lives. Further, surges in AI capabilities have led to a wide range of innovations with substantial promise for improving the operations of government agencies. However, AI can also pose significant risks to individuals, groups, and organizations. As a result, when agencies use AI to carry out their missions, they need to consider privacy-related risks and challenges. They also need to ensure that they have implemented appropriate risk management and privacy controls to protect the private information of the American public. In this report, GAO (1) describes the risks and challenges associated with protecting privacy when using AI and (2) examines the extent to which OMB addressed these risks and challenges in government-wide guidance. To do so, GAO assembled a panel of experts and compiled a non-exhaustive list of privacy risks and challenges associated with AI. GAO also reviewed OMB’s AI-related guidance to determine if it highlighted the specific types of privacy risks identified by the experts. Further, GAO compared OMB’s AI-related government-wide guidance to 10 selected challenges to determine if they could be addressed by the contents of the guidance.

What GAO Found The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) administers three primary programs that mitigate flood risk for properties insured by the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). A small number of these properties—known as repetitive loss properties, which have flooded and received claim payments multiple times—contribute to the program’s fiscal challenges. According to FEMA, unmitigated repetitive loss properties make up about 2.5 percent of NFIP policies, but 48 percent of NFIP claims by dollar value have been paid to properties with two or more losses. From 1989 through 2025, 77 percent of the properties FEMA mitigated were funded by the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program. FEMA supports four mitigation strategies—acquisition, elevation, relocation, and floodproofing. FEMA has mitigated flood risk primarily through acquisitions, which accounted for 69,415 (about 72.5 percent) of the properties mitigated from 1989 through 2025. FEMA Hazard Mitigation, by Grant Program and Method, Fiscal Years 1989–2025 While acquisitions offer benefits, the process faces significant challenges that can discourage communities and homeowners from participating. These challenges include a lengthy and complex process, limited state and community capacity, and financial constraints. NFIP represents a fiscal exposure to the federal government because FEMA is statutorily required to charge premium rates that do not fully reflect flood risk. Although mitigation reduces flood losses, it also requires substantial investment. Without addressing mitigation challenges, the number of repetitive loss properties will continue to grow, increasing costs to NFIP policyholders and federal taxpayers. One way to address the program’s fiscal exposure is to target mitigation efforts to those properties contributing most to the premium shortfall. These may disproportionately include repetitive loss properties, which face greater flood risk and higher full-risk premiums. By reducing risk, mitigation could also address affordability in the long term. Why GAO Did This Study Flooding is the most expensive natural disaster in the U.S., and in 2024, it caused over $8 billion in damages, according to FEMA. Congress created NFIP in 1968 to protect homeowners from flood losses, minimize property exposure to flood damage, and limit taxpayers' fiscal exposure to flood losses. However, the program faces multiple serious and longstanding challenges, primarily because it has two competing goals: keeping flood insurance affordable while maintaining the program’s fiscal solvency. This statement discusses (1) the role of mitigation in addressing NFIP’s fiscal exposure from repetitive loss properties and (2) how targeting mitigation efforts could reduce NFIP’s exposure and address affordability. This statement is based on GAO work issued in 2017–2023, including GAO-17-425, GAO-20-508, GAO-22-106037, and GAO-23-105977. Detailed information on the objectives, scope, and methodology can be found within each report.

What GAO Found Scams occur in a variety of forms and are a growing risk to consumers. Examples of a Scam Execution Process Note: Other types of contact methods, scams, and payment methods exist. At least 13 federal agencies engage in a range of activities related to countering scams. The agency activities cover a spectrum of roles intended to prevent, detect, and respond to scams. However, each agency largely carries out these activities independently. None of the 13 federal agencies that GAO spoke with were aware of a government-wide strategy to guide efforts to combat scams, nor did GAO independently identify such a strategy. In its April 2025 report, GAO recommended that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) lead a federal effort, in collaboration with other agencies, to develop and implement a government-wide strategy to counter scams and coordinate related activities. The FBI recently outlined actions to address this recommendation. The Consumer Protection Financial Bureau (CFPB), FBI, and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) collect and report on consumer complaints both directly and from other agencies. Data limitations prevent agencies from determining a total number of scam complaints and financial losses. Accordingly, there is no single, government-wide estimate of the total number of scams and financial losses. Similarly, federal agencies have not produced a common, government-wide definition of scams. A government-wide estimate would capture the scale of scams, and a common definition is necessary for producing such an estimate and for developing a government-wide strategy. In its April 2025 report, GAO made separate recommendations to CFPB, FBI, and FTC to (1) develop a common definition of scams, (2) harmonize data collection, (3) report an estimate of the number of scam complaints each receives and (4) produce a single, government-wide estimate of the number of consumers affected by scams. In a recent update, the FBI and FTC outlined various concerns with these recommendations, such as differing authorities and mandates among agencies. However, GAO maintains that these recommendations remain valid. In October 2025, CFPB stated that it will monitor FBI and FTC actions before determining if any actions of its own are warranted. Why GAO Did This Study Scams, a method of committing fraud, involve the use of deception or manipulation intended to achieve financial gain. Scams often cause individual victims to lose large sums—in some cases their entire life savings. Federal agencies such as the FBI and FTC have responsibilities that include preventing and responding to scams against Americans. This statement discusses (1) federal agencies’ activities to prevent and respond to scams and the need for a comprehensive, government-wide strategy to guide their efforts and (2) federal agencies’ activities to compile scam-related consumer-complaint data and estimate the total number of scams and related financial losses. It also provides updates on the status of 3 agencies’ actions to address applicable recommendations. This statement is based on GAO’s April 2025 report on federal efforts to combat scams (GAO-25-107088). For that report, GAO analyzed publicly available information (including prior GAO reports) and relevant agency documents. GAO also interviewed officials from 13 different federal agencies involved in countering scams.

What GAO Found Debt limit impasses impose avoidable costs. As a projected date nears when the U.S. will be unable to meet all its financial obligations—the X date—investors often demand higher yields on new Treasury securities maturing near that date to compensate for the added risk. This increases the government’s borrowing costs. GAO estimates that Treasury securities issued during periods of acute market concern over impasses between 2011 and 2023—the most recent impasses with complete data available at the time of GAO’s analysis—incurred a total of roughly $107 million to $161 million in increased immediate borrowing costs (in 2024 dollars), depending on the measure used to estimate market concern. Impasses also impose additional, hard-to-quantify costs, including long-term costs from reduced investor confidence in the Treasury market. Estimated Immediate Treasury Borrowing Costs Associated with Debt Limit Impasses Note: For each impasse, GAO used two distinct measures of market concern to estimate increased borrowing costs. For more details, see fig. 2 in GAO-26-107872. Debt limit impasses have also reduced the market value of outstanding Treasury securities. Market participants avoided securities maturing near a projected X-date, as those maturing after this date would be the first to default if the impasse were not resolved in time. GAO’s analysis found that these securities lost value relative to comparable ones maturing just before the X-date. Impasse disruptions to Treasury markets can spread to short-term funding markets and funds closely tied to Treasury securities. In 2011 and 2013, such disruptions included higher borrowing rates and money market fund outflows. These disruptions prompted market participant actions to limit risk and manage future impasse effects. However, other disruptions can occur after impasses are resolved, as fluctuations in the Department of the Treasury’s cash balance create volatility in some markets. GAO’s prior work has identified longstanding concerns about the debt limit (GAO-25-107089). The current debt limit process creates an unnecessary risk of U.S. default, with potentially devastating consequences for individuals, financial institutions, and the broader economy. The costs and market disruptions documented in this report further underscore the need for debt limit reform. Why GAO Did This Study Congress imposes a legal limit on federal borrowing, known as the debt limit. Under the current process, Congress can approve spending increases or tax cuts without also ensuring that Treasury has sufficient borrowing authority to finance these decisions. In recent years, when the federal government has approached the debt limit, prolonged congressional negotiations on increasing or suspending the limit have repeatedly brought it close to being unable to continue paying obligations stemming from past spending and revenue decisions. If Treasury exhausts its borrowing authority and runs out of cash, a default will occur. In this report, GAO examines how debt limit impasses—where outstanding debt reached the limit and Congress did not immediately raise or suspend it—between 2011 and 2023 affected Treasury’s borrowing costs and U.S. financial markets more broadly. GAO analyzed financial market data and developed a suite of econometric models to estimate increased borrowing costs attributable to these impasses. GAO also reviewed relevant research, documentation, and laws. In addition, GAO interviewed agency officials and 17 financial market participants, selected to reflect a range of institution types and sizes.