To alert the audit community to changes in professional standards, we periodically issue Professional Standards Updates (PSU). These updates highlight the effective dates of recently issued standards and guidance related to engagements conducted in accordance with Government Auditing Standards. PSUs contain summary information only, and those affected by a change should refer to the respective standard or guidance for details.

What GAO Found Nonbank mortgage companies—nondepository institutions specializing in mortgage lending—play a major role in the housing finance system. Nonbanks service most mortgages backing securities guaranteed by Ginnie Mae, a government-owned corporation, and by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, enterprises under Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) conservatorships. Share of Mortgages in Federally Backed Securities Serviced by Nonbanks (by Outstanding Dollar Volume in Trillions), as of Second Quarter 2024 Since 2020, FHFA and Ginnie Mae have coordinated on aspects of nonbank monitoring, including jointly updating program eligibility requirements (such as capital and liquidity standards) to strengthen nonbank financial capacity and promote consistency; enhancing nonbank reporting of financial data the agencies use for monitoring and risk analysis; and participating in the Financial Stability Oversight Council's (FSOC) task force on nonbank mortgage servicing. Both agencies contributed to a May 2024 FSOC report on the risks of nonbanks. They also have been supporting initiatives to develop risk-monitoring metrics and a plan for interagency coordination in a crisis. However, Ginnie Mae played a limited role in the task force's October 2023 crisis planning exercise, which simulated the failure of a large nonbank working with Ginnie Mae and the enterprises. Ginnie Mae did not produce responses to discussion questions during the exercise, citing legal restrictions and risks of sharing nonpublic information about its counterparties. But not all the exercise questions required sharing such information. For example, participants were asked to consider the possible consequences of their actions on external parties, information they would need from other agencies, and how they would communicate with other agencies. Ginnie Mae also did not identify or document lessons learned from the interagency exercise and lacks processes for doing so. By developing processes to guide participation in these exercises and incorporating lessons learned into its strategy for managing nonbank failures, Ginnie Mae could enhance its interagency coordination during a nonbank crisis and bolster overall federal preparedness. Why GAO Did This Study Nonbanks service the majority of federally backed home mortgages. Nonbank failures could significantly disrupt mortgage markets and increase federal fiscal exposure. Federal monitoring and oversight of nonbanks is spread among several agencies. These include Ginnie Mae and FHFA, which play key roles in supporting stable markets for mortgage-backed securities. Interagency coordination can help address the challenges of managing systemwide risks in a fragmented federal structure. Since 2013, GAO has designated the federal role in housing finance as a high-risk area. This report examines the extent to which FHFA and Ginnie Mae coordinate to monitor nonbanks. GAO reviewed FHFA and Ginnie Mae policies and procedures, as well as documentation on an FSOC exercise simulating a major nonbank failure. GAO also interviewed FHFA, Ginnie Mae, and FSOC officials.

What GAO Found The Department of Defense (DOD) spends tens of billions of dollars of operations and maintenance (O&M) and other appropriated amounts annually to operate and maintain its weapon systems, including combat surface ships. As of 2024, the Navy operates 149 of these ships—such as destroyers, cruisers and amphibious assault ships. GAO found that: The Navy requested almost $24.9 billion to maintain combat surface ships during fiscal years 2020 through 2023. The Navy reported that almost $25.9 billion was appropriated for maintenance activities during those same years – $1 billion more than requested. As of the end of fiscal year 2023, the Navy reported obligating 99.7 percent of the $25.9 billion, or about 25.8 billion, for expenditure to sustain combat surface ships during fiscal years 2020 through 2023. The Navy has a detailed process to manage surface ship sustainment that involves developing a budget, submitting the budget request, executing (obligating and expending) the funds, and reporting on results. The Navy still faces persistent challenges sustaining combat surface ships, including limited spare parts, a lack of sufficient and qualified maintenance personnel, and a continual need to defer maintenance. Why GAO Did This Study The U.S. Navy operates 149 non-nuclear combat surface ships—cruisers, destroyers, the littoral combat ships, and amphibious assault ships. These ships account for roughly two-thirds of the Navy's battle force and require timely maintenance to ensure they are available when needed. House Report 118-125, accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, includes a provision for GAO to review the sustainment budget for surface ships (H. R. No 118-125, (2023)). This report provides information on how the Navy develops its funding requirements for sustaining combat surface ships; amounts requested and used for such ships' maintenance during fiscal years 2020 through 2023; and long-standing maintenance challenges the Navy faces. We reviewed Navy documentation, interviewed cognizant Navy officials, and collected and assessed Navy appropriations data as part of this study. In a selection of reports published from 2020 through 2024 on Navy ship sustainment, GAO has made a total of 46 recommendations that, as of September 2024, have not been implemented. For example, GAO recommended that the Navy: (1)set material availability requirements that fully capture all factors that could preclude a ship from being ready when needed; (2)require documentation of the factors it considers when determining whether enlisted crewing target levels should be adjusted; and (3)annually report on the assessments of the operational, technical, and economic risks associated with deferred maintenance on surface ships. The Navy is currently making some progress towards implementing 12 of the 46 recommendations.

What GAO Found Most of the 15 selected colleges GAO interviewed offered a variety of on-campus sexual and reproductive health care for students through their student health center. For example, officials at all of the colleges said they offered menstrual products and pregnancy tests, and 12 of the 15 colleges offered sexually transmitted infection (STI) tests. Among contraceptives, college officials said male condoms and oral contraceptives were most commonly available (at 12 of the 15 colleges), while contraceptive implants and intrauterine devices were less commonly available. Medication abortion was available at one college and procedural abortion was not available at any, according to college officials. Various factors affected sexual and reproductive health care offered on campus, including costs, colleges' interpretation of state laws, political sensitivities, and religious affiliation, according to college officials. Officials at the selected colleges said students faced challenges seeking sexual and reproductive health care on campus, including unfamiliarity with sexual and reproductive health care, privacy concerns, and cost, among others (see figure). The selected colleges took various actions to address challenges, such as holding on-campus educational events; using health educators to share information; and implementing measures to enhance privacy at their student health center. Challenges to Students Seeking Sexual and Reproductive Health Care Cited Among 15 Selected Colleges Officials at 14 selected colleges said they did not offer any abortion services before or after the start of the 2021-2022 academic year—the year prior to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization —and officials at one said they began offering medication abortion in February 2021 due to state law. Officials at one college said they discontinued offering off-campus referrals for abortion services due to their state's political environment. In addition, officials at six colleges said some students asked more questions or otherwise expressed more uncertainty about their ability to access abortion services after the start of the 2021-2022 academic year. Officials at most colleges said availability and demand increased for other on-campus sexual and reproductive health care, such as pregnancy testing and contraception. Why GAO Did This Study About 19 million students were enrolled in nearly 3,900 degree-granting colleges across the U.S. during the fall 2022 semester. Many colleges have student health centers that provide health care to the students on their campuses. Among other things, student health centers may offer sexual and reproductive health care, which includes things such as STI testing and prevention; contraception; emergency contraception; pregnancy testing; abortion; and menstrual products. In June 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization that the U.S. Constitution does not confer the right to abortion. GAO was asked to review college students' access to sexual and reproductive health care. This report describes: (1) the availability of on-campus sexual and reproductive health care at selected colleges; (2) challenges students faced in seeking sexual and reproductive health care at selected colleges and efforts those colleges took to address them; and (3) how the availability of sexual and reproductive health care at selected colleges changed since the start of the 2021-2022 academic year. GAO interviewed officials from a nongeneralizable sample of 15 colleges, selected on the basis of program length, location, religious affiliation, size, and other factors. GAO also interviewed three professional organizations and four colleges' health educators. GAO also analyzed data from the American College Health Association's Sexual Health Services Survey for calendar year 2022, the most recent available. For more information, contact John E. Dicken at (202) 512-7114 or dickenj@gao.gov, or Melissa Emrey-Arras at (202) 512-7215 or emreyarrasm@gao.gov.

What GAO Found Education sometimes establishes department-wide or program-specific priorities to guide the process for awarding discretionary grants. Fulfilling a priority may be a required or an optional condition to receive the grant. Education announced department-wide priorities 15 times between November 2001 and December 2021. Some priorities replace previous ones, so not all department-wide priorities are still in use. Priorities covered various topics, such as improving teacher professional development and increasing high school graduation rates. Figure: Timeline of Education's Announcements for Department-Wide Priorities Note: The Department of Education published department-wide priorities two times in both 2014 and 2020. In December 2010, Education announced department-wide priorities and then issued a technical correction of those priorities in May 2011. We are only including the May 2011 version in our analysis because it includes the technical corrections. We also included announcements that amended Education's grant regulations that Education considered to be department-wide priorities. Among the three largest discretionary grant programs within Education’s Office of Elementary and Secondary Education (OESE), the number of priorities per grant announcement ranged from zero to 10 between 2001 and 2024. Across the three programs, the following priority themes were cited most frequently: (1) serving specific populations or geographic areas to improve academic outcomes or access to charter schools; (2) promoting or improving education in science, technology, engineering, mathematics or computer science; and (3) promoting equity in student access to educational resources and opportunities. Why GAO Did This Study Education awarded about $6 billion in discretionary grants during fiscal year 2023, according to officials, with the largest proportion of grant programs administered by OESE. Education awards discretionary grants to recipients such as states and school districts through a competitive process. GAO was asked to examine Education’s priorities for discretionary grants over time. This report provides information about how Education uses priorities in its discretionary grantmaking, how often Education has announced department-wide priorities since 2001, and the statutory authority Education cited when establishing department-wide priorities. It also describes how the number and themes of department-wide and program-specific priorities per grant announcement compare across the three largest OESE discretionary grant programs: (1) School Safety National Activities, (2) Education Innovation and Research, and (3) Charter Schools Program. GAO analyzed Federal Register announcements related to Education’s department-wide and selected K-12 program-specific discretionary grantmaking priorities from 2001 (when Education first identified department-wide priorities) to 2024 (most recent year available). GAO categorized these priorities by themes, identified by using a content analysis of department-wide and program-specific priority language. GAO included all department-wide priorities as well as program-specific priorities for the three largest discretionary grant programs (and their predecessor programs) within OESE by total dollars awarded for fiscal year 2023 (the most recent year available). These programs were: the School Safety National Activities program ($216 million), the Education Innovation and Research program ($284 million), and the Charter Schools Program ($440 million). GAO’s review of these three programs is not generalizable to all of Education’s discretionary grant programs. For more information, contact Jacqueline M. Nowicki at (202) 512-7215 or nowickij@gao.gov.

What GAO Found During the 2024 filing season the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) processed 98 percent of the nearly 174 million individual and business tax returns it received, as of April 19, 2024. IRS continued to face challenges with timely processing of paper returns. For example, IRS did not meet its 13-day goal for processing individual paper returns, instead averaging 20 days. In January 2024, GAO reported that IRS faced similar challenges processing paper returns during the 2023 filing season and recommended that IRS determine the cause and address processing shortfalls. IRS agreed and changed its reporting methodology in June 2024 to account for days in which IRS is awaiting taxpayer responses. However, IRS has not yet documented the cause for the shortfalls. IRS generally improved its customer service to taxpayers relative to 2023, serving more taxpayers on the telephone and in person. However, IRS responses to taxpayer mail continue to be delayed, with 66 percent considered late at the filing season's end. In March 2024, IRS launched a web page showing the receipt date of correspondence that IRS is currently processing. The web page does not provide information estimating how long taxpayers can expect to wait for a response once processing begins. Fully addressing GAO's 2022 recommendation to estimate and communicate time frames for resolving correspondence delays will better set expectations for, and potentially reduce repeat inquiries from, taxpayers. IRS Correspondence Inventory, Including Late Responses, as of the End of Each Filing Season, 2019 to 2024 During fiscal year 2024, IRS used Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) funding to staff and begin modernizing some filing season operations. IRS officials said this helped improve customer service during the 2024 filing season. IRS also used IRA funding for modernization efforts (e.g., mail sorting and scanning machines). Why GAO Did This Study During the annual tax filing season, IRS processes millions of tax returns and issues hundreds of billions of dollars in taxpayer refunds. IRS also provides telephone, correspondence, online, and in-person services to tens of millions of taxpayers. Partly due to the COVID-19 pandemic, IRS has faced challenges in recent years processing tax returns, meeting taxpayer service demands, and hiring employees. The IRA provided IRS tens of billions of dollars in funding to improve these and other areas. GAO was asked to review IRS's 2024 filing season performance. This report (1) assesses IRS's performance processing tax returns, (2) assesses IRS's performance providing customer service, and (3) describes IRS's efforts to improve service and processing. GAO analyzed IRS documentation and data and interviewed officials. GAO determined that these data were sufficiently reliable by reviewing IRS documentation and interviewing officials. GAO also visited two IRS processing facilities and held discussion groups with IRS staff.

What GAO Found The Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) is the primary source of federal funding to states for subsidies that help low-income families afford child care so parents can work, attend school, or participate in job training. According to U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) data, about 1.8 million children received child care subsidies in an average month in fiscal year 2021, roughly 15 percent of the 11.5 million children eligible under federal rules. Subsidies are not an entitlement and states have to prioritize which children receive them due to limited funds. Child Care Subsidy Eligibility and Receipt, Fiscal Year 2021 The number of children eligible for subsidies declined between 2019 and 2020, which HHS attributes to job loss that left children ineligible for subsidies based on their parents’ work status. Eligibility began to rebound in 2021 but did not return to 2019 levels. The number of children receiving subsidies also declined from 2.0 million in 2019 and 2020 to 1.8 million in 2021. A new CCDF final rule that became effective in April 2024 requires states to prohibit family child care co-payments above 7 percent of family income. It also requires states to pay providers before they provide care or at the beginning of the delivery of care rather than getting reimbursed after providing care, among other changes. Every state and the District of Columbia requested temporary waivers to delay implementation of certain provisions of the final rule for up to 2 years. Why GAO Did This Study In fiscal year 2021, federal and state government expenditures for child care subsidies totaled about $14.2 billion, according to HHS. Under CCDF, states have substantial flexibility to establish their own eligibility criteria that determine which low-income working families will be served. As a result, children eligible for subsidies under federal criteria may not be eligible under their state’s criteria. The Child Care and Development Block Grant Act of 2014 includes a provision for GAO to report every 2 years on eligibility for and receipt of child care subsidies. This report examines 1) what the available data show about the number of children eligible for federal child care subsidies and the extent to which they receive and use them, and 2) what the available data show about states’ requested waivers related to implementation of the 2024 CCDF final rule For more information, contact Kathryn A. Larin at (202) 512-7215 or larink@gao.gov.

What GAO Found Under certain circumstances, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers may accept and expend funds from nonfederal public entities, public utility companies, natural gas companies, railroad carriers, and Indian Tribes to expedite its evaluation of required permits for their projects, such as pipelines, in federally regulated waters and wetlands. The Corps does so through agreements that it makes with these entities under section 214 of the Water Resources Development Act of 2000 (WRDA 2000), as amended. Agreements made under this authority are known as section 214 agreements. Examples of Public Works Projects in Wetlands with a U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Permit As of July 2, 2024, the Corps had entered into 23 section 214 agreements for expedited permit processing with public utility companies, natural gas companies, and railroad carriers. The Corps has issued over 3,600 permits using funding from these agreements. In 2018, the Corps issued updated implementation guidance to help ensure its district offices and divisions meet statutory requirements when evaluating permits under section 214 agreements. These statutory requirements include ensuring that permit evaluations under these agreements are using the same procedures for decisions as other permits, are impartial, and are not adversely affecting the timeline for evaluating permits for entities that do not have section 214 agreements, to the maximum extent practicable. The Corps has publicly posted, as required by statute, some information about its section 214 implementation on two different program webpages. However, it does not distinguish between all permits issued using funding from section 214 agreements and other similar agreements. It also does not make all active section 214 agreements to accept funds or section 214 annual reports available on a single website, as section 214 of WRDA 2000, as amended, requires. By (1) updating its permit database to distinguish permits, (2) making all active section 214 agreements to accept funds available on a single website, and (3) making section 214 annual reports available on a single website, the Corps would enhance the transparency of its section 214 activities and ensure that it is making information publicly available as required. Why GAO Did This Study Nonfederal public entities and private entities that propose public works or infrastructure projects in federally regulated waters and wetlands may be required to obtain permits from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers before proceeding. Federal statute also requires these entities to obtain permits to alter a Corps water resource project. Section 214 of WRDA 2000, as amended, authorizes the Secretary of the Army to, after providing public notice, accept and expend funds from nonfederal public entities, public utility companies, natural gas companies, railroad carriers, and Indian Tribes to expedite the evaluation of permits for their proposed projects with a public purpose that fall under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Army. In an August 2017 report, GAO reviewed the Corps’ implementation of its section 214 authority for public utility companies, natural gas companies, and railroad carriers, as required by WRDA 2000, as amended. America’s Water Infrastructure Act of 2018 includes a provision for GAO to conduct a follow-up study. (Pub. L. No. 115-270, tit. I, § 1145(2), 132 Stat. 3765, 3785 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 2352(a)(4)). This report addresses key aspects of the Corps’ use of its expedited permit processing authority for these entities. GAO reviewed Corps documentation, including its 2018 updated implementation guidance, section 214 websites, and annual reports to relevant congressional committees. GAO also interviewed Corps officials about the Corps’ processes for expediting permit evaluations with public utilities, natural gas companies, and railroad carriers with section 214 agreements.

What GAO Found The U.S. public health workforce serves a critical role protecting community health, such as by tracking disease outbreaks, monitoring water quality, and communicating with the public about health threats. Nonfederal jurisdictions within the U.S. (states, territories, Tribes, and localities, such as counties and cities) have primary responsibility for public health in their geographic areas, and these jurisdictions employ most of the public health workforce—more than 200,000 workers. The federal government, particularly the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), supports these jurisdictions' workforces and also employs its own public health workforce. GAO's review found gaps between the existing public health workforce and the workforce needed. These gaps have existed across multiple occupations and jurisdictions and were exacerbated during public health emergencies. Gaps limit the ability of jurisdictions to conduct key public health functions, such as disease investigation and control, identification of hazards, and readiness to respond to emergencies. Examples of Gaps in the Public Health Workforce Challenges with recruiting and retaining workers contribute to public health workforce gaps. These challenges are difficult to solve and are likely to persist over time, according to GAO's review. For example, public health funding can be restricted to limited time frames or specific activities, which makes it difficult to use the funding for hiring. In addition, jurisdictions faced challenges dealing with market competition for workers from other employers offering higher pay, better job security, and more flexibility. Jurisdictions also can have cumbersome hiring processes based on state or local civil service requirements that are difficult to change, and public health work can involve high workloads and stress. HHS and selected jurisdictions have taken some steps to mitigate challenges. For example: HHS has responded to funding challenges by offering jurisdictions greater flexibility in using certain grant funds for workforce hiring and support. Selected jurisdictions have addressed the challenges of market competition, cumbersome hiring processes, and stressful workplace environments by offering financial incentives and improving hiring processes. For example, Maine increased pay for public health nurses and expedited hiring processes, which helped the state fully meet its need. Why GAO Did This Study Public health emergencies such as the COVID-19 pandemic, Hurricane Helene, and other threats, have highlighted the importance of a public health workforce that is ready to meet the needs of its citizens. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 includes a provision for GAO to report on the public health workforce in the United States. This report describes, among other topics: gaps in the jurisdictional public health workforce and challenges to recruitment and retention, and steps HHS and selected jurisdictions have taken to address jurisdictional recruitment and retention challenges. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed 69 public health workforce research studies and reports, and interviewed HHS officials and officials from 11 stakeholder organizations, including national organizations representing jurisdictions, public health professionals, or educational organizations; public health policy and research organizations; and a national organization focused on public health practice and population health. GAO also interviewed officials in 11 jurisdictions, selected to obtain variation in health department structure (e.g., centralized vs. decentralized), funding sources, and percent of population in rural areas. The selected jurisdictions included four states, one territory, two tribal organizations, and four localities. For more information, contact Mary Denigan-Macauley at (202) 512-7114 or deniganmacauleym@gao.gov.

What GAO Found Between February 2022 and April 2024, the Department of Defense (DOD) trained Ukrainian military personnel—mainly at U.S. training ranges in Germany—using various security assistance processes. Much of this training accompanied defense articles that DOD provided to Ukraine under Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA). However, the expanded size, scope, and speed of equipment deliveries to Ukraine contributed to training challenges. GAO found that U.S. Army units initially experienced disruptions delivering training due to insufficient training equipment, limited training preparation time, inadequate support resources to repair training equipment, and mismatches between Ukraine's training needs and U.S. trainer expertise. U.S. Army officials told GAO they overcame these challenges by adapting training schedules and obtaining contractor support, among other strategies. By issuing additional guidance to ensure that combatant commands identify training needs when proposing a security assistance package, DOD would be better positioned to avoid challenges that might disrupt associated training. This is especially relevant for future situations that require the rapid execution of PDA. DOD components that are responsible for overseeing and administering training to Ukrainian forces have used several approaches to assess trends and identify improvement opportunities. However, GAO found that data challenges hindered DOD's assessment approaches (see figure). Providing clear guidance on documenting the approaches used to assess training provided Ukrainian forces would position DOD to make more effective decisions on training in the future. Data Challenges with DOD's Approaches to Assess Training Provided to Ukrainian Forces DOD components also have not consistently recorded observations from training Ukrainian forces in the Joint Lessons Learned Information System, as required by DOD policy. GAO found that this requirement was not reflected in most of the implementing orders that govern the U.S. military's efforts to train Ukrainian forces. As a result, DOD's lessons learned may not be comprehensive or timely, leading to missed opportunities for improvement. This is a public version of a sensitive report GAO issued in November 2024. It omits (1) sensitive information and data related to the number of Ukrainians that DOD trained, (2) challenges and readiness effects that U.S. Army units experienced when providing the training, and (3) factors that hindered DOD components' ability to assess training provided to Ukrainian forces. Why GAO Did This Study In response to Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, DOD has received about $111 billion for assistance to Ukraine and related activities. DOD used a portion of this assistance to train Ukrainian forces. GAO initiated this review in response to a provision in Division M of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023. This report addresses (1) processes DOD has used to provide training on defense articles to Ukrainian forces and the associated challenges; and (2) approaches DOD has used to assess the training and share lessons learned, among other issues. GAO reviewed DOD documents on security assistance processes, examined training assessments and lessons learned results, and reviewed training range and readiness data.

What GAO Found In July 2024, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) completed its first Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) fraud risk assessment using its Fraud Risk Assessment Portal. It identified and assessed 21 fraud risks. GAO categorized these 21 fraud risks into nine broad categories. Categories Describing the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Fraud Risks Identified and Assessed by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services However, HHS's process for assessing risks is not fully consistent with leading practices for fraud risk management, as outlined below. Lack of clear guidance or procedures on planning and conducting regular TANF fraud risk assessments. HHS has not established clear guidance or procedures related to planning and conducting regular TANF fraud risk assessments. Specifically, HHS does not have clear and finalized guidance to ensure these assessments occur regularly. Also, HHS does not have standard procedures for conducting TANF fraud risk assessments. Relevant state or local stakeholders not involved in the TANF fraud risk assessment process. HHS did not engage directly with state and local TANF agencies, or their respective Offices of Inspectors General or auditors, to identify TANF fraud risks while conducting the program's fraud risk assessment. According to HHS officials, their ability to require these stakeholders to provide information on TANF fraud risks is limited. The Social Security Act prohibits oversight activities of state TANF programs beyond what is explicitly outlined in law. However, HHS is not prohibited from requesting input from stakeholders. Likelihood, impact, and tolerance of identified fraud risks, and additional risks are not assessed or determined. HHS's Fraud Risk Assessment Portal—used to conduct the assessments—is not designed to assess the likelihood or impact or determine tolerance of fraud risks identified. Additionally, the portal is not designed to assess additional fraud risks facing a program, such as TANF. Having a process for assessing fraud risks that is fully consistent with leading practices can help HHS ensure that its managers are aware of evolving fraud risks and are efficiently and effectively managing them. Why GAO Did This Study Since 1996, the TANF block grant has provided $16.5 billion annually in federal funding to states to help support low-income families and address community needs. Recent information from state auditors and the U.S. Department of Justice highlight concerns about whether vulnerabilities in TANF create opportunities for program participants and others to misuse or divert funds. GAO was asked to review TANF spending. This report examines the extent to which HHS identified and assessed TANF fraud risks. It is part of a series of reports reviewing TANF, see GAO-25-107235 . GAO reviewed HHS's fraud risk assessment for TANF and related policies, plans, and methodologies. GAO also interviewed HHS officials. GAO compared this information against leading practices for fraud risk management. GAO independently identified TANF fraud risks by reviewing court cases; state single audit reports; and prior GAO reports. GAO also interviewed state and local officials, including auditors, from eight states selected based on geography and variation in poverty level.