What GAO Found In May 2025, GAO identified 29 priority recommendations for the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). Since then, VA has implemented two of those recommendations. In May 2026, GAO identified an additional 3 priority recommendations, bringing the total to 30. GAO is highlighting the following three areas that warrant timely and focused attention: Improving quality and timely access to health care, Modernizing information technology, and Enhancing acquisition management. Addressing GAO's recommendations in these areas would help VA respond to risks that could interfere with the quality and timeliness of veterans' health care; achieve cost savings and better oversee information technology efforts; and address challenges with its high-risk acquisition management. Taking action to implement all of GAO's open priority recommendations would help enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of operations across VA. Why GAO Did This Study Priority open recommendations are the GAO recommendations that warrant priority attention from heads of key departments or agencies because their implementation could save large amounts of money; improve congressional and/or executive branch decision-making on major issues; eliminate mismanagement, fraud, and abuse; or make progress toward addressing a high risk or duplication issue, among other benefits. Since 2015, GAO has sent letters to selected agencies to highlight the importance of implementing such recommendations. For more information, contact Jess Farb at farbj@gao.gov.

What GAO Found Threat actors, such as state-sponsored hackers or criminal groups, are increasingly capable of carrying out cyberattacks on water and wastewater systems. This capability comes from the increasing connections between operational technologies—which control valves, pumps, and other physical devices—and internet-enabled devices. Internet-enabled devices can provide remote access to control pumps and other infrastructure. Remote access can be helpful over large and widely distributed water and sewer systems. However, the convergence of operational technologies and internet-enabled devices has also increased the ability of online attackers to reach critical operational systems. Water and wastewater systems have faced challenges reducing their vulnerability to cyberattacks. For example, systems have varying levels of cybersecurity capabilities. Systems are also managing workforce shortages and older technologies that are difficult to update with modern cybersecurity protections. Systems must also prioritize limited financial resources, so meeting regulatory requirements for clean and safe water may out-compete cybersecurity investments. Water and Wastewater Systems are Vulnerable to Cyberattack In 2024, GAO found that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had not performed key cybersecurity risk management steps for the sector and made recommendations to address these shortfalls. In response, EPA conducted a water sector risk assessment and developed a risk management plan to guide its efforts to mitigate priority risks. GAO also reported that EPA had faced legal challenges in its efforts to ensure water and wastewater entities took action to improve their cybersecurity. In response to GAO’s recommendation to evaluate the sufficiency of its legal authorities, EPA identified several critical gaps. Specifically, EPA identified a lack of cybersecurity risk assessment requirements for wastewater systems and certain drinking water systems. EPA also identified significant limitations in its authority under federal drinking water and clean water laws to address those gaps. GAO will continue to monitor how EPA addresses these limitations. Why GAO Did This Study Recent cyber incidents and security alerts highlight the vulnerability of the close to 170,000 water and wastewater systems that make up the U.S. water and wastewater systems sector (water sector). The water sector is one of 16 critical infrastructure sectors. GAO has identified the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure as a component of the cybersecurity high-risk area, which is one of nine high-risk areas needing focused executive and congressional attention. A successful cyberattack on a water or wastewater system could lead to service disruptions that harm public health or the environment. These systems have already experienced ransomware attacks, which use malicious software to deny access to IT systems or data. EPA is responsible for leading, coordinating, and supporting activities to reduce cybersecurity risk to the water sector. EPA works in partnership with the Department of Homeland Security’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency and other federal, state, and local entities. This statement addresses the cybersecurity challenges facing the water sector and EPA’s actions to address the sector’s cybersecurity risks. This statement is based on GAO’s August 2024 report on cybersecurity risks to U.S. water and wastewater systems (GAO-24-106744); documents provided by EPA in response to GAO’s recommendations; and publicly available information, as of May 2026, regarding challenges and EPA’s water sector cybersecurity efforts. For more information, contact David B. Hinchman at hinchmand@gao.gov or J. Alfredo Gómez at gomezj@gao.gov.

What GAO Found There are 18 intelligence community (IC) elements in the federal government. These elements have implemented a range of guidance through various sources to provide protections to service members under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, as amended (USERRA). Of these 18 IC elements, seven have statutory requirements under USERRA that are distinct from those of other federal agencies. These statutory requirements are delineated in USERRA under sections 4315 and 4325 of title 38, U.S. Code and include statutory provisions that apply to the seven IC elements listed in the figure below.   These seven IC elements have statutory requirements to provide reemployment protections under USERRA and include five provisions that are statutorily required to be in their guidance. However, GAO found that four of these IC elements—DIA, NRO, NSA, and FBI—have not included all five of these provisions in their guidance. Better meeting the intent of sections 4315 and 4325 of title 38, U.S. Code, could help these four elements stave off potential issues. For example, it could help ensure that service members are not being discriminated against because of their military service. By including in their guidance all five of the IC reemployment provisions that are statutorily required, DIA, NRO, NSA, and FBI can better ensure service members are informed of their rights under USERRA. GAO also found that the seven IC elements have reemployed all service members that went on military duty for 30 days or more from fiscal years 2019 through 2025, according to data reported by officials from these elements. Why GAO Did This Study USERRA prohibits employers from discriminating and retaliating against veterans and service members because of their military status or service. Specifically, USERRA protects the employment and reemployment rights of service members who temporarily leave government or private sector civilian jobs to perform military or other uniformed service. The Senator Elizabeth Dole 21st Century Veterans Healthcare and Benefits Improvement Act includes a provision for GAO to examine how the IC protects rights afforded to service members under USERRA. This report describes the guidance that IC elements have implemented to provide protections to service members under USERRA, and examines the extent to which the seven IC elements include the five provisions that are statutorily required to be in their guidance. GAO assessed guidance against statutory requirements under USERRA, analyzed reemployment and claims data, and interviewed relevant officials about their efforts to provide reemployment protections to service members.

What GAO Found The Veterans Health Administration (VHA) uses the services of external entities, known as business associates, to act on behalf of health care providers or other business associates to create, receive, maintain, or transmit protected health information (PHI). Veterans Affairs (VA) has implemented PHI sharing agreements with these entities to ensure they address requirements of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) Privacy Rule. GAO reviewed 73 randomly selected sharing agreements and found that 100 percent of them included all 12 HIPAA Privacy Rule requirements for use and disclosure of PHI. Further, VHA documented responsibilities for conducting performance audits to confirm that external entities are protecting veterans’ PHI. VA took steps to secure the health information in a key system used by its Million Veteran Program (MVP), which is focused on examining how genetics, lifestyle, military experiences, and exposures affect health and wellness in veterans. However, deficiencies existed in certain cybersecurity controls related to asset and risk management; configuration management; identity and access management; and continuous monitoring and logging. As a result of these deficiencies, VA had reduced assurance of the confidentiality and integrity of sensitive health information in the MVP. In September 2025, GAO made 13 recommendations to VA to address these deficiencies. Since September 2025, VA implemented nine of the 13 recommendations and partially implemented three others (see figure). GAO will continue to monitor VA’s progress in implementing the remaining recommendations. Figure: VA Progress, as of March 2026, in Addressing 13 GAO Recommendations Made in September 2025 Why GAO Did This Study Within VA, VHA oversees the delivery of health care services to millions of veterans. The amount of PHI used by VHA and shared with external entities highlights the importance of protecting the privacy of PHI. Further, VA is responsible for the cybersecurity of veterans’ sensitive health data, such as information in systems used to support its MVP. Since launching in 2011, about 1 million veterans have joined MVP, making it the nation’s largest biorepository of veteran data. GAO was asked to review VA’s privacy and cybersecurity efforts. In September 2025, GAO issued a sensitive report with limited distribution on the extent to which VHA oversaw the privacy of veterans’ health information shared with external entities, and the extent to which VA protected the confidentiality and integrity of veterans’ health information in its MVP, among other things. In that report, GAO identified security control deficiencies in a system supporting MVP and made 13 recommendations to address them. This report is a public version of the September 2025 report, with sensitive information removed. For this public report, GAO also determined the extent to which VA had taken corrective actions to address the previously identified security control deficiencies and the 13 related recommendations for improvement. GAO reviewed supporting documents and interviewed agency officials regarding VA’s actions to address these recommendations. For more information, contact Jennifer R. Franks at FranksJ@gao.gov.

What GAO Found In 2022 The Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) directed federal agencies to make research results freely accessible to the public immediately when published. In response, seven of the nine agencies GAO reviewed issued updated plans or policies. The Department of Transportation and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission were still drafting updated plans and policies at the time of our review. Five agencies’ plans or policies fully met OSTP’s guidance. The National Science Foundation’s and U.S. Department of Agriculture’s plans did not fully address OSTP’s guidance for reuse rights. These rights describe how others can share, modify, or use the research. Better alignment with OSTP’s guidance could help ensure this research can be built upon by others. Amid the federal shift to public access, publishers are changing their business models to remain viable without subscription revenue and will require authors to pay to have their publications made open access. Agencies allow grant funds to cover these charges. Assuming historical patterns continue, the new policies and publishers' responses may result in significant agency cost growth. This would mean less money for research (see figure). However, only the National Institutes of Health has planned to manage these potential costs. Additional analysis could help other agencies better manage costs, which may triple annually. Estimated Spending on Publishing Charges for Selected Agencies Increased public access can improve the visibility of research and enable readers to identify problems with specific publications more quickly. However, according to stakeholders GAO spoke with, pay-to-publish models may encourage publishers to lower publication standards to publish more articles. In 2024, OSTP published an economic analysis on expanding public access, but it did not fully reflect all five of GAO’s key elements of an economic analysis. Notably, the scope did not address the goal of estimating the potential costs and other effects. Ensuring that future analyses are consistent with the key elements can help agencies better understand the cost implications of their new policies. Why GAO Did This Study The U.S. government is one of the largest funders of scientific research globally. The results of federally funded research are ordinarily shared through scholarly publications. But many of these publications were restricted to paid subscribers. GAO was asked to examine agencies’ efforts to implement OSTP’s 2022 guidance. This report examines: (1) the extent to which selected agencies' public access plans and policies are consistent with federal guidance, (2) how the scholarly publishing industry is responding to the federal shift to public access and how this affects selected agencies and journal market dynamics, (3) the potential effects of expanding public access to federally funded research, and (4) the extent to which OSTP’s 2024 economic analysis of public access followed GAO’s key elements for an economic analysis. GAO selected nine agencies with a mix of research funding levels and assessed their public access plans and policies against OSTP guidelines. GAO reviewed available literature and data and interviewed nongovernmental stakeholders, such as publishers and universities. Further, GAO assessed OSTP’s economic analysis against GAO’s key elements that serve as a framework for assessing an economic analysis.

How to Use the Framework GAO’s framework is a method for assessing AI capabilities and capacity in the U.S. and its competitiveness. A nation’s competitiveness in AI is how well it develops or deploys AI technologies compared to other nations. Policymakers may be interested in knowing how the U.S. compares to other nations in the AI race. GAO developed this framework to help analysts from government, industry, academia, and elsewhere obtain and provide structured information to policymakers about AI competitiveness. The complexity of factors affecting AI competitiveness makes it difficult to decide which factors are more important than others. The framework organizes relevant factors into four pillars: Science & Technology, Human Capital, Governance, and Economy. Each pillar is further divided into subpillars, such as R&D; laws, regulations and policies; workforce; and investment and financing. Analysts can use these pillars and subpillars to systematically consider the breadth of factors relevant to the needs of policymakers seeking information on our nation’s AI capabilities and capacity versus those of other nations. Factors Affecting AI Competitiveness Analysts can use the framework for different purposes and policymaker needs. For example, if U.S. policymakers express interest in helping U.S. companies export AI technologies, analysts can use the framework to rank the U.S. and its peers in their progress toward outcomes of AI competitiveness, such as the ability to influence global technology standards. These rankings can in turn inform policies to help the U.S. improve its AI capabilities, capacity, and competitiveness. The framework involves four steps that allow analysts to tailor their assessment: Focus the assessment by selecting targeted outcomes of AI competitiveness. Identify indicators for measurement or evaluation. Conduct data analysis. Develop policy options and final product. Framework for Assessing AI Competitiveness   Why GAO Developed This Framework Artificial intelligence (AI) could spur economic growth, enhance societal well-being, and improve national security. These possibilities have led to a global AI competition, in which nations that fall behind risk losing economic advantages and global influence. To be competitive, the U.S. needs to consider risks of AI deployment, such as job dislocation and increased energy consumption. Assessing U.S. competitiveness in AI presents challenges. The ability of the U.S. to successfully develop and deploy AI technologies depends on a broad mix of factors, including private and public investment, talent attraction, regulatory environments, and computing infrastructure. GAO was asked to develop a framework to assess U.S. AI capabilities, capacity, and competitiveness compared to other nations. GAO developed this framework to help analysts prioritize among the many factors that affect AI competitiveness. The framework is also designed to help analysts develop policy options to improve U.S. competitiveness. To develop this framework, GAO conducted a literature search to find articles on frameworks and measurements to evaluate AI capabilities and capacity and reviewed key reports on AI competitiveness and assessment methods. GAO also interviewed, surveyed, and met with experts from government agencies, academia, industry, nonprofit organizations, and more. For more information, contact Candice Wright at WrightC@gao.gov. or Sterling Thomas at ThomasS2@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The Department of Energy (DOE) is pursuing options to grout (i.e., immobilize in a concrete-like mixture) a portion of waste from 22 underground storage tanks at the Hanford Site. Specifically, DOE plans to grout about 24 million gallons of waste that has low levels of radioactivity—called low-activity waste (LAW). The waste will then be disposed of at one of two commercial disposal facilities located outside of Washington State. DOE will generally follow five process steps to grout and dispose of Hanford LAW. General Process Steps for Grouting and Disposing of Low-Activity Radioactive Waste from Hanford In December 2025, DOE’s tank waste contractor at the Hanford Site issued a solicitation to prospective subcontractors to submit proposals to grout the waste. As of April 2026, DOE and its contractor are evaluating proposals and plan to award one or more contracts later in 2026. As part of this evaluation, DOE is assessing options regarding where to grout this waste. DOE’s options include, for example, designing and constructing a new grouting facility onsite at Hanford or transporting liquid waste to existing grouting facilities for treatment and permanent disposal. In determining a path forward, DOE must consider a range of factors, including cost and schedule, associated risks, and disposal options. DOE must also consider whether to transport the waste in liquid or grouted form by truck or rail. DOE officials and industry representatives agreed that a reasonable cost estimate for grouting Hanford LAW, in either a new or existing commercial grout facility, ranges from about $20 to $45 per gallon of waste. Accordingly, grouting 24 million gallons of LAW could cost $480 million to $1.1 billion. DOE officials and industry representatives emphasized these costs captured only the grouting process and did not include other key costs, such as transportation, disposal, and the need to address potential organic materials that were added during waste extraction operations and remain in a portion of the waste. DOE is also exploring potential opportunities to continue grouting Hanford LAW beyond the initial 22 tanks. In doing so, DOE officials stated they must holistically consider the costs, schedules, and risks present across all of DOE’s efforts spanning the Hanford Site. They added that pursuing additional grouting opportunities could help the agency to address existing gaps in Hanford’s treatment capability and accelerate cleanup operations at the site. Why GAO Did This Study The Hanford Site in Washington State is home to one of the largest and most expensive environmental cleanup projects in the world. DOE’s mission at Hanford includes addressing approximately 55 million gallons of hazardous and radioactive waste stored in 177 underground tanks that must be retrieved and treated—or immobilized—before disposal. GAO has previously reported that grouting Hanford LAW could accelerate DOE’s cleanup mission and save billions of dollars. Senate Report 119-39 includes a provision for GAO to assess DOE’s available options for grouting Hanford LAW. This report provides information on DOE’s options for grouting, transporting, and disposing of a subset of Hanford LAW and key factors for DOE’s consideration in pursuing identified options. GAO assessed DOE documentation, relevant reports, and prior GAO work on DOE’s cleanup mission at Hanford and its options to treat and dispose of liquid tank waste. GAO also analyzed data from DOE’s Best Basis Inventory on the volume and radioactivity of selected underground storage tanks at Hanford. GAO interviewed DOE officials and industry representatives to identify and assess DOE’s options for grouting and transporting Hanford LAW as well as relevant factors affecting DOE’s decision-making. For more information, contact Nathan J. Anderson at andersonn@gao.gov.

Why This Matters In September 2017, Hurricanes Irma and Maria struck Puerto Rico, causing billions of dollars in damage to its housing, infrastructure, and economy. Paths of Hurricanes Irma and Maria in Puerto Rico, September 2017 Puerto Rico had already experienced a prolonged economic recession before the hurricanes, contributing to increases in mortgage delinquencies and foreclosures. The widespread devastation from Maria raised questions about how foreclosure rates in Puerto Rico might be affected. In November 2023, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York published a report that examined the effects of Irma and Maria on the stability of banks and their ability to lend, as well as the performance of bank-held and federally owned or guaranteed mortgages. Specifically, it compared the performance of mortgages in Puerto Rico before and after Maria, including rates of delinquency, banks’ mortgage loss, and foreclosure. The report also provided information on homeownership rates. According to the report, Maria’s effect on mortgages in Puerto Rico appears to have been mild or short-lived. The following summarizes the report’s key findings. Delinquency Rates At the time Maria struck, more than 10 percent of active mortgages in Puerto Rico were already delinquent. The rate roughly tripled by November 2017 but returned to pre-Maria levels 1 year later. Loss Rates for Bank-Held Mortgages Bank losses on mortgages generally represent the unpaid principal balance of loans in default minus amounts recovered from the proceeds of the sale of the home and mortgage insurance. Banks’ mortgage loss rates can be considered a proxy for estimating mortgage default rates in Puerto Rico. According to the report, various financial protections helped limit bank losses and contributed to relatively mild and short-lived financial effects. For example, mortgage insurance and government assistance helped protect banks from losses on residential mortgages in Puerto Rico. Banks experienced the greatest losses on conventional mortgages without private mortgage insurance. Loans covered by mortgage insurance (private or through the Federal Housing Administration) or guaranteed by the Department of Veterans Affairs were less likely to result in bank losses. These insured or guaranteed loans made up about 37 percent of all loans. Losses were more common among loans that were already troubled before Maria. Foreclosure Rates In response to Maria, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, Federal Housing Administration, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture imposed a foreclosure moratorium from the fourth quarter of 2017 through the third quarter of 2018. Despite the spike in delinquencies, foreclosures continued to decline during the moratorium. After it was lifted, foreclosures rose for several months before returning to prior trends after about 1 year. Many mortgages foreclosed in 2019 were likely delinquent before Maria, suggesting that the effect of Maria was modest. Homeownership Rates In 2017, homeownership rates in Puerto Rico were comparable to those on the U.S. mainland. However, mortgage financing was less common in Puerto Rico—about 41 percent of owner-occupied homes had a mortgage, compared with about 67 percent on the mainland. According to the report, residents in Puerto Rico’s large informal housing sector (such as homes built on public land and subdivided family plots) may lack title to their property, making it hard to obtain a mortgage. Rates of Return for Housing Developers The Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act also required GAO to report on rates of return for housing developers in Puerto Rico, but this analysis could not be conducted because data were not available. Why GAO Did This Study The Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act includes a provision for GAO to report on foreclosures in Puerto Rico before and after Hurricane Maria, including rates of delinquency, default, foreclosure, and homeownership. This report summarizes key relevant findings from a November 2023 Federal Reserve Bank of New York report that examined this issue. For more information, contact Jill Naamane at naamanej@gao.gov.

Based on the limited procedures GAO performed in reviewing the performance of the independent public accountant’s (IPA) audit of the Congressional Award Foundation’s financial statements for fiscal year 2024, GAO did not identify any significant issues it believes require attention. Had GAO performed additional procedures, other matters related to the performance of the audit might have come to its attention that it would have reported. The IPA provided an unmodified audit opinion on the Foundation’s financial statements for fiscal years 2024 and 2023. Specifically, the IPA found that the Foundation’s financial statements were presented fairly, in all material respects, in accordance with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles. However, for fiscal year 2024, the IPA identified a deficiency related to revenue recognition that it considered to be a material weakness in the Foundation’s internal control over financial reporting. Further, for fiscal year 2024, the IPA did not identify instances of noncompliance or other matters that are required to be reported under U.S. generally accepted government auditing standards. The Foundation concurred with the IPA’s conclusions. GAO’s review of the Foundation’s fiscal year 2024 financial statement audit, as differentiated from an audit of the financial statements, was not intended to enable GAO to express—and it does not express—an opinion on the Foundation’s financial statements or a conclusion on the effectiveness of its internal control over financial reporting. Furthermore, GAO does not express an opinion on the Foundation’s compliance with provisions of applicable laws, regulations, contracts, and grant agreements. The IPA is responsible for its reports on the Foundation and the conclusions expressed therein. GAO provided a draft of this report to the Foundation and the IPA for review and comment. The Foundation’s National Director and the Foundation’s Audit Committee Chair responded in an email that they have taken actions to improve operations and internal controls over financial reporting related to revenue recognition. The IPA’s Audit Principal responded in an email that the IPA had no comments regarding GAO’s report and its findings. Why GAO Did This Study This report presents the results of GAO’s review of the Foundation’s financial statement audit for fiscal year 2024. The Congressional Award Act established the Congressional Award Board to carry out a program to promote excellence among the nation’s youth in the areas of public service, personal development, physical fitness, and expedition or exploration. The Board created the Foundation as a nonprofit corporation to help it carry out this program. The Congressional Award Act, as amended by the Government Reports Elimination Act of 2014, requires the Foundation to obtain an annual financial statement audit from an IPA. The act also includes a provision for GAO to review the audit and report the results to the Congress annually. GAO’s objective was to review the Foundation’s fiscal year 2024 financial statement audit to identify any significant issues it believes require attention. To satisfy this objective, GAO (1) read and considered various documents with respect to the IPA’s independence, objectivity, and qualifications; (2) analyzed key IPA audit documentation; (3) read the Foundation’s financial statements for fiscal years 2024 and 2023, the IPA’s audit report on the these statements, and the IPA’s report on internal control over financial reporting and on compliance and other matters based on its audit; and (4) discussed matters pertinent to its objective with IPA representatives and Foundation management officials. For more information, contact Cheryl E. Clark at clarkce@gao.gov.

What GAO Found In this 10th annual review, GAO found that most federal agencies that could be subject to the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990, as amended (IAA), have published civil monetary penalty inflation adjustments for 2025 in the Federal Register and reported related information in their 2025 or 2024 agency financial reports (AFR) or equivalent. All 49 agencies GAO reviewed for 2025 correctly calculated the 2025 civil monetary penalty annual inflation adjustment amounts. However, one agency did not publish its inflation adjustment in the Federal Register as of December 31, 2025, and did not report the required information in its 2025 AFR for its civil monetary penalties. Why GAO Did This Study The IAA includes a provision, added in 2015, for GAO to annually submit to Congress a report assessing agencies' compliance with the annual inflation adjustments the act requires. For more information, please contact Paula M. Rascona at rasconap@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The Department of Defense’s (DOD) Defense Suicide Prevention Office (DSPO) is responsible for suicide prevention efforts across the department, but it lacks information to monitor DOD-wide completion of required suicide prevention training. Specifically, a DSPO official told GAO the office does not receive data from the military services on whether they are completing the training. Requiring the services to report their training completion rates would give DSPO data needed to make informed decisions as it oversees training and develops DOD-wide suicide prevention policies. In addition, the military services’ headquarters suicide prevention offices generally do not effectively monitor training completion for their service members. The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps offices do not regularly track required annual training completion and only the National Guard Bureau takes action to help ensure training completion. Addressing these issues would help the service headquarters offices ensure training and service-specific learning objectives are reaching the military community as intended. Examples of Learning Objectives from Military Services’ Suicide Prevention Trainings, as of 2025 The military services have also not fully assessed the effectiveness of their suicide prevention training. Most of the services have taken steps to do so. For example, the Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force have surveys for some annual trainings. But these and other efforts have not fully assessed training effectiveness, such as by identifying the extent to which expected outcomes have been achieved. Developing and implementing evaluation plans would help the services ensure a systematic approach to assessment and determine if trainings are achieving intended outcomes, such as recognizing risk factors for suicide. DOD has made progress implementing certain training-related recommendations from the Suicide Prevention and Response Independent Review Committee, but uncertainties exist for future efforts. DOD has begun addressing the committee’s recommendations, including 18 on nonclinical training. However, GAO found that DOD’s ability to continue these efforts is uncertain given recent changes in staffing levels and pending decisions on combining suicide prevention training with other trainings. By using an iterative process to regularly update its project plans to account for and mitigate these uncertainties, DOD would be better positioned to effectively assess risks and manage resources. Why GAO Did This Study Suicide rates for active-duty service members have gradually increased since 2011, according to DOD. DOD’s latest data show that in 2024, 471 service members died by suicide. Suicide prevention training can increase awareness of risk factors and provide resources for intervention, among other things. However, recent GAO and DOD reports have identified gaps in DOD’s implementation of suicide prevention activities, including training. House Report 118-125 includes a provision for GAO to assess DOD’s suicide prevention training. This report examines (1) DSPO and the military services’ monitoring of suicide prevention training completion; (2) the military services’ assessment of training effectiveness; and (3) DOD’s steps to address an independent review committee’s training-related recommendations. GAO reviewed DOD policies, procedures, and other documentation on suicide prevention training; analyzed fiscal years 2020–2024 data on training completion; assessed DOD-wide evaluation procedures against federal standards; and interviewed officials.