What GAO Found In school year 2024–2025, about 10 percent of the approximately 60,000 K-12 students attending Department of Defense Education Activity’s (DODEA) schools full time received strategic instruction. This is short-term extra help in a small group setting (see figure). About 5 percent had a “specific learning disability” (SLD). SLDs are a group of disorders, such as dyslexia and dyscalculia, related to understanding language or doing mathematical calculations. The number of DODEA students with SLDs increased 29 percent from school years 2018–2019 through 2024–2025. DODEA Instructional Materials for Students with Literacy and Math Deficits Most staff in the 11 selected schools GAO visited—in five districts that serve 63 percent of DODEA students with SLDs—outlined obstacles to timely identifying students needing strategic instruction or special education for SLDs. These included limited screening tools, challenges with submitting complete student referrals for strategic instruction and special education, and delayed special education evaluations. For example, at nine of 11 schools, staff said they needed more or better screening tools to identify students. DODEA’s screening tools do not directly assess elementary school students’ foundational phonics skills, which help identify reading deficits. They also are not available for all students. These limitations make it difficult to identify students who are behind grade level when they arrive at a school—which is important given DODEA’s highly mobile population. In July 2026, DODEA officials said that they procured universal screening tools for all grades and plan to start administering them in late 2026. When implemented, these tools will provide key data to fill gaps in identifying students’ needs and connect them to support. DODEA staff at all 11 schools we visited also cited obstacles to helping students meet their literacy and math goals. These included strategic instruction and special education teachers not receiving professional learning relevant to their roles, not having adequate access to data on students’ grades, and varied practices across DODEA schools that result in eligible students not receiving needed help to meet grade-level expectations. For example, during GAO’s interviews, 32 of 44 strategic instruction and special education teachers rated their professional learning opportunities as “bad” or “very bad.” Further, staff at all 11 schools said they wanted teachers to be able to provide input on needed professional learning—for example, opportunities focused on identifying students with literacy and math deficits and SLDs. DODEA guidelines say that professional learning should advance teachers’ ability to apply acquired knowledge and skills targeted to their role. Asking for and acting on teacher feedback would help DODEA advance teachers’ ability to apply the skills needed to help students with literacy and math deficits and SLDs meet their learning goals. Why GAO Did This Study Students in military families—many of whom attend DODEA schools—face unique challenges due to frequent moves. DODEA families have raised concerns about access to literacy and math supports and special education services. Research shows that instruction tailored to students’ needs can improve academic outcomes and reduce the number of students referred to special education. The Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the 2025 National Defense Authorization Act includes a provision for GAO to examine services for DODEA students with literacy and math deficits and SLDs. GAO examined (1) the number of students receiving strategic instruction or having an SLD, (2) the extent DODEA provides guidance and tools to identify these students, and (3) the extent DODEA supports teachers in helping students. GAO analyzed DODEA data from school years 2018-2019 through 2024-2025 on student enrollment and reviewed relevant federal laws and DOD policies. GAO conducted in-person site visits to schools in five of nine DODEA districts, selected for variation in number of students with SLDs, among other things. GAO interviewed DODEA officials and held 47 group interviews with teachers, administrators, and other stakeholders. GAO also administered a nongeneralizable opt-in online questionnaire to parents of DODEA students with SLDs.

What GAO Found Selected field offices in Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Environmental Management (EM) have taken steps to evaluate effectiveness of contractor assurance systems (CAS) in accordance with DOE policy, though neither DOE nor EM have defined effectiveness or specified evaluation criteria. The basis on which the selected field offices made their respective effectiveness determinations was unclear (see table). In addition, all selected field offices reported examples of poor CAS performance and recurring issues that undermined the reliability of the effectiveness determinations. How Selected EM Field Offices Assessed Contractor Assurance System (CAS) Effectiveness Selected field office CAS effectiveness determination Was CAS effectiveness defined? Were effectiveness criteria included? Hanford Effective No No Idaho Effective No No Los Alamos Not determined No No Source: GAO analysis of Office of Environmental Managment (EM) information. | GAO-26-107850 Hanford: The field office reported that the contractor demonstrated poor work planning and conduct of operations, requiring EM to formally request a corrective action plan in several areas. Also, the contractor’s review of issues between January 2022 and October 2023 found that it improperly closed and insufficiently documented nearly 40 percent of sampled issues at the two highest significance levels. These are issues that should not recur or are typically related to misuse of resources, according to field office officials. Idaho: The field office reported that the number and severity of conduct of operations and maintenance-related abnormal events indicated a need for improved rigor and discipline in operations. The contractor noted trends that showed a continuing need for attention to detail and personnel awareness. Additionally, the contractor reported 15 radiological events over 8 months that put personnel at risk of radiological overexposure. Los Alamos: The field office identified concerns with CAS effectiveness, including that the contractor did not have effective processes for self-identifying significant issues. Furthermore, a widespread breakdown of the contractor’s training and qualification program in 2023 resulted in a stop work order—an indicator that a CAS is not functioning well, according to a field office official. The stop work order resulted in a 90-day delay for nuclear waste disposal and environmental remediation efforts. Without defining what constitutes an effective CAS—including establishing specific, measurable evaluation criteria—field offices do not have concrete guidelines for evaluating CASs and their determinations may be less informative or meaningful as a result. Additionally, the lack of a clear definition hinders EM’s ability to hold the contractor accountable, and EM cannot be assured that contractors can effectively and efficiently manage risks. Why GAO Did This Study EM relies on contractors to execute its mission to clean up contaminated sites from decades of nuclear-related activities. EM expects certain contractors to design and use a CAS—management systems and processes to oversee their own performance, identify and report potential problems, and take actions to prevent their recurrence. According to EM policy, EM is to rely on outcomes and information from CASs to inform and optimize their respective oversight programs. However, in 2024, an independent entity found that contractors inadequately managed issues, leading to compromised safety and increased likelihood of significant consequences. Senate Report 118-58, accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, includes a provision for GAO to examine EM’s oversight of contractors’ assurance systems. This report examines the extent to which EM has evaluated the effectiveness of selected CASs. GAO reviewed EM and contractor documents, conducted a site visit, and interviewed DOE officials and contractors. GAO selected three contracts and associated CASs, contractors, and field offices to review based on factors including contract value and purpose.

What GAO Found Qualified Opportunity Zones (Zone)—low-income census tracts nominated by governors and designated by the Department of the Treasury—have lower incomes and higher poverty than other census tracts. The law commonly known as the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA) changed the eligibility criteria for Zone designation, which resulted in fewer eligible tracts for future selection. Stakeholders, including some states and subject-matter specialists, reported that this may allow better targeting of the tax incentive to the most economically distressed areas. Stakeholders reported the incentive is primarily funding real estate development. According to state officials and Qualified Opportunity Fund representatives, Zones that received investment tended to be in urban locations and have access to infrastructure and community support. Tax benefits for investments in newly defined rural Zones could drive investment in those areas, but stakeholders were uncertain about the extent. States were mostly unsure about the effects of investment on outcomes, but about 20 percent of states cited increased job creation and housing as effects. States’ Views of Effects of Opportunity Zone Investment on Selected Outcomes in Their States, 2025 OBBBA’s changes to the tax incentive may mitigate some challenges state officials and fund representatives identified with the original incentive. For example, new requirements for funds and for Treasury to report on characteristics of investments will allow the government and the public to better understand investment and its potential economic effects in Zones. Further, the additional time the act provides for states to prepare to nominate census tracts to be designated as Zones may help states make informed selections. Why GAO Did This Study Congress created the Opportunity Zone tax incentive to spur investment in economically distressed communities. Taxpayers who invest in Qualified Opportunity Funds—funds organized for the purpose of investing in Zones—are eligible for certain tax benefits, such as deferral of taxes on the invested amount. These funds held more than $108 billion in assets as of the end of 2024. OBBBA made the incentive permanent and introduced a new category of Zones comprised entirely of a rural area with different potential tax benefits. GAO was asked to review the Opportunity Zone tax incentive. This report describes (1) Zones’ characteristics and how the revised incentive under OBBBA could affect future Zones’ characteristics; (2) the experiences of states, Qualified Opportunity Funds, and other stakeholders with the original incentive and how the revised incentive may affect future investment activity; (3) stakeholders’ awareness of the original incentive’s effects on communities; and (4) the changes to the incentive introduced by OBBBA and the extent to which they address previous challenges. GAO analyzed Census data on tracts designated as Zones and those eligible for the second round of Zone designation, analyzed data from a nongeneralizable sample of 16 Qualified Opportunity Funds, interviewed fund representatives, conducted site visits to investments from seven selected funds, surveyed all states and U.S. territories, and interviewed selected state officials and subject-matter specialists knowledgeable about the tax incentive from five organizations. GAO also reviewed documents and interviewed federal agency officials. For more information, contact Jessica Lucas-Judy at lucasjudyj@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The Department of Defense (DOD) does not request full funding of identified needs for installation maintenance or major improvement projects for facilities. This shortage has led to an estimated $285 billion of maintenance backlogs in fiscal year 2025. Due to competing budget priorities, DOD set a goal to fund 90 percent of its maintenance needs, but GAO found that the military services continue to fall short of this goal by funding about 80 percent of these needs. DOD has not fully determined the risks to its mission and to the quality of life of its personnel as a result of not meeting its funding goal. Fully determining and communicating these risks would provide better information to DOD and Congress to weigh budget priorities. Examples of Facility Deterioration at Selected Military Installations due to Deferred Maintenance, Resulting in Damage, Corrosion, and Suspected Mold DOD also faces challenges in hiring and retaining key maintenance workers, which are critical for maintaining facilities. According to officials, challenges include hiring in remote and isolated locations; employment competition with the private sector; and federal hiring, pay, and work eligibility practices, which have been exacerbated by recent workforce reductions and the subsequent hiring freeze. However, GAO found that the military departments have not fully identified the extent of maintenance workforce shortages or developed strategies to address these challenges. Doing so would better position department and service leadership to ensure that they have the skilled workforce to address maintenance needs. Reliable information is important for DOD to effectively prioritize needed maintenance and improvement projects in light of insufficient funding and workforce challenges. However, GAO found that standards for maintenance vary across the services, limiting effective department-wide decision-making. Additionally, installations rely on maintenance work order data systems to respond to identified maintenance needs. However, GAO found that tracking is limited and that the data within those systems are generally unreliable for determining the overall effectiveness of maintenance performed across installations and the services. With improved maintenance information, DOD would be better positioned to take steps to strengthen oversight to improve the department’s vast portfolio of infrastructure and ensure that risks to mission and quality of life are reduced. Why GAO Did This Study DOD had over 736,000 facilities worldwide, with an estimated value of $2.6 trillion as of fiscal year 2025. Managing real property has been on GAO’s High-Risk List since 2003. GAO has reported that better management of the federal government’s real property portfolio is needed to collect reliable real property information and improve the condition of federal facilities, including DOD facilities, and could save billions of dollars. Senate Report 118-58 and House Report 118-125 contained provisions for GAO to assess DOD’s installation maintenance practices. Specifically, this report examines the extent to which DOD has (1) fully funded its facility maintenance and improvement needs; (2) determined the sufficiency of its maintenance workforce; and (3) developed the needed standards, reliable information, and oversight to manage installation maintenance. GAO analyzed DOD policies, budgets, maintenance data, and other documentation; interviewed DOD officials, including installation officials and maintenance customers from a non-generalizable sample of eight installations.

What GAO Found As of August 2026, EXIM was not monitoring the end use of any dual-use export because all such transactions had been repaid in full. EXIM did not finance any new exports under its dual-use authority in fiscal year 2025, according to EXIM authorization data and EXIM officials. Why GAO Did This Study The mission of the Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM) is to help support American jobs by facilitating the export of U.S. goods and services and financing imports. In 1994, Congress passed legislation authorizing EXIM to facilitate the financing of U.S. exports of defense articles and services with both civilian and military applications, provided that the bank determines such dual-use items are nonlethal and primarily meant for civilian end use. Included in the same act was a provision for GAO, in consultation with EXIM, to report annually on the end uses of dual-use exports financed by EXIM during the second preceding fiscal year. This report (1) examines the status of EXIM's monitoring of dual-use exports that it continued to finance in fiscal year 2024, as of August 2026, and (2) identifies any new dual-use exports that EXIM financed in fiscal year 2025. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed EXIM documentation and data on dual-use exports and interviewed EXIM officials. For more information, contact Nagla'a El-Hodiri at elhodirin@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is preserving a sufficient inventory of low-enriched uranium (LEU) and highly enriched uranium (HEU) to meet national security needs until the 2040s. Separately, the largest needs for civilian enriched uranium are fuel for light water and advanced reactors. Estimates from the Department of Energy (DOE) and others about LEU supply and demand are generally well established, but factors such as the ban on LEU imports from Russia could affect availability. Demand estimates for high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) vary, and estimated supply may not meet near-term demands. National Security and Civilian Use of Enriched Uranium NNSA has a plan to meet national security needs for enriched uranium that includes using current inventory until the 2040s while pursuing three enrichment efforts for long-term needs. NNSA estimates total program costs for these efforts of about $140 billion through 2105. NNSA has not yet conveyed those costs in a biennial report required by Congress because the estimates are new. Providing this information would inform Congress of future costs for any future production options being considered. On the civilian side, DOE awarded $900 million to one company to expand LEU enrichment in the U.S. to support the existing commercial reactor fleet. DOE also issued $1.8 billion in awards to two companies to build HALEU capacity in the U.S. to support development of advanced reactors. However, DOE did not document an analysis to determine whether its actions are sufficient to induce expansion of commercial LEU and HALEU production in the U.S. According to agency documents and stakeholders, a range of challenges may affect NNSA’s and DOE’s goals to increase domestic enriched uranium production, but both agencies are working to mitigate challenges. For example, limitations in domestic fuel cycle infrastructure could challenge NNSA and DOE in achieving their goals. In 2025, DOE entered into an agreement to increase conversion capacity, to address one of the limitations in the domestic fuel cycle. Why GAO Did This Study The U.S. needs enriched uranium for national security and civilian purposes. NNSA provides enriched uranium to support missions such as tritium production for nuclear weapons and fuel for naval reactors. Civilian needs include fuel for commercial nuclear power, medical isotope production, and research reactors. Current law and policy restrict the U.S. from using imported uranium or uranium enriched through foreign technology to meet national security needs and the U.S. does not have a fully domestic enrichment capability. Civilian nuclear fuel can be sourced domestically or internationally. Federal laws direct DOE to support domestic development of advanced nuclear reactors and LEU and HALEU fuels. The fiscal year 2023 National Defense Authorization Act and two congressional committee reports provide for GAO to address NNSA’s and DOE’s management and development of enriched uranium in the U.S. This report describes estimates of enriched uranium supplies and demands, examines agency plans to meet enriched uranium needs, and describes potential challenges to agency enriched uranium supply goals. GAO reviewed NNSA and DOE documents and plans, and interviewed DOE, NNSA, other agency officials, and industry representatives.

What GAO Found The Army’s two efforts to modernize its battlefield networks—the nearer-term Command and Control Fix (C2 Fix) and the longer-term Next Generation Command and Control (NGC2)—seek to make command and control more adaptive, survivable, and better suited for modern large-scale combat operations. Representation of Evolution of Battlefield Network Through Next Generation Command and Control (NGC2) The Army’s approach to developing C2 Fix and NGC2 incorporates some key elements of an iterative business case. For example, the Army is using a flexible acquisition approach that collects user feedback and makes changes based on evolving market conditions and product capabilities. However, the Army has not taken important steps to implement other key elements that could position the Army to assess the scalability of these efforts. Specifically: The Army developed short-term schedules for NGC2 through fiscal year 2027 with a tentative goal of fielding NGC2’s full technology stack across 11 divisions and four corps by the end of fiscal year 2032. However, the Army is not well positioned to assess its ability to meet this timeline because it has not developed a detailed schedule that identifies the specific units, by fiscal year, that will receive the modernized capabilities. The Army identified NGC2 costs through fiscal year 2026 in documentation supporting the President’s fiscal year 2026 budget submission totaling approximately $3.3 billion. However, the Army has limited visibility into long-term costs because it has not completed an initial cost estimate for the life cycle of the collective effort. The absence of a detailed schedule and long-term cost data limits the Army’s ability to assess whether it has the time and resources it needs to meet its tentative goal for fielding NGC2 across the service by 2032. This gap risks access to secure and reliable communications that soldiers in the field need for modern large-scale combat operations. This information would also better position the Army and Congress to be able to make informed decisions about how to proceed with this effort. Why GAO Did This Study The Army’s modernization strategy seeks to provide soldiers with network technologies to command and control forces across vast terrain and multiple domains (i.e., land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace). As part of this strategy, the Army is focusing its modernization efforts on developing a mobile system of hardware, software, and infrastructure for reliable and secure communications. Senate Report 118-188 includes a provision for GAO to review the Army’s battlefield network modernization efforts. This report addresses (1) how the Army’s modernization approach for battlefield command, control, and communications networks enables it to meet evolving user needs and clearly specify the product to be provided; and (2) the extent to which the Army assessed its ability to scale NGC2 across the military service. GAO reviewed Department of Defense policy and guidance, requirements and planning documents, and Army budget requests. GAO evaluated if, and how, the Army developed cost and schedule estimates; and compared the Army’s two battlefield network modernization efforts against GAO’s leading practices for innovative product development, specifically the key elements of an iterative business case for target schedule and internal value. GAO also spoke with Army officials.

What GAO Found Five Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) teams are implementing the security cooperation workforce provisions in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024. Of the 66 provisions in the law we identified and reviewed, the agency has completed work on 46, is in progress on 15, and has not started implementing the remaining five. DSCA expects to complete work on all security cooperation workforce provisions in fiscal year 2028. For example: The Human Capital Initiative has completed work on 23 provisions and is in progress on 11 provisions. For example, the team has completed the provision to identify and code security cooperation workforce positions. It is in progress of implementing the provision to develop a management information system with the qualification, assignments, and tenure of security cooperation workforce personnel. The Defense Security Cooperation Service has completed work on two of four provisions related to ensuring that security cooperation workforce offices possess the requisite personnel, and that such personnel possess the skills needed to properly perform their missions. Status of Security Cooperation Workforce Provisions, by Defense Security Cooperation Agency Implementation Team, as of May 2026 Note: DSCU = the Defense Security Cooperation University DSCA officials implementing the security cooperation workforce provisions have identified and made plans to address personnel shortfalls and other challenges. For example, DSCA officials said that the federal civilian hiring freeze, implemented in January 2025, has been a factor in not being able to hire personnel to fill positions in the Human Capital Initiative. Officials are addressing this challenge by assigning key tasks and duties to other team members and leveraging other DSCA expertise to overcome critical skill gaps. As another example, officials identified challenges related to the development of a management information system. Officials said that DOD’s various security cooperation workforce components use different data systems to track positions and personnel. Until this management information system is in place, analysis of the security cooperation workforce position data is being done manually. Why GAO Did This Study To advance the U.S. national security strategy and foreign policy, the Department of Defense’s (DOD) security cooperation workforce works on activities that build the capacity of partner nations’ security forces through security assistance, including foreign military sales. This workforce includes military and civilian personnel in the U.S. and overseas who are responsible for planning, monitoring, or conducting these types of activities. DSCA, within DOD, plays a key role in planning and executing these programs. Congress included provisions to help modernize and professionalize the security cooperation workforce in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 The statute also includes a provision for GAO to evaluate DOD’s implementation of these provisions. GAO examined (1) the status of DSCA’s implementation of the Act’s security cooperation workforce provisions and (2) DSCA’s plans to address the challenges it identified in implementing the provisions. GAO reviewed and analyzed DSCA documents describing actions the agency is taking to implement the provisions. GAO identified a total of 66 provisions in the law. GAO assessed the status as “complete” if there was evidence of actions taken that addressed the provision with no significant identified actions remaining to implement it. “In progress” indicates there is some evidence of actions taken to address the provision, and “not started” means that, as of May 2026, DSCA had not taken any actions to address the provision. GAO also interviewed DSCA officials responsible for managing these efforts about these actions and challenges in implementing the provisions. For more information, contact James A. Reynolds at reynoldsj@gao.gov.