What GAO Found The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) administers and enforces the National Labor Relations Act. The Act encourages the practice of collective bargaining, protects the rights of employees in this area, and seeks to eliminate unfair labor practices. To do so, the Board relies on a host of IT systems to carry out its functions, including seven human resources systems. According to NLRB officials, the United States DOGE Service (USDS) (formerly known as the United States Digital Service and now commonly referred to as DOGE) first contacted them on April 15, 2025. Subsequently, USDS staff met with NLRB’s Chairman, Acting General Counsel, and other senior Board leaders on April 16, 2025. That same day, NLRB entered into agreements for two General Services Administration employees to be detailed to NLRB as DOGE team staff. The agreements expired on July 25, 2025. The DOGE team requested access to NLRB systems but did not use them. Specifically, both DOGE team staff requested access to all seven of the Board’s human resources systems. Board staff then (1) fulfilled two of those access requests but (2) did not fulfill the other five. Specifically: Two fulfilled requests. According to NLRB officials, the Board created accounts on April 24, 2025, for both team members that addressed two of the seven requests for system access. However, DOGE team staff did not use the accounts to enter the systems. Specifically, as of July 25, 2025, the team staff had not picked up their NLRB laptops or activated their system accounts, according to Board officials. Accordingly, NLRB disabled the system accounts shortly after the agreements with team staff expired. Five requests that were not fulfilled. Requests for access to the remaining five systems were not completed because the DOGE team staff did not pick up the laptops needed for the Board to provide them with such access. GAO found no evidence that DOGE team staff accessed any of these systems between April 16, 2025, and July 25, 2025. To determine this, GAO reviewed the sign-in activity of the logs for the DOGE team members’ accounts used to access NLRB network resources and did not identify any sign-ins during the specified timeframes. Why GAO Did This Study USDS was created by executive order to implement the President’s goals to maximize government efficiency by modernizing technology. The executive order also calls for the heads of executive branch agencies to establish DOGE teams that work with USDS. On April 14, 2025, an NLRB IT staff member disclosed to Congress allegations that one or more DOGE team members arrived in March 2025 and unlawfully accessed the Board’s case management systems and allowed potential foreign actors to exfiltrate or steal data. The following day, a news outlet publicly reported on these allegations. According to NLRB, the Board’s Inspector General is investigating these allegations. GAO was asked to review the systems and information NLRB’s DOGE team accessed at the Board. This report describes the NLRB systems that the DOGE team had been provided access to and how, if at all, the team used those systems. To address the objective, GAO focused on DOGE team access to NLRB systems between April 16, 2025, and July 25, 2025 (start and end dates for the agreements to detail DOGE team staff to NLRB). GAO did not review DOGE team access prior to April 16, 2025, to not overlap with the NLRB Inspector General’s investigation. GAO reviewed system access request forms and NLRB approval communications to determine the level of access that the DOGE team was authorized to receive for each system. GAO also interviewed NLRB staff regarding what level of access they provided for each system to the team. GAO reviewed NLRB sign-in activity of the logs for the accounts used to access agency network resources. The NLRB did not have any comments on the report. For more information, contact Marisol Cruz Cain at CruzCainM@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The U.S. government disburses payments for various reasons (e.g., income tax refunds, benefit payments, and vendor and salary payments). The majority of federal entities process their payments through the Bureau of the Fiscal Service’s (BFS) payment systems. Accordingly, the integrity and security of these systems are critical to the nation’s economy. The preliminary results of GAO’s ongoing work show that one Treasury Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) team employee had access to three BFS payment systems between January 2025 and February 2025. The employee had access to view, copy, and print data for the three payment systems. In addition, the employee was inadvertently granted temporary access to create, modify, and delete data for one of the three systems, but GAO found no evidence of any changes to system data. The bureau did not fully address three of four selected control areas for ensuring that DOGE team employees with access to BFS systems follow its IT security rules. (See table.) Specifically, BFS implemented five of the 14 selected controls within those four areas. Extent to Which Bureau of the Fiscal Service (BFS) Implemented the Four Selected Cybersecurity Control Areas Control area Area rating Control System Access (5 controls) Partially implemented Control System Integrity (2 controls) Fully implemented Control Information Confidentiality (4 controls) Substantially implemented Monitor System Usage (3 controls) Substantially implemented Source: GAO analysis of BFS documentation. | GAO-26-108131 Key: Fully implemented: BFS provided evidence that satisfied all of the related controls; Substantially implemented: BFS provided evidence that satisfied at least two-thirds, but not all, of the related controls; Partially implemented: BFS provided evidence that satisfied at least one-third, but less than two-thirds, of the related controls. Examples of BFS not fully implementing specific controls include: BFS did not ensure that an employee agreed to follow the bureau’s IT security rules before receiving a BFS laptop. As a result, the bureau was not well positioned to hold the employee accountable for not following those rules. BFS did not configure its security tools to identify and block unencrypted payment information resulting in an employee improperly transmitting payment information outside of the bureau. In addition, the Treasury DOGE team did not always follow BFS’s IT security rules. Specifically, an employee did not encrypt payment information sent to another agency DOGE team or obtain approval to share this information prior to sending it. This employee did not always follow the IT security rules because, as previously discussed, BFS did not implement all controls needed to ensure compliance with those rules. Until BFS fully implements controls for overseeing users with broad access to payment systems, this important information will be at greater risk of improper access, modification, disclosure, and misuse. Why GAO Did This Study The United States DOGE Service (USDS) was created by executive order to implement the President’s goals to maximize government efficiency by modernizing technology. The order also calls for the heads of executive branch agencies to establish DOGE teams that work with USDS. GAO was asked to review the efforts of Treasury DOGE staff to protect BFS systems. Its objectives were to (1) describe the DOGE team access to BFS payment systems, (2) evaluate the extent to which BFS implemented controls to ensure that the DOGE team followed the bureau’s IT security rules, and (3) assess the extent that the DOGE team followed those rules. In addressing its first objective, GAO summarized the preliminary results of its ongoing work describing access to payment systems. For the latter two objectives, GAO completed its audit work and is making recommendations. Specifically, GAO analyzed federal IT security guidance and identified 14 applicable controls in four areas related to managing system access and protecting sensitive information. GAO also analyzed BFS’s IT security rules and evaluated documentation related to DOGE access to payment systems.

Why This Matters Space-based data centers would place data processing and storage systems for AI and other computing needs into satellites. This could reduce the land, electricity, and water needed for data centers on Earth. Several companies have begun development of data centers in space, but there are engineering and economic barriers to deployment. Key Takeaways Placing data centers in space could reduce the demand for resources from these facilities on Earth. Data centers generate excess heat, but space does not cool computing hardware efficiently. This could be a major engineering challenge. A significant increase in the number of satellites in orbit could be difficult to manage and cause collisions. The Technology What is it? Data centers house computer servers, data storage systems, and network equipment that provide digital applications and services—such as artificial intelligence (AI) and cloud computing. Space-based data centers would house similar equipment in satellites to process data in space instead of on Earth (see figure). How does it work? Most proposals for space-based data centers use satellites deployed to low Earth orbits. These orbits allow faster communication with Earth and cost less to reach than higher ones. Some low Earth orbits (e.g., sun-synchronous) could also provide satellites with near-continuous solar energy. Some proposals envision constellations of thousands of new satellites working together to process data. Figure 1. Terrestrial and Hypothetical In-Space Data Centers These might supplement or replace the use of terrestrial data centers for energy-intensive tasks such as cloud computing services or training AI models. How mature is it? Like existing satellites, space-based data centers need support systems that provide power, cooling, and communication. These basic components rely on mature technologies, but their deployment and operation to support data centers is unproven. Smaller data centers intended to process data generated in space may be closer to maturity than larger data centers built to train AI models in space. Large data centers have power and cooling needs that will require further engineering development, such as solar arrays that are larger than any launched and assembled in space as of April 2026. Cooling solutions at this scale are also unproven. Large data centers produce waste heat that must be dissipated into space to prevent damage to computing systems. Such cooling is challenging because heat is not easily dispersed in the near-empty vacuum of space. Space-based data centers may need more advanced data transfer systems. These systems could transmit larger amounts of data to Earth or between networked satellites for data-intensive tasks like training AI. Public and private projects are testing high-performance computing hardware and communications technologies in space, with deployment of some data center satellites planned by the mid-2030s. Since January 2026, the Federal Communications Commission has received three applications from U.S. companies for large satellite constellations operating as data centers. Other projects are underway in China, the European Union, and Japan. Opportunities Reduce AI resource demands. The Department of Energy projects data centers will account for up to 12 percent of U.S. electrical demand by 2028, driven by AI development. Data centers in space might reduce demand for electricity, water, and physical infrastructure on Earth. Process data collected in space faster. Orbiting telescopes and observation satellites create large volumes of data that are currently sent to Earth for processing. Not all raw data are ultimately useful, and processing in space could reduce data transmission volume to Earth, and associated costs, and increase decision-making speed. Challenges Economic viability. Manufacturing and launching satellites is expensive. Reducing the cost of space-based data centers may depend on developing solutions to electricity, cooling, and communications needs that do not add excessive size or launch weight. Crowded orbits. More satellites in orbit could increase collision risks, including with crewed missions, and interfere with astronomical research. Federal agencies must coordinate demand nationally and internationally for radio frequencies for data communication. Computing in space. Space radiation can corrupt data unpredictably and degrade hardware. Mitigation may be costly or could reduce computing performance. A data center might benefit from in-space servicing by other satellites, but this capability is underdeveloped. As a result, data centers might be decommissioned more frequently than other satellites, potentially increasing space debris or risks from atmospheric reentry. Policy Context And Questions To what extent does the U.S. have adequate launch and other facilities to support a potential increase in satellites? What information is needed to help policymakers balance growing commercial use of space with the long-term management of space as a resource? How might existing laws, treaties, and other international agreements covering space or using data apply to data centers in space? What research is needed to predict the safety, costs, and life cycles of novel data centers, including in space? Selected GAO Work In-Space Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing: Benefits, Challenges, and Policy Options, GAO-25-107555. Large Constellations of Satellites: Mitigating Environmental and Other Effects, GAO-22-105166. Selected Reference Ablimit Aili, Jihwan Choi, Yew Soon Ong, and Yonggang Wen. "The development of carbon-neutral data centres in space." Nature Electronics, vol. 8, no. 11 (2025): 1016–1026. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41928-025-01476-1. For more information, contact Karen L. Howard, PhD at HowardK@gao.gov.

What GAO Found For fiscal year 2025, 15 agencies’ estimated improper payments totaled about $186 billion across 64 programs. This represented about $24 billion more in improper payment estimates in fiscal year 2025 than in the prior fiscal year. Agencies reported that about $153 billion (approximately 82 percent) of this total was the result of overpayments. However, these estimates do not represent the full extent of government-wide improper payments. For instance, the $186 billion does not include certain programs that agencies have determined are susceptible to significant improper payments, such as the Department of Health and Human Services’ Temporary Assistance for Needy Families. Of the programs reporting improper payment estimates for fiscal year 2025, 19 reported improper payment rate estimates of at least 10 percent, including six programs whose rates exceeded 25 percent. Programs Reporting the Largest Percentage of Government-Wide Improper Payments Estimates for Fiscal Year 2025 Note: For more details, see fig. 2 in GAO-26-108694. Percentages in the figure do not sum to 100 percent due to rounding. The Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 (PIIA) requires the inspector general (IG) at each executive branch agency to annually report on the agency’s compliance with applicable PIIA criteria. According to these IGs, half of the 24 agencies reporting the majority (99 percent) of the federal government’s improper payment estimates in fiscal year 2024 fully complied with PIIA criteria and related Office of Management and Budget requirements. The IGs found that the other 12 agencies did not comply with at least one criterion in fiscal year 2024. IGs made recommendations to address noncompliance related to inadequate risk assessments for five agencies and unreliable estimates for seven agencies. Why GAO Did This Study Improper payments—those that should not have been made or were made in incorrect amounts—have consistently been a government-wide issue. Since fiscal year 2003, cumulative improper payment estimates by executive branch agencies have totaled about $3 trillion, though the actual amount may be much higher. Reducing improper payments is critical to safeguarding federal funds. GAO performed this audit in connection with the statutory requirement for GAO to audit the U.S. government’s consolidated financial statements. This report provides an overview of federal agencies’ improper payment estimates for fiscal year 2025. Additionally, it discusses agencies’ compliance with requirements for reporting and managing improper payments in fiscal year 2024 as well as the recommendations that IGs made to the agencies to improve compliance.

What GAO Found In fiscal year 2025, the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) conducted over 4,600 security reviews. The agency also documented over 800 security violations (see figure) and over 1,000 open security vulnerabilities associated with cleared contractor facilities. To conduct its industrial security mission, DCSA relied on over 470 industrial security mission personnel and spent over $160 million in fiscal year 2025. Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) Documented 815 Security Violations by Category Type, Fiscal Year 2025 Note: Security violations are incidents where a contractor fails to comply with the National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual’s policies and procedures that could reasonably result in the loss or compromise of classified information. For example, data spills are when classified information appears, or “spills,” onto an unclassified system. Security vulnerabilities are identified weaknesses in a contractor’s industrial security program that could be exploited to gain unauthorized access to classified information or information systems accredited to process classified information. DCSA has taken steps to manage risk with the industrial security mission. These include efforts to identify, assess, and respond to risk. However, DCSA has not addressed gaps to fully assess and respond to risks to its operational activities in line with DOD guidance on risk management. For example, DCSA has not identified and developed analytic capabilities to better support field operators’ assessments of risk at the regional level. With such capabilities, the agency could identify the most significant regional trends affecting its overall performance objectives. Further, DCSA began an initiative in 2019—the National Access Elsewhere Security Oversight Center (NAESOC)—aimed at mitigating risk partly through the reduction of workload on regional officials. However, participants in all 12 of the focus groups GAO conducted reported on the center’s insufficient staffing, limited risk mitigation, and industry dissatisfaction. According to DCSA officials, the agency has not comprehensively assessed the NAESOC risk response effort, including identifying its resourcing needs and outcome-oriented performance goals. Doing so would be in line with DOD risk guidance to conduct regular assessments on risk responses. Finally, DCSA identified challenges with its current industrial security data system of record and has begun developing a replacement. However, DCSA has not continuously engaged its end-users—DCSA regional and military department officials—throughout the development process, to include requirements development and other stages prior to testing. Without doing this, DCSA risks developing a replacement system with ongoing challenges. Why GAO Did This Study Foreign entities continue to attempt to illicitly obtain classified information and technology from industry thousands of times a year. DCSA, a Department of Defense (DOD) component, administers the DOD portion of the National Industrial Security Program (NISP), with the purpose of protecting classified information released to federal contractors, among others. DCSA has responsibility for ensuring that contractors properly access and store classified content for an estimated 90 to 95 percent of U.S. classified contracts across the federal government. House Report 118-125 includes a provision for GAO to review DOD’s administration of the NISP. This report addresses (1) the funding, personnel, and training DCSA dedicates to perform its industrial security mission, and the extent to which DCSA (2) has managed risks within the NISP’s core operational activities and (3) is addressing challenges with the National Industrial Security System. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials from DCSA, the military service components, and the National Archives and Records Administration. GAO also conducted a series of focus groups with 80 selected DCSA regional personnel who conduct industrial security operations.

What GAO Found During GAO’s audits of the Federal Housing Finance Agency’s (FHFA) fiscal year 2025 financial statements, GAO identified a deficiency in FHFA’s controls over its review of its financial statements for conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles that represents a new significant deficiency in FHFA’s internal control over financial reporting. GAO also found that FHFA completed corrective actions to address seven of the nine recommendations from prior reports that remained open as of September 30, 2024. In conjunction with the recommendations it addressed, FHFA resolved the significant deficiency in controls over its review of accounts payable accruals that GAO reported as a result of its 2024 audits. Why GAO Did This Study In January 2026, GAO reported on the results of its audits of FHFA’s fiscal year 2025 financial statements and the deficiency in FHFA’s internal controls. This report presents (1) the deficiency GAO identified during its fiscal year 2025 audit, along with the related recommendation to address this deficiency, and (2) the status of FHFA’s corrective actions to address recommendations related to internal control over financial reporting deficiencies identified in prior reports that remained open as of September 30, 2024. As part of its fiscal year 2025 audits, GAO reviewed FHFA policies and procedures; interviewed FHFA management and staff; observed controls in operation; and tested controls to determine whether FHFA effectively designed, implemented, and operated these controls. GAO also followed up on the status of FHFA’s corrective actions to address open recommendations related to internal control over financial reporting deficiencies that GAO identified in prior reports.

What GAO Found Operating and support (O&S) costs are comprised of costs for repair parts, maintenance activities, contract services, and personnel. The Department of Defense (DOD) identified 14 systems with critical O&S cost growth out of 36 weapon system sustainment reviews it conducted for fiscal years 2023 and 2024. This critical O&S cost growth represents at least a 25 percent increase in the cost estimate for the remainder of a system’s life cycle compared with its most recent independent cost estimate, or at least a 50 percent increase compared with the original baseline cost estimate. GAO identified common causes DOD reported for the critical O&S cost growth for the 14 systems, such as extensions to operational life. Weapon System Sustainment Reviews with Reported Critical Operating and Support Cost Growth and Causes, Fiscal Years 2023 and 20224 Note: Weapon systems experienced critical O&S cost growth in either Category A (growth is at least 25 percent more than the estimate documented in the most recent independent cost estimate for the system) or Category B (growth is at least 50 percent more than the original baseline cost estimate for the system). DOD has taken some actions to address critical O&S cost growth identified in fiscal year 2021 and fiscal year 2022. However, GAO found the Army has not fully completed a software update that it reported would remediate a top maintenance issue for its Common Remotely Operated Weapons Station (CROWS). Doing so would yield cost savings that GAO estimates would be more than $130 million over the program’s remaining approximately 30 years of life. Without ensuring that its units implement the software update identified in the CROWS remediation plan on a timely basis, the Army is missing an opportunity to address a top maintenance issue affecting this weapon system and to achieve a cost savings of more than $130 million over the remaining life of the program. DOD identified challenges in conducting sustainment reviews and determining O&S cost growth. GAO found that DOD has taken steps to address challenges, such as revising guidance to correct cost estimating data deficiencies. Why GAO Did This Study DOD spends tens of billions of dollars to sustain its weapon systems. O&S costs are about 70 percent of a system’s total life-cycle cost. In response to a statutory provision, DOD has been required to annually submit sustainment reviews that include O&S cost estimates and the reasons for any critical cost growth, although the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 eliminated the requirement for DOD to include the O&S cost growth information in its sustainment reports. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 included a provision for GAO to review DOD’s annual sustainment reviews and O&S cost estimates through 2025. This report, the final one to be submitted under this statutory requirement, evaluates the extent to which DOD (1) identified critical O&S cost growth in its fiscal years 2023 and 2024 weapon system sustainment reviews and the causes of that growth, (2) has taken actions to address the critical O&S cost growth identified in the fiscal years 2021 and 2022 sustainment reviews, and (3) has taken steps to identify challenges and improve the sustainment review process. GAO analyzed DOD guidance and weapon system sustainment reviews DOD conducted in fiscal years 2023 and 2024 and cost savings initiatives identified in the fiscal years 2021 and 2022 reviews and interviewed DOD officials who conducted the reviews.

What GAO Found Navy and Coast Guard shipbuilding programs have consistently fallen short of expectations over the last 2 decades. Collectively, they are billions of dollars over cost and years behind schedule. For example, the Navy’s Constellation class frigate program was overcome by issues. As a result, the Navy announced a strategic shift away from the program in 2025—having previously exercised contract options valued at over $3 billion dollars. Similarly, the Coast Guard paused work on two ships and terminated two other ships in its Offshore Patrol Cutter program after a more than 5-year delay in delivering the lead ship. Constellation Class Frigate and Offshore Patrol Cutter Proposed solutions by federal officials have included reorganizing how shipbuilding programs are managed, increasing shipbuilder workforce wages, and finalizing ship designs before beginning construction, among others. While there is no singular solution, implementing leading practices and GAO’s prior recommendations could help ensure smoother sailing. For example, ensuring that new ship design efforts, such as the Navy’s planned new attack submarine program, fully leverage ship design practices used by leading companies will be critical to long-term success. This would include practices like iterative design based on user feedback, completing ship design before beginning construction, and using digital tools. (See GAO-24-105503.) Additionally, the shipbuilding industrial base—the private companies that build or supply the parts for ships—has not met the government’s submarine construction goals in recent years. GAO’s analysis of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) efforts to invest in the submarine industrial base to improve its capacity found shortcomings. For example, DOD does not know how much funding it expects to need—beyond the more than $10 billion DOD already invested—to solve submarine industrial base challenges such as ensuring needed parts get delivered on time. Without this understanding, decision-makers may not have the information needed to balance funding for the submarine industrial base with other shipbuilding priorities. Further, DOD has not taken key steps to ensure oversight for some of its costliest submarine industrial base investments. Without improvements, such as documented project monitoring, DOD cannot ensure those taxpayer dollars are helping achieve its goals as cost effectively as possible. These findings can provide lessons learned for the Navy, Coast Guard, and other federal agencies in their efforts to build up the maritime industrial base. Why GAO Did This Study The U.S. is in a period of heightened emphasis on improving shipbuilding to tackle pressing national security demands. The Navy and Coast Guard spend billions to procure ships each year and have ambitious plans to build new ships. GAO has reported for decades on the persistent issues that plague these shipbuilding programs and has made more than 100 recommendations to address them. This statement addresses (1) the state of Navy and Coast Guard shipbuilding; (2) key challenges the Navy and Coast Guard need to address to achieve their ambitious shipbuilding goals; and (3) DOD’s efforts to support the submarine industrial base and the lessons that can be derived for future maritime industrial base investments. This statement is based on prior and ongoing GAO work. In addition, GAO is issuing the results of its analysis of DOD’s management of submarine industrial base investments in this testimony statement. To perform this work, GAO analyzed relevant Navy and Coast Guard documentation and interviewed knowledgeable officials.

What GAO Found The Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA's) Individual Assistance helps survivors of major disasters cover necessary expenses and serious needs that insurance or low-interest loans do not cover. This may include reimbursing survivors for temporary lodging or providing assistance with rental housing and home repairs. In response to Hurricanes Helene and Milton, the 2025 Los Angeles (LA) wildfires, and the 2025 Texas floods, FEMA provided over $3 billion to 1.2 million individuals and households, according to agency data. FEMA has made changes to improve the implementation of its assistance to survivors. For example, FEMA has simplified application requirements and increased eligibility for certain assistance. However, GAO found that survivors continued to face challenges communicating with FEMA and securing post-disaster housing. For example: Reaching FEMA's helpline. FEMA data show that most survivors affected by Hurricanes Helene and Milton and the Texas floods faced long wait times and could not reach a representative when trying to apply for assistance through FEMA's helpline. Understanding FEMA's letters. Some survivors faced challenges interpreting letters from FEMA regarding their eligibility for assistance. For example, some survivors thought letters requesting more information were denial letters, according to FEMA and state officials. FEMA revised its letters in 2024 and 2025 to incorporate more plain language and clearer instructions. Securing post-disaster housing. Survivors of recent disasters and officials from all levels of government experienced long-standing housing challenges. For example, FEMA officials said that it was challenging for the agency to support post-disaster housing for survivors after Hurricane Helene destroyed many of the housing resources that were already constrained before the storm hit. Additionally, FEMA officials reported issues that delayed the agency's ability to provide direct housing—such as needing to set up septic tanks and energy meters before making manufactured housing units available. At the direction of the current administration, FEMA made recent changes that affect its delivery of assistance to survivors. This includes focusing on providing support at state or local centers, thereby reducing the need for FEMA to establish its own Disaster Recovery Centers where applicants can obtain information and apply for benefits. In addition, FEMA has discontinued its door-to-door canvassing efforts. However, some FEMA and state officials expressed concerns about how this could affect their ability to support survivors who may not be able to access an in-person recovery center, including those who are older, have disabilities, live in rural areas, or lack phone or internet access. State and local capacity to provide assistance to survivors will significantly impact the implementation of these and other potential changes to FEMA's delivery of assistance. For example, officials from four states affected by Hurricanes Helene and Milton told GAO they do not have their own individual assistance programs for survivors after a disaster. In addition, federal and state officials emphasized the need for adequate time for state and local governments to prepare for any changes in disaster response roles since they currently rely on significant federal support. Why GAO Did This Study The extensive damage caused by recent natural disasters, including Hurricanes Helene and Milton in 2024, the LA wildfires in 2025, and the July 2025 floods in Texas, demonstrates the need for government-wide action to deliver assistance efficiently and effectively. GAO has previously reported that disaster survivors have faced numerous challenges receiving aid from FEMA—the lead agency for federal disaster response. This includes challenges understanding and navigating the assistance process that may have prevented survivors from receiving assistance for which they may have otherwise been eligible. Further, improving processes for assisting survivors is one of the key challenges identified in GAO's High-Risk List on Improving the Delivery of Federal Disaster Assistance. Congress and the President have signaled an interest in enacting reforms to FEMA. For example, in January 2025, the President established a FEMA Review Council to assess FEMA's disaster response efforts, recommend improvements to the agency, and review existing reform proposals. GAO was asked to review long-standing challenges and emerging issues in federal response efforts for recent disasters. This report, the third in a series, provides information on FEMA's assistance to disaster survivors and related challenges. GAO reviewed FEMA information on Individual Assistance—including data on the amount of assistance provided and the number of calls to FEMA's helpline, and eligibility letters to survivors. GAO also analyzed information from 56 interviews and written responses from FEMA and state and local governments impacted by disasters in recent years. For more information, contact Chris Currie at CurrieC@gao.gov.

What GAO Found Every year, Congress appropriates funds to support federal activities and address national priorities. Congress generally appropriates funding, or budget authority, to an agency for use during a specific period, known as the period of availability. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 authorized trillions of dollars to federal agencies to obligate, or commit to pay for goods and services, during fiscal year 2023 and beyond. GAO found that 156 of the 258 appropriation accounts in GAO’s review of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 had budget authority available for obligation in fiscal year 2026 or later, as of September 30, 2025. These accounts had approximately $20.9 billion in unobligated budget authority, or about 1.97 percent of the approximately $1 trillion initially appropriated that had a period of availability of fiscal year 2026 or later. The unobligated budget authority is unexpired, and is comprised of multiple periods of availability (see table). Table: Unobligated Budget Authority from the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 by Period of Availability, for Selected Agencies Period of availability Budget authority provided in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 (in USD) Unobligated budget authority, as of September 30, 2025 (in USD) Unobligated budget authority as a proportion of budget authority provided in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 (percentage) 2026 $25,370,407,254 $1,705,579,606 6.72% 2027 $60,291,452,000 $9,033,188,722 14.98% Indefinite $980,222,929,895 $10,208,442,784 1.04% Total $1,065,884,789,149 $20,947,211,112 1.97% Source: GAO analysis of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 and data from the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Energy, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Housing and Urban Development, Justice, Transportation, and Veterans Affairs, and the Social Security Administration. | GAO-26-108476 Detailed information about the amount of unobligated budget authority by appropriation account is in a downloadable dataset, which can be accessed via a link on this page. Why GAO Did This Study GAO was asked to identify any remaining budget authority provided in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 that is unexpired and still available for obligation. This report provides information on these amounts still available to selected agencies to obligate in fiscal year 2026 or later, and key characteristics, such as the appropriation account name; type of budget authority; and the associated programs, projects, or activities. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 to select the 10 federal agencies with the largest amount of budget authority potentially available for obligation in fiscal year 2026 or later. These agencies are the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Energy, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Housing and Urban Development, Justice, Transportation, and Veterans Affairs, and the Social Security Administration, and represent 258 appropriation accounts that included budget authority available for obligation in fiscal year 2026 or later. GAO used a data collection instrument to collect the amount of unobligated budget authority from the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 in each appropriation account and related information from the 10 selected agencies. In some cases, GAO conducted follow-up interviews with agency officials to gain additional clarity on the data and information they provided. GAO analyzed the data to calculate summary statistics and to populate a downloadable dataset. For more information, contact Jeff Arkin at ArkinJ@gao.gov.