What GAO Found The Office for Civil Rights (OCR) within the Department of Education (Education) enforces several federal civil rights laws, including laws that prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, color, and national origin; sex; disability; and age. Under most of these laws, OCR's enforcement authority extends to institutions that receive funds from Education, such as state educational agencies, elementary and secondary school systems, and colleges and universities. In March 2025, about half of OCR's 575 staff were placed on paid administrative leave, and seven of OCR's 12 regional offices were closed as part of agencywide Reduction-in-Force (RIF) and reorganization efforts. Based on Education's court filings, GAO calculated that paying salaries and benefits to OCR staff who were subject to the RIF cost between $18 million and $24 million from mid-March through September 5, 2025. GAO calculated that it cost an additional $10.5 to $14 million for the staff remaining on administrative leave from September 8 through December 12, 2025. In December 2025, Education recalled to work those OCR staff subject to the March 2025 RIF. Agency officials said that since the March 2025 RIF, OCR has kept up with its workload and met its mission without these staff. They noted that Education decided to recall these staff to contribute to the enforcement of existing civil rights complaints. These officials also said that there is always work to be done and the agency will continue utilizing available resources to do so. Subsequently, in early January 2026, Education rescinded the RIF actions for OCR staff. From March to September 2025, OCR received over 9,000 complaints of alleged discrimination and resolved over 7,000. About 90 percent of these were resolved by Education dismissing the complaints. Education did not demonstrate that it accounted for all potential costs and savings associated with its RIF and reorganization actions, and did not document its analyses, though Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and Office of Personnel Management (OPM) guidance directed it to do so. Without fully accounting for costs and savings and documenting its analyses, Education lacks reasonable assurance that its actions achieved the stated goal of reforming its federal workforce to maximize efficiency and productivity, including whether such actions improved service to the American people, increased productivity, or saved taxpayer dollars. GAO recommends that Education estimate the full costs and savings associated with the Reduction-in-Force and reorganization actions it initiated in March 2025, and document its analysis. Education disagreed with the recommendation, stating that it had rescinded the RIFs for OCR staff and taken action to return those employees to active duty. GAO continues to believe that Education should conduct and document such an analysis, as discussed in the report. Why GAO Did This Study In response to an Executive Order, Education announced a RIF and reorganization in March 2025 that would cut OCR's workforce by about half. However, subsequent preliminary injunctions prohibited Education from doing so. According to Education, all RIF actions were paused as of November 21, 2025. Education rescinded the RIF actions for OCR staff in early January 2026. GAO was asked to examine issues related to OCR's operations in light of recent RIF actions. This report provides information about OCR RIF actions, including associated costs and savings and OCR's workload in relation to these actions. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws and OCR's Case Processing Manual. GAO assessed RIF actions against relevant federal guidance from OMB and OPM. In addition, GAO analyzed publicly available information from court filings that Education submitted in federal court, the President's fiscal year 2026 budget request for OCR, and data that Education provided to Congress.

What GAO Found Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) institutions generally make menstrual products available to incarcerated and detained individuals; however, a few of the 29 institutions that housed women in fiscal year 2024 do not fully adhere to all required elements of BOP’s policy. For example, based on site visits and questionnaire responses, GAO found that not all institutions provide the five required types of products in common areas or replenish menstrual products within 24 hours. BOP has two oversight mechanisms to monitor whether institutions adhere to its policy. However, neither mechanism has systematically assessed, detected, and rectified all deficiencies across BOP institutions related to providing menstrual products. By conducting routine, systematic oversight, BOP could better ensure that menstrual products are consistently, appropriately, and equitably available and accessible to incarcerated and detained individuals. Of the 31 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) facilities GAO visited or whose officials responded to GAO’s questionnaire, facilities generally make at least some menstrual products available to detained individuals. However, ICE’s detention standards do not have specific detail to allow its oversight mechanism to detect variation in access to menstrual products. ICE conducts inspections of facilities against their assigned detention standards, which outline how facilities are to provide safe, secure, and humane confinement. Without more detailed language in these standards, inspections cannot detect deficiencies related to access to menstrual products. GAO found variation in (1) the types of menstrual products facilities provide, (2) how facilities provide products, and (3) the quantity limits that facilities apply. By revising the detention standards to clarify requirements, ICE could better ensure menstrual products are consistently, appropriately, and equitably available and accessible to detained individuals. Examples of the Provision of Menstrual Products at Bureau of Prisons (BOP) Institutions and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Facilities Why GAO Did This Study BOP and ICE incarcerated and detained tens of thousands of women in fiscal year 2024. These agencies are responsible for caring for the individuals in their custody. This includes providing hygiene items like menstrual products. GAO was asked to review the availability and accessibility of menstrual products for vulnerable populations, including incarcerated and detained individuals. This report examines the extent to which (1) BOP provides access to menstrual products for incarcerated and detained individuals and (2) ICE provides access to menstrual products for detained individuals. GAO visited a nongeneralizable sample of five BOP institutions and three ICE facilities. These locations were selected based on the number of individuals housed and security level or facility type, among other criteria. During these visits, GAO observed the provision of menstrual products and interviewed facility staff and incarcerated and detained individuals. GAO also reviewed agency documents and conducted a web-based survey of 29 BOP institutions and 52 ICE facilities. GAO analyzed the responses received from officials from 100 percent of BOP institutions and 58 percent of ICE facilities (30).

What GAO Found GAO made significant accomplishments in FY 2025, as detailed in this Performance and Accountability Report for Fiscal Year (FY) 2025 (see figure). In the spirit of the Government Performance and Results Act, this annual report informs the Congress and the American people about what GAO has achieved on their behalf. This report describes GAO's performance measures, results, and accountability processes for FY 2025. In assessing our performance, we compared actual results against targets and goals that were set in our annual performance plan and performance budget, and that were developed to help carry out our strategic plan. An overview of our annual measures and targets for 2025 is available here, along with links to a complete set of our strategic planning and performance and accountability reports. This report includes a performance and financial snapshot for the American taxpayer for FY 2025, a letter from the Acting Comptroller General, and five parts. Part I: Management's Discussion and Analysis. This section includes a statement attesting to the completeness and reliability of the performance and financial data in this report and the effectiveness of our internal control over financial reporting. It includes a summary of our mission, organizational structure, strategies we use to achieve our goals, and processes for measuring our performance. In addition, it discusses our agency-wide performance results and use of resources in FY 2025. It also includes information on management challenges, external factors that affect our performance, and future challenges and priorities. Part II: Performance Information. This section includes details on our performance results by strategic goal in FY 2025 and our targets for FY 2026. Part III: Financial Information. This section includes details on our finances in FY 2025, including a letter from our Chief Financial Officer, audited financial statements and notes, and the reports from our external auditor and Audit Advisory Committee. This section also includes an explanation of the information each of our financial statements conveys. Part IV: Inspector General's (IG) View of GAO's Management Challenges. This section includes our IG's perspective of our agency's management challenges. Part V: Appendixes. This section provides the report's abbreviations and describes how we ensure the completeness and reliability of the data for each of our performance measures. Why GAO Did This Study As a legislative branch agency, GAO is exempt from many laws that apply to executive branch agencies. However, GAO generally holds itself to the spirit of many such laws, including the Government Performance and Results Act and the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act. Accordingly, the FY 2025 Performance and Accountability Report provides information on GAO's work, which it considers comparable to that reported by executive branch agencies that choose to prepare annual Performance and Accountability Reports in lieu of separate Agency Financial Reports. For more information, contact Rebecca Gambler at GamblerR@gao.gov.

What GAO Found In January 2026, GAO identified 38 open recommendations under the purview of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Chief Information Officer (CIO), from previously issued work. Each of these recommendations relates to a GAO High-Risk area: (1) Ensuring the Cybersecurity of the Nation or (2) Improving IT Acquisitions and Management. In addition, GAO has designated four of the 38 as priority recommendations. For example, GAO previously recommended that VA fully implement all event logging requirements on the systems used to detect, investigate, and remediate cyber threats as directed by the Office of Management and Budget. Further, GAO recommended that VA develop guidance regarding standardizing cloud service-level agreements. GAO also previously recommended that the department ensure that it compares its inventories of active software licenses to purchased licenses to identify opportunities to reduce costs and improve investment decisions. The CIO's continued attention to these recommendations will help ensure the secure and effective use of IT at the department. Why GAO Did This Study CIO open recommendations are outstanding GAO recommendations that warrant the attention of agency CIOs because their implementation could significantly improve government IT operations by securing IT systems, identifying cost savings, improving major government programs, eliminating mismanagement of IT programs and processes, or ensuring that IT programs comply with laws, among others. For more information, contact Nick Marinos at marinosn@gao.gov.

What GAO Found Individuals 55 and older accounted for about 22 percent of participants (769,000 individuals) across six selected federal workforce development programs GAO examined using program year 2023 data. Program year 2023, which ran from July 2023 through June 2024, was the most recent complete year of data available at the time of this review. Compared to younger participants, older adults were less likely to find a job after exiting a program. For example, about 60 percent of older adults reported having a job in the second quarter after exiting Department of Labor (DOL) Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA) programs in program year 2023. In contrast, about 69 percent of participants ages 40–54 and 73 percent of participants ages 16–39 reported having a job. Similarly, about 50 percent of older adults in the Department of Education’s Vocational Rehabilitation program reported having a job, compared to about 54 percent of participants ages 40–54 and 58 percent of participants ages 16–39. Exit from a program generally occurs when a participant has not received services for 90 days and does not have plans to receive future services. Older workers (41 total) who GAO interviewed at 10 job centers in five states said participating in federal workforce development programs helped them learn digital literacy skills and get employment and training opportunities in their communities. They also noted challenges, such as limited numbers of employers participating in job fairs and few openings in some workforce programs. Additionally, they said they faced challenges finding jobs, including challenges navigating the job application process, developing new skills, and managing potential age discrimination by employers. Older Adults Using Job Center Services Job center officials GAO interviewed at the 10 centers said older workers they served had unique employment needs compared to younger workers. Some state and local partners in locations GAO visited had initiatives to address the needs of older workers. However, DOL, which administers most of these programs, does not facilitate information sharing among these partners on promising practices that could support older workers. Doing so could help DOL strengthen workforce system support for older workers, improve their employment rates and earnings, and bring their valuable knowledge and experience to the workplace. Why GAO Did This Study Older workers represent an increasing share of the U.S. workforce. From 2003 to 2023, individuals 55 and older increased their share of the workforce from 15 percent to 23 percent, according to Bureau of Labor Statistics data. Federal workforce development programs may help older workers manage challenges that could affect their ability to find and retain jobs, such as demand for new skills or limited knowledge of effective job search strategies. These programs are administered primarily by DOL and Education through a network of state and local partners, including job centers that provide employment and training services to all jobseekers. GAO was asked to examine employment support for older workers. This report provides information on the percentage of workforce development program participants who are 55 and older, their rates of employment after exiting these programs, and their perspectives as participants in these programs. This report also examines the extent to which DOL has helped state and local partners share information with one another to support older workers. To provide this information, GAO analyzed DOL and Education program data to compare the employment outcomes of older and younger participants in six workforce development programs (out of 38 programs that serve adults). GAO focused on four core Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA) programs that serve older workers, among other customers, and two other programs in which older workers make up a large share of participants. GAO also held nine non-generalizable discussions with small groups of older workers at job centers in five states to learn from their experiences seeking employment and participating in workforce programs. GAO selected locations in which individuals 55 and older represented a substantial share of program participants within these local areas and that reflected variation in geographic and economic conditions. GAO reviewed, for all 50 states, program year 2024 WIOA State Plans that outline their 4-year workforce development strategies. Additionally, GAO interviewed state and local partners, including job center officials, about initiatives focused on older workers within their states. GAO also interviewed DOL and Education officials about their coordination on issues related to older workers.

What GAO Found Assistive technology—such as pencil grips, calculators, and screen readers—can help students with disabilities more fully participate at school. Staff from the eight school districts that GAO visited provided examples of assistive technology that students use in the classroom (see figure). Limited knowledge about assistive technology was a key challenge, according to staff from all eight school districts GAO visited. For example, staff in many school districts said that teachers often only think of high-tech devices and may not consider simpler low-tech devices that could meet students’ individual needs. In addition, rapidly changing technology can make it difficult for school district and school staff to keep abreast of current assistive technology options. School district staff also described how broad challenges pertaining to public education adversely affected their ability to provide assistive technology to students with disabilities. These included insufficient time and opportunities for training, staffing issues (e.g., shortages and high turnover), technology issues, and funding constraints. Examples of Assistive Technology Used in School Districts GAO Visited The eight school districts GAO visited sometimes formed assistive technology teams and used external resources, which helped mitigate some of the challenges described above. Specifically, four districts had assistive technology teams that helped improve coordination and increase staff knowledge about assistive technology, according to school district officials. The teams—generally comprised of district special education staff—help school staff develop standardized processes to identify the best assistive technology for students’ needs, document assistive technology use in students’ individualized education programs, and acquire assistive technology. In addition, district officials in all eight school districts said that they used federal, state, or regional resources to train school staff or provide assistive technology to students. These included external training, expert consultations, libraries that loan assistive technology, and guidance such as Education’s 2024 Myths and Facts Surrounding Assistive Technology Devices and Services. Why GAO Did This Study The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) requires that all children with disabilities receive a free appropriate public education. Under IDEA, assistive technology must be considered for students receiving special education services. Little is known about how this requirement is implemented locally. GAO was asked to review how schools make decisions about providing assistive technology to students with disabilities. This report describes (1) the assistive technology selected school districts provide to students and the challenges they face doing so, and (2) strategies and resources selected school districts use to provide assistive technology to students and mitigate challenges. GAO visited four states—Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wyoming— selected for variation in factors such as percentage of students with disabilities and presence of state-level assistive technology initiatives. GAO interviewed staff from state and regional education agencies, eight school districts, and eight schools. GAO selected districts for variation in factors such as urbanicity and assistive technology initiatives. In addition, GAO interviewed officials and reviewed documents from the U.S. Department of Education (Education), the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and both departments’ relevant technical assistance centers. GAO also conducted a web-based survey of all 93 Parent Centers—family technical assistance centers funded by Education—and received a response rate of 88 percent. We provided a draft of this report to Education and HHS for review and comment. Education provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. HHS did not provide any comments on the report. For more information, contact Jacqueline M. Nowicki at nowickij@gao.gov.

What GAO Found To promote global financial stability, U.S. and foreign banking regulators negotiate and develop nonbinding minimum capital standards for banks through the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. U.S. members are the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB), Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). The Basel Committee expects members to treat Committee work as confidential. Its internal regulations state that internal discussions and the analyses on which they are based should be kept confidential. It also has a process for collecting sensitive bank data (for assessing the effect of standards on select banks), which requires analysts to sign a confidentiality agreement intended to protect the data. The Committee imposes no penalties for violating these expectations, but could take informal action (e.g., restrict a member’s access to information). U.S. members vary in the extent to which they are subject to the Federal Records Act and have different policies for retaining Basel Committee and related documents as records under the act: FRB’s policy expressly covers its work on international organizations, including the Committee, and FRB also issued related guidance. FDIC’s policy does not expressly cover its Committee work, but FDIC officials said the policy applies. FDIC also has a procedure directing staff to document their Committee work to share with leadership. OCC’s policy does not expressly cover its Committee work. OCC officials said that only documents used as background or working files in rulemaking to implement Basel standards are considered records under their policy. OCC’s policy does not instruct staff whether to treat—and thus retain—Basel Committee or related documents as records under the Federal Records Act when first created or received. The act requires covered agencies to preserve records documenting the organization’s functions and decisions and to communicate records management responsibilities to staff. However, OCC has not clarified how to treat Committee and related documents, citing its current policy as sufficient. Taking such action could help OCC ensure staff retain documents needed to support rulemaking, consult leadership during Committee negotiations, and demonstrate accountability. U.S. members said they process Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests for Basel Committee or related records in the same way as other FOIA requests. In 2019–2024, FRB received two FOIA requests related to the Committee and FDIC received one. FRB identified information responsive to the requests but deemed it confidential and therefore exempt from FOIA disclosure. FDIC provided the requested information. Why GAO Did This Study In 2025, GAO reported on U.S. participation in the Basel Committee’s development of Basel III bank capital standards. U.S. members told GAO that Committee discussions and related information are governed by confidentiality expectations. GAO was asked to review these expectations and their potential implications. Among its objectives, this report examines the Basel Committee’s confidentiality expectations; U.S. members’ records retention policies for their Committee work; and U.S. members’ processes for handling FOIA requests for Committee or related records. GAO reviewed Committee and U.S. member documents on confidentiality expectations and associated penalties. GAO assessed relevant records retention policies of U.S. members against provisions in the Federal Records Act and its associated regulations. GAO also reviewed relevant FOIA regulations and data on related requests and interviewed U.S. Committee members.

What GAO Found In January 2026, GAO identified 17 open recommendations under the purview of the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Chief Information Officer (CIO) from previously issued work. Each of these recommendations relates to a GAO High-Risk area: (1) Ensuring the Cybersecurity of the Nation or (2) Improving IT Acquisitions and Management. In addition, GAO has designated two of the 17 as priority recommendations. For example, GAO previously recommended that USDA establish a time frame for incorporating privacy into an organization-wide risk management strategy that should include the department's risk tolerance. Further, GAO recommended that USDA complete annual reviews of its IT portfolio consistent with federal requirements. GAO also previously recommended that the department manage its software licenses more effectively by implementing procedures to track usage. The CIO's continued attention to these recommendations will help ensure the secure and effective use of IT at the department. Why GAO Did This Study CIO open recommendations are outstanding GAO recommendations that warrant the attention of agency CIOs because their implementation could significantly improve government IT operations by securing IT systems, identifying cost savings, improving major government programs, eliminating mismanagement of IT programs and processes, or ensuring that IT programs comply with laws, among others. For more information, contact Nick Marinos at marinosn@gao.gov.

To alert the audit community to changes in professional standards, we periodically issue Professional Standards Updates (PSU). These updates highlight the effective dates of recently issued standards and guidance related to engagements conducted in accordance with Government Auditing Standards. PSUs contain summary information only, and those affected by a change should refer to the respective standard or guidance for details.

What GAO Found In March 2023, the Small Business Administration (SBA) established 12 best practices to help participating agencies manage risks posed by small business applicants in their Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) programs. GAO found that participating agencies and selected components have incorporated some best practices in their due diligence efforts, but gaps remain. For example, as of August 2025 all agencies had incorporated three of the 12 best practices, such as leveraging standardized foreign affiliation disclosures to capture consistent information. Most agencies incorporated additional practices, such as documenting a risk-based approach to their due diligence processes, and some incorporated practices such as determining “covered individuals” required to submit disclosures (see figure). The SBIR and STTR Extension Act of 2022 (Extension Act) requires participating agencies to incorporate the applicable best practices in their due diligence programs to the extent practicable. Doing so may improve agencies’ ability to manage potential foreign risks. The Extension Act also requires participating agencies to assess SBIR and STTR applicants’ cybersecurity practices. GAO found that nine of the 11 participating agencies and selected components did so using a variety of mechanisms, including business intelligence tools and self-assessment forms. However, two of the agencies GAO reviewed—the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)—are not assessing all applicants’ cybersecurity practices. NSF officials told GAO that its applicants are small and nascent companies with limited electronic assets or systems to protect. USDA officials stated they previously understood training applicants on cybersecurity would suffice as an assessment. Until NSF and USDA incorporate cybersecurity assessments into their due diligence programs, they are at an increased risk of making awards to applicants that are vulnerable to cyberattacks.   SBA conducts information sharing meetings for agencies to discuss due diligence efforts, but GAO found agencies have gaps in how they have incorporated SBA’s best practices to manage and reduce foreign risks. For example, GAO found some agencies are not incorporating certain best practices because, in part, they lack clarity on the intent of the practice or the best means to incorporate it. In August 2025, SBA officials acknowledged that based on the gaps and agency needs we identified in this report, additional opportunities may exist for SBA to engage with agencies on the challenges and impacts of incorporating the best practices and due diligence programs. The SBA-facilitated meetings could provide a discussion forum on agencies’ challenges in incorporating the best practices, potential for additional guidance, and possible revisions. Why GAO Did This Study The SBIR and STTR programs fund research and development (R&D) performed by U.S. small businesses. In fiscal year 2023, federal agencies issued more than 6,300 such awards in areas such as defense and environmental protection. However, Congress and U.S. intelligence agencies have expressed concerns about foreign adversaries exploiting potential vulnerabilities in these programs and in entrepreneurial small businesses. The Extension Act requires the 11 participating agencies to implement due diligence programs to assess the security risks posed by small business applicants. It includes a provision for GAO to issue a series of reports on the implementation and best practices of agencies’ due diligence. This report is the third in this series and examines (1) agencies’ incorporation of the best practices, (2) their assessments of applicants’ cybersecurity practices, and (3) interagency mechanisms for sharing information on due diligence programs. To determine the extent to which agencies have incorporated SBA’s best practices, GAO reviewed agencies’ policies and procedures for conducting due diligence and assessing applicants’ cybersecurity practices. GAO also interviewed SBA and SBIR and STTR program officials at the participating agencies and selected components on the best practices.

What GAO Found The U.S. Department of State's Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia (EUR/ACE) is responsible for coordinating and overseeing foreign assistance to Ukraine. In June 2023, EUR/ACE entered into a 3-year contract for Monitoring, Evaluation, and Audit Services for Ukraine Reporting (MEASURE). This contract assists EUR/ACE in overseeing nonhumanitarian, nonmilitary assistance programs implemented within Ukraine and funded by supplemental appropriations, such as training and equipping Ukraine's police and border guards and ensuring the safety of nuclear power operations. Many MEASURE contract tasks have been completed, such as progress reports on programs funded by U.S. assistance. For these reports, MEASURE's contractor compiled available information on outcomes of assistance, which EUR/ACE has used for decision-making, particularly with respect to project oversight. But data availability and timeframes to realize outcomes have varied, which have limited the MEASURE contractor's ability to analyze outcome information and conduct evaluations. In response, EUR/ACE has adjusted the structure and timing of contract deliverables to enhance their ability to inform decision-making. For example, EUR/ACE revised the progress reports to be more streamlined, include more analysis, and issue semiannually rather than quarterly. As of November 2025, MEASURE tasks not yet completed included evaluations across projects and a selection of strategic outcome indicators, both of which were meant to provide a broader sense of the effectiveness of Ukraine assistance. These and other deliverables were delayed due to implementation challenges, such as needing to negotiate access to key data and working in a wartime environment, as well as the administration's decision to conduct a foreign assistance review and pending updates to the Ukraine Assistance Strategy. EUR/ACE officials expect that the planned evaluations and selection of strategic outcome indicators will provide a greater sense of the extent to which the assistance provided has been effective in meeting U.S. objectives as defined in the Ukraine Assistance Strategy.  Why GAO Did This Study Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the U.S. government has appropriated tens of billions in assistance for Ukraine and countries impacted by the situation in Ukraine. As of September 30, 2025, according to State, the MEASURE contract helped EUR/ACE oversee $6.1 billion of the supplemental appropriations for Ukraine—$4.3 billion from the first four supplementals and a further $1.8 billion from a fifth supplemental that is subject to change in fiscal year 2026. GAO was asked to review the oversight mechanisms in place for U.S. assistance to Ukraine. This report is part of a series of work GAO has done evaluating U.S. oversight of Ukraine assistance. This report discusses: the design and status of the MEASURE contract, challenges faced during implementation, the outcome information the MEASURE contract provided, and State's use of this information. GAO reviewed the MEASURE contract and associated deliverables and spoke with EUR/ACE officials, contractor representatives, and five U.S. government implementing entities on the implementation of the contract and associated challenges and mitigation efforts. GAO selected these entities based on factors such as their amount of Ukraine assistance funding.

What GAO Found The Space Development Agency (SDA) is developing space- and ground-based systems to detect and track potential missile threats in low Earth orbit. SDA aims to rapidly deliver capability and frequently update technology by delivering multiple satellites in phases, which it calls tranches, planned for contract award every 2 years. Each tranche needs to be replaced roughly 5 years after launch. However, SDA is at risk of being unable to deliver capability as quickly as planned. For example, SDA is overestimating the technology readiness of some critical elements it plans to use. This includes the spacecraft, which must be modified for the mission. As a result, contractors have performed additional unplanned work, which has added to already delayed schedules. Earth Orbits with Missile Warning Satellites Additionally, SDA’s requirements process is not transparent to users. For example, SDA is not sufficiently collaborating with combatant commands, which report having insufficient insight into how SDA defines requirements and when, or whether, SDA will deliver planned capabilities. Consequently, SDA is at risk of delivering satellites that do not meet warfighter needs. SDA reports achieving early milestones, but these achievements do not reflect schedule risks. SDA has continued to award new tranche contracts every 2 years irrespective of satellite performance. SDA relies on contractor schedules for each tranche but has not developed an overall or architecture-level schedule. Using an architecture-level schedule to monitor schedule risks would better position SDA and stakeholders to understand earlier how schedule changes affect SDA’s progress in delivering capabilities. In addition, the Department of Defense (DOD) does not know the life-cycle cost to deliver missile warning and tracking capabilities because it has not created a reliable cost estimate. SDA required limited cost data from contractors for tranches 1 and 2. Requiring more complete and frequent cost data moving forward would enable DOD to develop reliable cost estimates for future tranches. Why GAO Did This Study DOD is developing large constellations of satellites for missions that include missile warning and tracking. SDA’s effort—known as the Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture—plans to have at least 300-500 satellites in low Earth orbit. This constellation is expected to cost nearly $35 billion through fiscal year 2029. Given the design life of the satellites, each one must be replaced about every 5 years. A Senate report contains a provision for GAO to assess DOD’s efforts to develop these capabilities. GAO’s report (1) describes SDA’s efforts to develop and deliver missile warning and tracking capabilities; (2) identifies risks SDA faces delivering these planned capabilities; (3) assesses aspects of SDA’s requirements process; and (4) evaluates the extent to which SDA is meeting schedule milestones and cost estimates. GAO reviewed relevant program, DOD, and contractor documents; assessed SDA’s schedule and cost estimates against best practices; conducted site visits to a ground operations center, the Boulder Ground Innovation Facility, which analyzes satellite data, and seven contractor sites; and interviewed SDA and DOD officials and three combatant commands.

What GAO Found Shared decision-making agreements with federal agencies enable Tribes to provide substantive, long-term input into natural and cultural resource management decisions for public lands. In treaties, Tribes ceded millions of acres of their territories to the federal government in exchange for certain commitments. Many of these areas are now public lands. Agencies committed in 2022 to ensure Tribes play an integral role in deciding how to manage federal natural resources. These agencies include the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and the Interior and their components, such as Agriculture’s Forest Service and Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). GAO identified 11 features that strengthen shared decision-making agreements, including a commitment to seeking consensus and a clearly outlined dispute resolution process. Fully incorporating these 11 features into policies would better position agencies to strengthen shared decision-making. Agency and tribal officials GAO interviewed identified factors that facilitated agreement development, including having certain legal authorities. For example, the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, as amended, authorizes eligible Tribes to assume administration of certain Interior programs through a self-governance agreement. However, the Forest Service and NOAA’s Office of National Marine Sanctuaries are not authorized to enter into this type of agreement, even though they manage natural resources similar to Interior. Providing these agencies a similar authority would allow for increased tribal input into management decisions, consistent with current administration priorities. Factors That Agency and Tribal Officials Said Facilitated or Impeded Development of Shared Decision-Making Agreements Agency and tribal officials also identified factors that impeded development of agreements, including limited agency understanding of legal authorities and incomplete guidance. Agencies have taken steps to address these factors, such as training staff working with Tribes. However, in light of significant federal workforce reductions that began in 2025, agencies have not conducted workforce planning to assess their capacity related to developing agreements. Doing so could enable better understanding of how to allocate agencies’ limited resources, address any skill gaps, and make strategic use of partnerships with Tribes. Why GAO Did This Study Federal agencies manage public lands, including national forests and parks, that are Tribes’ ancestral territories. Public lands retain special significance and importance to Tribes. Agencies collaborate with Tribes when meeting their missions and to fulfill unique federal trust and treaty responsibilities. GAO was asked to examine issues related to agencies developing shared decision-making agreements with Tribes. This report identifies features that strengthen shared decision-making agreements and examines factors that facilitated or impeded their development, as well as agency actions to address impediments. GAO reviewed agreements between federal agencies and Tribes, as well as federal laws, academic reports, and agency documents. GAO selected five shared decision-making agreements for in-depth analysis and interviewed the federal and tribal officials involved.

What GAO Found Of the 51 large, medium, and small airports included in GAO’s review, all but two small airports have some level of public transit service by bus or rail. Accessing airports by transit, instead of driving or taking taxis or rideshares, can help reduce congestion on increasingly busy airport roads. GAO found that 23 of the nation’s 31 large airports have rail service such as light or commuter rail. For 18 of these airports, the rail service is either located on airport grounds or off-site but connected by an air train that moves passengers on dedicated tracks. The remaining five large airports have rail service located off the airport grounds but connected by a free bus. The 20 selected medium and small airports generally have bus service from the airport curb to the local downtown. Large Hub Airports with Transit Rail Service (such as light or commuter rail) Note: Includes large hub airports per Federal Aviation Administration 2023 passenger boarding (enplanement) data. Use of transit by passengers and airport and airline employees varies widely across airports. Transit use ranged from 4 percent to 19 percent for the 12 airports for which GAO identified reports on passengers’ mode of transport. For employees, two large airports GAO visited reported that 17 percent and 19 percent of surveyed employees used public transit. Meanwhile an estimated 4 percent of airport and airline employees nationwide used public transit to commute, according to GAO’s analysis of Census data. Factors that influence individuals’ transit decisions include cost, travel time, and familiarity with transit options, according to Transit Cooperative Research Program reports and stakeholders GAO interviewed. In addition, people with disability consider factors such as availability of elevators or accomodations for mobility aids. Employees may also consider the availability of parking or transit benefits and transportation modes that match their work shifts, which often begin early in the morning. Some airports have begun to implement transportation demand management (TDM) strategies to promote the use of existing transit options. TDM broadly refers to efforts to reduce congestion and vehicle-related emissions. Five airports GAO visited were implementing TDM strategies, such as additional signage or advertising of transit options, or offering incentives, such as reduced cost transit. Although airports are implementing TDM strategies for passengers and employees, some are prioritizing strategies for employees who may be more willing to shift to transit due to their familiarity with the airport. Two airports GAO visited set, and plan to assess, transit use goals for their TDM strategies. Why GAO Did This Study Millions of passengers and employees travel to and from U.S. airports daily. Increased air travel demand has renewed concerns about congestion on roads to airports. Some airports and transit agencies have implemented TDM strategies to increase transit capacity or the use of existing transit to relieve congestion. The Federal Aviation Admministration (FAA) Reauthorization Act of 2024 includes provisions for GAO to assess the extent to which U.S. commercial airports are accessible by transit and the TDM strategies that airports are implementing. This report addresses, among other things, (1) public transit availability at selected U.S. airports; (2) passenger and employee use of public transit to access airports and the factors that influence their decisions to do so; and (3) TDM strategies selected large airports are implementing and plans by the airports to assess the effects of these strategies. GAO reviewed airport websites and conducted literature searches to identify documentation on transit options and use for 51 airports—all 31 large-hub airports and a random selection of 20 medium-hub and small-hub airports based on 2023 FAA enplanement data. GAO contacted all 51 airports to confirm this information was accurate. GAO also analyzed 2019-2023 Census data on employee commutes. GAO reviewed Department of Transportation (DOT) guidance and interviewed officials from DOT and nine stakeholder organizations selected to represent a range of perspectives. GAO visited five large airports that recently implemented projects to increase transit capacity, were implementing TDM strategies, or both. At each airport, GAO interviewed airport and transit agency officials and other stakeholders. For more information, contact Andrew Von Ah at VonahA@gao.gov.

What GAO Found Within U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Shadow Wolves program operates on the Tohono O’odham Nation reservation in Sells, Arizona. In January 2024, GAO recommended that ICE define the mission and goals of the program, with input from the Tohono O’odham Nation. GAO also recommended that, ICE determine the staffing needs for the program on the Tohono O’odham Nation reservation, to include the skills and number of positions necessary. ICE concurred with the recommendations. In July 2024, ICE defined the program’s mission. However, ICE had not discussed the mission and goals of the program with the Tribe as of September 2025. In addition, ICE’s defined goals for the program do not align with the program’s mission or describe the results it hopes to achieve. Further, though ICE has defined staffing goals for the program, it has not yet performed a workforce analysis to determine the program’s staffing needs, including the number and type of personnel the unit needs to meet operational demands. GAO maintains that defining operational goals linked to the program’s mission with input from the Tohono O’odham Nation can better position ICE to ensure that operations achieve desired outcomes and ensure that ICE and the Tohono O’odham Nation have a common understanding of the program’s mission. Clearly defining the Shadow Wolves program mission and establishing operational goals are particularly important in light of continued differing perspectives and lack of clarity on the mission and activities of the program on tribal lands. The number of Shadow Wolves has declined over time as shown in the figure below. In January 2024, GAO recommended that ICE update its October 2022 Shadow Wolves recruitment strategy to include measurable goals, timelines, and milestones, and develop a succession plan to address upcoming retirements. ICE concurred with these recommendations and has taken steps to recruit Shadow Wolves, such as posting a job announcement seeking applications for Shadow Wolves personnel in September 2025. While this is a positive step, GAO maintains that ICE should also (1) develop and document measurable goals, timelines, and milestones so that officials can review progress of their recruitment efforts and make any needed adjustments and (2) develop a succession plan to better ensure that experienced Shadow Wolves will be available to train new recruits. Number of Shadow Wolves, Calendar Years 2003 to 2025 In January 2024, GAO also recommended that ICE develop criteria for evaluating possible additional Shadow Wolves locations. ICE concurred with this recommendation and has taken some steps to implement it. In July 2024, it broadly defined elements that would enable it to select new locations, including: the willingness of partnering Tribal Nations, levels of criminal activity, and the availability of funding. However, ICE had not detailed how it will apply these broad criteria to selecting potential locations. As of August 2025, ICE officials said expansion efforts had been placed on hold due to a lack of funding for Shadow Wolves positions outside of Sells, Arizona. GAO maintains that, moving forward, developing criteria for evaluating and selecting expansion locations could help ensure that ICE evaluates locations consistently while improving transparency of the process. Why GAO Did This Study About 62 miles of the U.S. southwest border is located on the Tohono O’odham Nation reservation, which may be vulnerable to illicit cross-border activity. The Shadow Wolves program began operations in 1974 to address the illegal smuggling of controlled substances from Mexico to this reservation in Arizona. The unit currently operates within ICE’s Homeland Security Investigations (HSI). The program’s employees—known as “Shadow Wolves”—must be certified to have at least one-quarter American Indian ancestry from a federally recognized Tribe. The Shadow Wolves Enhancement Act, which became law in April 2022, includes a provision for GAO to assess the effectiveness of ICE’s strategy for the Shadow Wolves program not later than 1 year after receiving the strategy, and annually for the following 2 years. GAO issued its first report related to this provision in January 2024 and the second report in November 2024. This report assesses ICE’s (1) efforts to define the mission of the Shadow Wolves program and conduct workforce planning to understand the skills and positions necessary to meet mission needs, (2) strategies for recruiting and retaining Shadow Wolves, and (3) planning efforts to expand the program to other tribal lands. GAO conducted interviews with ICE and HSI headquarters officials, HSI field officials, and each member of the Shadow Wolves unit regarding program operations, mission, retirement plans, and expansion planning efforts.

What GAO Found GAO performed agreed-upon procedures at the Senate Disbursing Office (SDO) consisting of (1) identifying the authorized and reported amount of cash accountability for the Secretary of the Senate, (2) counting all cash items that support the cash accountability level of the SDO, (3) counting all noncash items that support the cash accountability level of the SDO, and (4) agreeing the total amount counted to the authorized amount and reported amount of cash accountability. The total value of cash and noncash items counted on September 22, 2025, agreed to the cash accountability level that the SDO authorized and reported, except for a difference of $3.31, which SDO officials stated is a known overage that has accumulated over time. The Secretary of the Senate is responsible for the sufficiency of these agreed-upon procedures to meet its objectives, and GAO makes no representation in that respect. The report provides the details on the agreed-upon procedures and the results of performing each of the procedures. In commenting on a draft of this report, the Secretary of the Senate in an email response stated that she had no comments on the report. Why GAO Did This Study The Chair and Ranking Member of the U.S. Senate Committee on Rules and Administration requested that GAO perform procedures on the cash accountability level that the SDO authorized and reported. The cash accountability level represents the value of cash and noncash items for which the Secretary of the Senate, as disbursing officer for the U.S. Senate, is responsible. For more information, contact Cheryl E. Clark at clarkce@gao.gov.

What GAO Found U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has implemented the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (CTPAT) program as part of a layered, risk-informed approach to supply chain security. CTPAT provides private companies in the supply chain with certain benefits (e.g., reduced cargo inspections or expedited processing) in exchange for voluntary adherence to additional security requirements. CBP monitors CTPAT participants’ involvement in security incidents, such as smuggling cargo that contains narcotics, which could result in participants’ suspension or removal from the program. According to CBP data, about 4 percent of CTPAT program participants were involved in one or more security incidents. Specifically, 480 CTPAT program participants were involved in approximately 2,200 security incidents (about 1 percent of all incidents) in the cargo supply chain in fiscal years 2020 through 2024. The most common type of security incident that participants were involved in were drug-related, accounting for just under 50 percent of all incidents. However, CBP does not collect complete data on security incidents involving program participants, such as on incidents self-reported by participants. Ensuring data on CTPAT security incidents are complete and consistent would position CBP to better identify and understand possible risks to the cargo supply chain. Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (CTPAT) Participant Involvement in Security Incidents That Occurred in the Cargo Supply Chain, Fiscal Years 2020-2024 Note: These data are estimates. While GAO determined that these data are sufficiently reliable to report approximate numbers, limitations in these data exist. For more details, see GAO-26-107893. The total number of CTPAT participants is as of August 2025. CBP did not consistently investigate security incidents involving CTPAT participants or take enforcement actions against them. For example, GAO found several cases where CBP documented that they would not investigate a security incident involving a program participant and did not take enforcement action against them, but did not explain these decisions. In one instance, CBP did not take enforcement action against a participant involved in a security incident in 2021. This same participant was subsequently involved in dozens of additional incidents before it was suspended 2 years later. Without clear, documented decision criteria to determine appropriate enforcement actions against CTPAT participants involved in security incidents, CBP risks leaving the nation and supply chain vulnerable to additional security incidents. Why GAO Did This Study The U.S. economy depends on the quick and efficient flow of millions of tons of cargo each day throughout the global supply chain. However, U.S.-bound cargo can present security concerns, as there is a risk that terrorists could use cargo shipments to transport a weapon of mass destruction or other contraband into the U.S. The Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism Pilot Program Act of 2023 includes a provision for GAO to assess the effectiveness of the program. This report examines (1) the number and types of security incidents that occurred in the cargo supply chain in fiscal years 2020 through 2024 and the extent to which CTPAT participants were involved; (2) enforcement actions against CTPAT participants involved in security incidents during this timeframe; and (3) the extent to which CBP meets certain statutory requirements in its management of the CTPAT program. GAO analyzed CBP data on CTPAT participant involvement in security incidents and CTPAT’s enforcement actions against these participants in fiscal years 2020 through 2024. GAO also reviewed CBP procedures for addressing program participant involvement in security incidents and interviewed CBP headquarters officials.

What GAO Found The First Step Act of 2018 (FSA) required the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to assess incarcerated people’s risk of recidivism and their needs, that if addressed, may reduce that risk. BOP did not conduct all assessments within required time frames (28 days for initial and 90 or 180 days for reassessments) for various reasons, including technology issues. For example, BOP conducted initial risk assessments within required time frames for about 75 percent of the 57,902 incarcerated people who entered a BOP facility from June 1, 2022, to March 30, 2024. For the needs it is responsible for assessing, BOP conducted 69 to 95 percent of this cohort’s assessments within required time frames. BOP plans to enhance an existing application to ensure assessments are conducted as required, in response to a 2023 GAO recommendation. BOP officials said they offer FSA programs and activities that address all 13 needs (e.g., substance use). However, BOP does not have accurate program data because, for example, staff used different methods to record when an incarcerated person declined to participate in a recommended program. GAO also found inaccuracies in program participation data, which BOP officials attributed to data entry errors. Without accurate data, BOP cannot determine if it offers sufficient programming to meet the needs of its incarcerated population. Eligible incarcerated people who agree to participate in programs, among other things, may earn time credits toward early transfer to supervised release and prerelease custody (i.e., home confinement or residential reentry center). GAO found that BOP generally applied all time credits toward supervised release but not for prerelease custody. BOP implemented new planning tools in 2024 and 2025 to help staff anticipate upcoming transfers to prerelease custody and ensure incarcerated people receive their FSA time credits. GAO has ongoing work examining BOP’s efforts to forecast capacity needs and provide sufficient residential reentry center resources. People Incarcerated in a BOP Facility on March 30, 2024 that Transferred or Could Have Transferred to Prerelease Custody From March 31, 2024–December 31, 2024 The Department of Justice (DOJ) has not been able to fully address all FSA annual reporting requirements because not enough time has passed since the agency implemented FSA to determine certain things, such as recidivism rates. This requirement expired in 2025, and absent congressional actions, DOJ no longer has to submit a report to Congress. Without such information, Congress may be hindered in its decision making regarding the FSA. Why GAO Did This Study In 2024, BOP released approximately 42,000 people from federal prisons. Approximately 45 percent of people released from federal prison recidivate (are re-arrested or return within 3 years of their release), according to BOP. Under the FSA, BOP is to help reduce recidivism by assessing a person’s recidivism risk and needs and providing programs and activities to address their needs. The FSA allows eligible people to earn time credits that may reduce their time in prison. The FSA includes a provision for GAO to assess certain FSA requirements. This report examines the extent to which BOP conducted risk and needs assessments; offered programs and activities; and applied FSA time credits. This report also examines the extent to which DOJ met FSA reporting requirements, among other objectives. GAO analyzed BOP data from January 2022 through December 2024 for people in BOP custody as of March 30, 2024. GAO analyzed DOJ and BOP policies, guidance, and reports and interviewed officials at BOP’s Central Office and three regional offices. GAO also interviewed staff and incarcerated persons at four facilities. GAO selected facilities based on factors such as geographic location and security level.