What GAO Found GAO found (1) the Federal Housing Finance Agency's (FHFA) financial statements as of and for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2025, are presented fairly, in all material respects, in accordance with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles; (2) although internal controls could be improved, FHFA maintained, in all material respects, effective internal control over financial reporting as of September 30, 2025; and (3) no reportable noncompliance for fiscal year 2025 with provisions of applicable laws, regulations, contracts, and grant agreements GAO tested. In its written comments on a draft of this report, FHFA stated that it is pleased to accept GAO's unmodified opinion on its financial statements and maintains its commitment to strong internal controls and reliable financial reporting. Why GAO Did This Study The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 established FHFA as an independent agency empowered with supervisory and regulatory oversight of the housing-related government-sponsored enterprises: the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), the 11 Federal Home Loan Banks, and the Office of Finance. This act requires FHFA to prepare financial statements annually and requires GAO to audit the agency's financial statements. In accordance with the act, GAO audited FHFA's financial statements. For more information, contact Anne Sit-Williams at sitwilliamsa@gao.gov.

What GAO Found Telework use decreased following the end of the COVID-19 pandemic emergency and the President’s January 2025 Return to In-Person Work memorandum among three federal agencies GAO reviewed: the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), the Social Security Administration (SSA), and the Department of State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA). Officials at all three agencies told us telework likely had some effect on operations. For instance, SSA and CA had staff who had left or considered leaving for other organizations with more telework availability. They told us that other factors, such as a lack of qualified applicants and increased workloads, led to recruiting challenges. Officials at SSA told us telework was an important recruitment tool. GAO found, however, that SSA is at risk of skills gaps in key occupations, in part because its employees are seeking greater telework flexibility elsewhere. These risks come at a time when SSA is seeking to substantially reduce the size of its workforce. GAO previously reported that it is critical for agencies to carefully consider how to strategically downsize their workforces and maintain the staff resources to carry out their missions before implementing workforce reduction strategies (GAO-18-427). Agency officials said SSA has a human capital plan it can update to help guide staffing decisions, but has not done so because they are focused on responding to administration workforce priorities such as implementing skills-based hiring. However, without developing or updating a human capital plan, SSA may lack the information needed to ensure it has the mission-critical staff necessary to provide timely public service. Officials at all three agencies also told us factors other than telework contributed to problems in providing key customer services at times during fiscal years 2019 through 2024. For example, BIA attributed delays in providing probate services to Tribes and their citizens to factors such as staffing shortages and funding issues. SSA officials cited a learning curve related to a new disability case processing system and a substantial increase in the volume of submitted medical evidence as contributors to delays in processing disability claims. CA reported an unexpectedly large volume of applications and high rates of attrition that contributed to substantial delays in 2023 passport processing. However, none of the agencies had evaluated their telework programs to determine their effects on its performance and identify problems, a key practice for successful telework programs. Officials said they had not done so because they were unsure how to or were not required to conduct such evaluations. GAO determined that it was not practical for BIA and CA to evaluate their telework programs now because their staff can no longer use regular telework. Since some of SSA’s program offices continue to regularly use telework, it remains important for the agency to evaluate its telework program to identify any problems or issues and make appropriate adjustments. Why GAO Did This Study Federal agencies have used telework to help accomplish their missions, maintain continuity of operations during emergencies, and recruit and retain employees. GAO was asked to review telework use at BIA, SSA, and CA. This report (1) summarizes how often the agencies’ staff teleworked from July 2019 through May 2025, and how the agencies’ telework programs changed following the President’s issuance of the Return to In-Person Work memorandum in January 2025; (2) describes the effects telework’s use had on the agencies’ operations and customer service; and (3) assesses the extent to which the agencies followed selected key practices for successful telework programs. For this report, GAO collected and analyzed the agencies’ telework data from July 2019 through May 2025. GAO reviewed and summarized agencies’ plans to change telework use before and after January 2025. GAO analyzed agency performance information, and compared agencies’ activities with selected key telework practices identified in GAO-21-238T. GAO also conducted interviews and 11 discussion groups with agency staff.

What GAO Found U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) uses non-intrusive inspection (NII) systems, such as X-ray machines, to inspect vehicles and travelers at land ports of entry (POE). As part of this process, CBP officers use large-scale NII systems to scan entire vehicles and their contents. These scans produce images that CBP officers review to help detect illegal drugs or other contraband. In 2020, to increase vehicle scans, CBP began deploying these systems to preprimary inspection areas—before a traveler is interviewed by a CBP officer. Previously, NII systems were generally used only when an officer determined that further inspection was required after the interview. Non-Intrusive Inspection Systems Deployed in Preprimary Inspection Areas at Mission, Texas (left), and Laredo, Texas (right) CBP uses performance data to help ensure large-scale NII systems are operational, but it has not defined all key performance parameters for NII systems. For one key parameter, CBP reports and uses data on the percentage of time that large-scale NII systems are available for operational use. However, CBP has not clearly defined or reported results for its other two key parameters related to inspection rate and examination of containers and cargo. For example, CBP’s inspection rate parameter requires 100 percent inspection of high-risk commercial vehicles and container cargo, but CBP has not clearly defined the term “high risk” or the meaning of maintaining 100 percent inspection of targeted containers, cargo, and international mail. Clearly defining and reporting results for all of its key performance parameters would help CBP manage the NII program and inform future procurement decisions. CBP has made progress deploying large-scale NII systems. As of February 2025, 52 of 153 planned systems were fully operational, nearly all at preprimary inspection areas. Deployments have cost more and taken longer than CBP estimated due to, for example, unexpected construction challenges. Congress directed CBP to develop a plan to achieve 100 percent scanning of commercial and passenger vehicles and freight rail at land POEs using large-scale NII by 2027. CBP estimated that it would need 434 large-scale NII systems to achieve this goal at the northern and southwest borders—281 of which have not yet been procured, including 62 for the southwest border. However, CBP’s plans for the southwest border omit systems to scan passenger vehicles at nine crossings, including three of its highest-traffic locations that account for nearly 40 percent of passenger vehicle traffic at the southwest border in fiscal year 2024. Without these crossings in its plan, CBP risks entry of many unscanned passenger vehicles, hampering its ability to prevent illegal drugs and other contraband from entering the United States. Why GAO Did This Study Since 2019, CBP has received over $2 billion that it has used to deploy additional NII systems to land POEs, which are a key drug smuggling route. This testimony summarizes a report GAO published in September 2025 in response to a request to review the implementation and effectiveness of CBP’s NII program entitled Land Port Inspections: CBP Should Improve Performance Data and Deployment Plans for Scanning Systems. This testimony focuses on three areas: (1) how CBP assesses large-scale NII performance, (2) the status of large-scale NII system deployments, and (3) CBP’s plans for future large-scale NII system deployments. To inform that report, GAO analyzed NII program documentation, including inspection procedures, performance data, and deployment plans, and interviewed program officials. GAO also interviewed and observed CBP officers conducting inspections at land POEs where large-scale NII systems had been deployed in preprimary inspection areas.

What GAO Found The federal government gives grants to individual scientists and groups of scientists through their respective research institutions, supporting both basic and applied research. Federal funding agencies must have research security policies in place to ensure that such research is free of improper foreign influence. Such influence includes, for example, malign talent recruitment activities by foreign governments or misappropriation of research findings. Agencies are required to carry out research security policies in a manner that does not discriminate against scientists based on their race, ethnicity, or national origin. The Departments of Defense (DOD) and Energy (DOE), National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), National Institutes of Health (NIH), and National Science Foundation (NSF) have applied safeguards to varying degrees in their research security programs to help prevent discrimination. Extent to Which Selected Agencies Have Adopted Safeguards to Prevent Discrimination While Addressing Improper Foreign Influence   Transparent improper foreign influence review processes Collection and use of demographic data to assess agency processes Multiple levels of review in improper foreign influence reviews Training agency staff in non-discrimination in improper foreign influence reviews Leadership commitment to non-discrimination in improper foreign influence reviews Department of Defense ◒ ◯ ● ◒ ◯ Department of Energy ◒ ◯ ● ◒ ● National Aeronautics and Space Administration ◒ ◯ ● ◯ ◯ National Institutes of Health ● ◒ ● ◯ ● National Science Foundation ◒ ◯ ● ● ● ● = Fully adopted ◒ = Partially adopted or plan in development; ◯ = Not adopted Source: GAO analysis of selected agencies’ documents and interviews. | GAO-26-107544 While NASA and NSF documented their processes for identifying and addressing improper foreign influence, they have not documented their risk mitigation processes. By clearly documenting risk mitigation processes, agencies can create shared expectations with research institutions and researchers about how these processes are implemented fairly and without discrimination. Additionally, DOD, DOE, NASA, NIH, and NSF have not assessed their research security processes to determine whether the safeguards the agencies have in place provide reasonable assurance that discrimination will not occur. By assessing their current safeguards, agencies can provide greater assurance that discrimination will not occur and may identify additional safeguards appropriate to the agency. Why GAO Did This Study As a global leader in scientific research, the U.S. has benefited from recruiting international talent and international collaborations. However, concerns have grown about improper foreign influence in federally funded research. While agency identification of improper foreign influence is critical to preventing fraud in taxpayer funded research, some stakeholders raised concerns that agencies were discriminating against certain demographic groups when reviewing grants. GAO was asked to examine whether federal agencies ensure that research security reviews are free from discrimination. This report assesses the extent to which selected agencies have implemented safeguards to prevent discrimination in research security processes. GAO selected the five agencies that funded the highest amounts of extramural research and reviewed agency documents and published literature. GAO also performed statistical analysis on data obtained from one agency to assess differences among improper foreign influence cases and interviewed agency officials and representatives of universities and civil society organizations.

What GAO Found In May 2023, the Department of Defense (DOD) discontinued its MyTravel initiative and directed all users to return to the previous Defense Travel System (DTS). Based on information from DOD, the department’s abandonment of MyTravel was due to four primary factors: lack of a central leadership authority and advocate for change; insufficient program management practices; inadequate outreach to understand evolving stakeholder needs; and inconsistent inclusion of key users in gathering and tracking program requirements. While DOD is reinvesting in DTS to add key capabilities, the department has not yet fully addressed applicable leading practices related to the primary factors of MyTravel's abandonment (see figure). These practices include statutory department-specific business system requirements. Overall, DOD fully addressed 12 practices, partially addressed six, and did not address four. Of particular concern are the three program management and five requirements management practices that are not yet fully addressed. Until it fully implements these practices, DOD risks shortcomings in managing the program and in ensuring that users are involved in requirements gathering and tracking. Assessment of DOD’s Defense Travel System Against Selected Leading Practices and Statutory Elements Related to the MyTravel System’s Abandonment Regarding overall system modernization, DOD has department-wide improvements underway. However, its policies and guidance for managing and directing these efforts do not fully address 11 of 23 leading practices and statutory requirements related to the above four factors. For example, the department has established a framework to monitor progress of selected programs but has not established a permanent leadership structure for the efforts or taken steps to ensure that programs fully align with department-wide goals and priorities. Without fully implementing these leading practices and statutory requirements, DOD can experience coordination issues and inconsistent execution in planning and making improvements to its business systems modernization efforts. Why GAO Did This Study DOD relies on its travel system to support mission-critical operations. DOD has faced multiple challenges in its many attempts to modernize this system, most recently through the abandoned MyTravel initiative. Similar challenges have kept DOD’s business systems modernization on GAO’s High-Risk List since 1995. GAO was asked to review the DTS modernization program and DOD’s overall business system modernization. This report examines (1) primary factors that caused DOD’s abandonment of MyTravel, (2) the extent to which DOD is following applicable leading practices in modernizing DTS, and (3) the extent to which DOD is following selected practices in its overall business systems modernization. To conduct this review, GAO analyzed DOD documentation related to MyTravel and identified leading practices for system modernization. GAO analyzed DOD efforts to modernize its travel system, as well as documentation related to departmentwide business system modernization efforts, against the leading practices. GAO also interviewed relevant DOD officials.

What GAO Found In January 2026, GAO identified 16 open recommendations under the purview of the Office of Personnel Management's (OPM) Chief Information Officer (CIO) from previously issued work. Each of these recommendations relates to a GAO High-Risk area: (1) Ensuring the Cybersecurity of the Nation or (2) Improving IT Acquisitions and Management. In addition, GAO has designated two of the 16 as priority recommendations. For example, GAO previously recommended that OPM fully implement all event logging requirements as directed by the Office of Management and Budget. Further, GAO recommended that OPM complete annual reviews of its IT portfolio in conjunction with the Federal CIO. GAO also recommended that OPM compare in-use software license inventories with information on purchased licenses to identify opportunities to reduce costs and better inform decision-making. The CIO's continued attention to these recommendations will help ensure the secure and effective use of IT at the agency. Why GAO Did This Study CIO open recommendations are outstanding GAO recommendations that warrant the attention of agency CIOs because their implementation could significantly improve government IT operations by securing IT systems, identifying cost savings, improving major government programs, eliminating mismanagement of IT programs and processes, or ensuring that IT programs comply with laws, among others. For more information, contact Nick Marinos at marinosn@gao.gov.

What GAO Found In January 2026, GAO identified 30 open recommendations under the purview of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Chief Information Officer (CIO), from previously issued work. Each of these recommendations relates to a GAO High-Risk area: (1) Ensuring the Cybersecurity of the Nation or (2) Improving IT Acquisitions and Management. For example, GAO previously recommended that NASA prepare and approve an organization-wide cybersecurity risk assessment. Further, GAO recommended that NASA fully implement all event logging requirements as directed by the Office of Management and Budget. In addition, GAO recommended that NASA develop an implementation plan with time frames to update its spacecraft acquisition policies and standards to incorporate essential controls required to protect against cyber threats. GAO also previously recommended that the agency complete annual reviews of its IT portfolio consistent with federal requirements. The CIO's continued attention to these recommendations will help ensure the secure and effective use of IT at the agency. Why GAO Did This Study CIO open recommendations are outstanding GAO recommendations that warrant the attention of agency CIOs because their implementation could significantly improve government IT operations by securing IT systems, identifying cost savings, improving major government programs, eliminating mismanagement of IT programs and processes, or ensuring that IT programs comply with laws, among others. For more information, contact Nick Marinos at marinosn@gao.gov.

What GAO Found In 2021, the Federal Highway Administration issued a final rule—the “dig once” rule—establishing new broadband infrastructure regulatory requirements for state departments of transportation that receive federal-aid highway program funding. These requirements included (1) identifying a broadband utility coordinator, (2) establishing certain processes to register and notify internet service providers and other entities, and (3) coordinating initiatives with state and local plans. Broadband utility coordinator. In GAO’s national survey, 46 of 52 respondents reported their state department of transportation had identified a coordinator. Registration and notification. Over half of survey respondents reported their state had fully established processes to (1) register internet providers and other entities, and (2) electronically notify them of the state transportation improvement program. A few respondents noted barriers to implementing the processes, including limited availability of experienced staff, IT difficulties, and challenges engaging providers in the processes. Survey Respondents’ Reported Progress Establishing Registration and Notification Processes Required by the Federal Highway Administration, as of May 2025 Coordination. In responding to questions related to regulatory requirements for coordination,46 of 52 survey respondents reported coordinating broadly with federal, state, or local agencies to facilitate broadband infrastructure deployment in federal-aid highway rights-of-way. For example, one respondent reported that the broadband utility coordinator and a county utility committee exchanged details on planned highway and broadband projects at the utility’s monthly meeting. Survey respondents and stakeholders GAO interviewed said the rule’s effects on broadband deployment were not well known. However, a few respondents, state officials, provider representatives, and other stakeholders cited the overall goals of “dig once” as reasons for optimism. Specifically, they were optimistic about the potential for benefits such as reduced excavation and traffic disruptions, lower project costs, and greater broadband access. Why GAO Did This Study Installing the infrastructure necessary to expand broadband access can be costly. “Dig once” policies encourage coordination between broadband projects and road projects, which can minimize excavations and save money. GAO was asked to review the implementation status of the Federal Highway Administration’s 2021 “dig once” rule that established regulatory requirements to facilitate broadband infrastructure deployment, as required by statute. This report describes states’ progress implementing certain “dig once” rule requirements and states’ views on the effects of the rule on broadband deployment. To address these objectives, GAO surveyed all 52 broadband utility coordinators or other appropriate contacts (50 states, Puerto Rico, and Washington, D.C.). GAO reviewed applicable statutes, regulations, and Federal Highway Administration documentation. GAO also interviewed or obtained written responses from Federal Highway Administration and National Telecommunications and Information Administration officials, and representatives from four broadband industry and state government associations, which GAO selected to obtain a cross section of stakeholder interests. For three selected states, GAO reviewed documents; interviewed state department of transportation and broadband office officials; and interviewed representatives of five internet service providers. GAO selected these states to reflect a range of factors, based on information including survey responses and experience with broadband deployment projects in federal-aid highway rights-of-way since the final rule took effect. For more information, contact Andrew Von Ah at vonaha@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) reports national estimates of the number and characteristics of people using homeless shelters. These estimates are based on data from about 400 Continuums of Care (CoC), which are planning bodies that coordinate homelessness services within a defined geographic area. CoCs manage shared databases that service providers in their area use to collect data on the people they serve. Each year, CoCs submit aggregated data from these databases to Abt Associates, a consulting firm that processes and analyzes the data for HUD. Abt works with CoCs to identify and resolve data quality issues and determines whether the data meet HUD’s standards (see figure). For CoCs with unusable data and shelters that do not collect data, Abt uses statistical methods to generate estimates. HUD’s Process for Collecting Data on Shelter Use HUD’s process for assessing data quality lacks transparency, making it difficult to assess the reliability of its estimates. Abt staff review each CoC’s data to determine whether they should be included in national estimates of people using shelter programs. However, HUD has not defined which specific data quality issues render a CoC’s data unusable. Instead, according to Abt staff, these decisions are based on their professional judgment. The Office of Management and Budget’s guidelines issued in response to the Information Quality Act require agencies to provide sufficient transparency about their data and methods so that published information can be substantially reproduced. GAO reviewed HUD and Abt data and documentation and was unable to replicate HUD’s data usability determinations. Greater transparency in HUD’s review process could increase confidence in the reliability of its homelessness data. HUD has taken steps to improve the quality of aggregated CoC data by offering tools and technical assistance directly to CoCs. Staff at most of the 14 CoCs GAO interviewed said these resources were helpful and that their data quality was improving. However, when HUD determines that a CoC’s data are not usable, it does not communicate the rationale to the CoC. As a result, CoCs may be unsure about how to best improve their data and may devote limited resources to issues that may not result in better data quality. Why GAO Did This Study Hundreds of thousands of people experience homelessness in the U.S. each year, but developing quality data on homelessness has long been a challenge. High-quality information on homelessness can help policymakers and service providers more effectively target programs and allocate resources. GAO was asked to review how HUD collects and analyzes data on people experiencing sheltered homelessness.This report (1) describes HUD's process for estimating the number and characteristics of people who use shelter programs, (2) examines HUD’s process for assessing data quality and creating estimates, and (3) assesses HUD’s efforts to address data quality issues that may affect those estimates. GAO reviewed HUD data from fiscal years 2021 and 2022 (the most recent available) and documentation and interviewed agency officials. GAO also reviewed HUD guidance and interviewed staff from a nongeneralizable sample of 14 CoCs (out of about 400), selected to reflect variation in location and data quality, and conducted site visits to two of these CoCs.

What GAO Found Organ transplantation is the leading treatment for patients with severe organ failure, but as of May 2025, more than 100,000 individuals remained on the national waiting list. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has overseen organ allocation services since 1984, using the same contractor to do so, until recently. In 2024, HHS entered into contracts to assess weaknesses in organ allocation services, as part of a modernization initiative. The assessments target issues, including inequitable organ allocation and insufficient investigation of serious events, such as beginning to recover organs before patient death. However, HHS has not yet developed detailed plans for the next initiative phase, including how it will make reforms to address identified weaknesses. Doing so is crucial to improving HHS’s ability to provide organs to critically ill patients. Organ Transplants from Deceased Donors, Percent by Type, 2024 Note: Data show organ transplant types reported by the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network. In 2024, there were 41,119 organ transplants from deceased donors in the United States. HHS has not assessed the risks associated with its contractor providing supplementary services outside of its HHS contract, and charging a related monthly fee, to transplant programs. Services include, for example, analytics to help transplant programs manage their waiting lists. In fiscal year 2024, the contractor received about $9.6 million from transplant programs paying the fee. These supplementary services and fee raise several concerns, including whether the services should be provided as part of the contractor’s agreement with HHS and that transplant programs may be paying the fee without realizing it is optional. Assessing the risks associated with this contractor activity, and making changes as appropriate, would better position HHS to ensure it is effectively overseeing its contractor, which has a crucial role in ensuring lifesaving organs are provided to patients effectively and safely. In 2021, HHS formed a coordination group to improve the organ transplantation system, overseen by two of its agencies. However, the group’s action plan does not include specific, actionable steps with milestone completion dates and measures to gauge success of actions taken. Including these elements, consistent with the group’s charter, would better enable HHS to improve the organ transplantation system through its agencies’ collaborative efforts. Why GAO Did This Study Congress and others have raised concerns about systemic issues with organ allocation services, such as the data reliability of the organ matching IT system. In March 2023, HHS announced a modernization initiative to improve organ allocation services. The Securing the U.S. Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network Act includes a provision for GAO to review the organ transplantation system. This report examines, in part, HHS’s efforts to assess weaknesses in organ allocation services as part of its modernization initiative; the extent to which HHS assesses supplementary services and the fee charged to transplant programs by the contractor; and coordination across HHS. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed agency and contractor documentation and interviewed officials and representatives from HHS, the contractor, and non-federal groups involved in the organ transplantation system, including providers and patients, among others.

What GAO Found The U.S. Coast Guard is the only military service that is a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) rather than the Department of Defense (DOD). Thus, the operations and oversight of the Coast Guard are established separately from those of the other military services. The DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) oversees the Coast Guard in addition to other DHS components. The DOD OIG oversees the other military services—the Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Space Force. In addition, each of those military services—except the Space Force—has its own dedicated service-level OIG. There are both similarities and differences in the structure of how DHS OIG oversees the Coast Guard compared to the OIG oversight structure for the other military services. For example, DHS and DOD OIGs both operate independently of their respective departments. However, military service OIGs do not have the same statutory independence provisions. Additionally, DHS OIG conducts all oversight, including audits, inspections, evaluations, and investigations, whereas these same activities are divided among DOD OIG and the military service OIGs. Finally, the OIGs vary in personnel and budget size, as do the services they oversee. Why GAO Did This Study The James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 includes a provision for GAO to compare the DHS OIG's oversight structure for the Coast Guard to the DOD and the military service OIGs' oversight structure for other military services. To compare oversight structures, GAO analyzed data and reviewed statutes, policies, and procedures for OIGs at DHS, DOD, and each military service. GAO also reviewed policies and procedures for oversight activities, including audits, inspections, evaluations, and investigations. Further, GAO spoke to officials in each OIG to ensure appropriate understanding of roles and responsibilities of the various OIGs. For more information, contact Heather MacLeod at macleodh@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The Coast Guard Investigative Service (CGIS) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) have some overlapping authorities to investigate complaints regarding the Coast Guard. From October 2018 through May 2024, CGIS investigated at least 4,951 such complaints, and DHS OIG investigated 70 such complaints. CGIS is an independent investigative body within the Coast Guard that primarily conducts criminal investigations related to Coast Guard personnel, assets, and operations. DHS OIG investigates complaints of alleged criminal, civil, and administrative misconduct involving Coast Guard employees, contractors, and programs, among others. CGIS and DHS OIG identified the need to prevent duplicative investigations, but the two agencies have not fully followed five out of six selected leading practices for collaboration. For example, the agencies have different perspectives on which complaints CGIS should refer to DHS OIG. Fully following these five practices to improve collaboration, consistent with their statutory responsibilities, would better position the agencies to deconflict their investigative activities and ensure effective and appropriate allocation of resources. Extent of Coast Guard Investigative Service (CGIS) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) Collaboration Why GAO Did This Study CGIS and DHS OIG play critical roles in overseeing the Coast Guard—a multi-mission maritime military service within DHS that employs more than 51,000 personnel. The James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 includes a provision for GAO to assess the oversight of Coast Guard activities. This report examines the extent that (1) DHS OIG has processes in place to ensure timely and effective oversight of Coast Guard activities and (2) CGIS and DHS OIG coordinate on complaints, among other things. GAO evaluated CGIS’s and DHS OIG’s processes for referring Coast Guard complaints to one another against GAO-identified leading practices for collaboration. GAO analyzed CGIS and DHS OIG investigative data, reviewed the 2003 memorandum of understanding and CGIS standard operating procedures, and interviewed CGIS and DHS OIG officials.

What GAO Found The U.S. military conducts operations around the globe while staying ready to immediately respond to new and emerging security threats. In all but 4 of the last 49 fiscal years, the Department of Defense (DOD) has had to carry out its critical national security mission while operating under temporary appropriations in the form of continuing resolutions (CR). Under CRs, there is uncertainty for agencies about when they will receive their final appropriation and what amount of funding will be available for a fiscal year that has already begun. In addition, CRs include constraints that, among other things, place limits on starting new programs or increasing production of weapon systems and munitions. DOD officials have stated publicly in recent years that CRs hamper the military services’ ability to accomplish their missions and carry out management functions. DOD has made adjustments to continue to meet mission needs under the constraints of CRs. Available data do not allow for a precise measure of the extent of the effects of CRs on DOD operations in many cases. However, officials from the selected activities and programs that GAO reviewed reported facing delays, increased costs, operational challenges, spending challenges, and administrative burdens as a result of CRs. Effects of Continuing Resolutions on DOD Delays. About half (36 of 74) of acquisition programs GAO surveyed reported experiencing schedule effects, such as delays in awarding contracts or in the delivery and fielding of equipment, as a result of CRs. For example, five of nine Air Force aircraft acquisition programs reported experiencing effects such as delayed program activities and contracts. In one instance, officials reported that due to CR constraints in fiscal year 2022, the F-15 Eagle Passive Active Warning Survivability System modification program—which is modernizing the electronic warfare system on the F-15—delayed the award of a contract for hardware kits, resulting in likely parts shortages for the aircraft. Increased costs. Some activities and programs have experienced increased costs because of delays from CRs, according to officials. For example, Joint Base San Antonio officials told GAO that the cost of a facilities sustainment contract more than doubled after CR-related delays in fiscal year 2024. The original contract was estimated at a cost of $579,000, but according to officials, the contract was delayed due to limited funding available while operating under a CR. After a final appropriation was passed, the quoted price had increased to $1,445,000. In addition, officials from the Marine Corps Amphibious Combat Vehicle program reported that they incurred an additional cost of $17.7 million from fiscal year 2022 through fiscal year 2024 as a result of CRs. This increase was due to shifts in the timing of orders and associated changes in foreign exchange rates. Operational challenges. Officials stated that CRs have affected the availability of equipment, logistics, and other supports for training and exercises, limiting the quality of the training and unit readiness. For example, according to a U.S. Indo-Pacific Command official, CRs during fiscal year 2024 led to the command not having funding to send targets to the Philippines for Exercise Balikatan. As a result, one of the exercise’s training events for the U.S. and partner nations was canceled. Spending challenges. CRs can lead to uneven spending over the course of the fiscal year. GAO’s analysis of DOD obligations (i.e., spending commitments) in selected appropriation accounts from fiscal year 2013 through fiscal year 2023 shows the spending-related effects of operating under a CR. As shown in the graphic below, longer CR periods—those that last more than 3 months of the fiscal year—have led to slower obligation rates early in the fiscal year, particularly for research, development, test, and evaluation accounts and procurement accounts, with faster obligation rates later in the fiscal year. Activities and programs have faced difficulties executing full-year appropriations because there is limited time left in the fiscal year to obligate funds, especially in years with longer CR periods. In particular, according to military service officials, activities and programs can face bottlenecks, such as with the capacity of contracting offices to solicit and issue contracts or the ability of vendors to complete projects. DOD Obligations in Selected Appropriation Accounts in First Year of Availability, Fiscal Years 2013–2023 Note: Obligations represent the percentage of total obligations for an appropriation in the first year of availability; RDT&E and procurement obligations add up to less than 100 percent because those appropriations are available for multiple years. Short CR years are those fiscal years with CR periods lasting 3 months or less and long CR years are those fiscal years with CR periods lasting more than 3 months. This analysis excludes fiscal year 2014, due to CRs affecting only certain DOD programs and a lapse in other DOD appropriations during that year, as well as fiscal year 2019, when full-year Defense appropriations were enacted prior to the start of the fiscal year. Administrative burdens. CRs have created additional administrative burdens and inefficiencies for DOD personnel who must prepare additional contracting actions and spending plans. For example, F-35 program officials GAO surveyed stated that they constantly replan their budget during a CR and estimate that 20 percent of their financial management staff’s time is spent adjusting their budget to manage through CR constraints. Why GAO Did This Study A CR is a type of temporary appropriation act that provides budget authority to keep federal agencies or specific activities in operation when a regular appropriation act has not been enacted by the beginning of the fiscal year. Senate Report 118-58 includes a provision for GAO to review how CRs affect specific DOD operation and maintenance activities and acquisition programs. This report describes the effects of CRs on selected DOD activities and programs. GAO reviewed a nongeneralizable sample of operation and maintenance activities (including facilities sustainment, joint exercises, and unit training) and acquisition programs (including Air Force aircraft, Army ammunition, and Space Force and Navy missile defense systems). This sample provides illustrative examples of how DOD was affected by CRs in meeting its critical national security mission since fiscal year 2022. GAO interviewed and obtained information on the effects of CRs from DOD and military service officials, and conducted site visits to selected military installations. These included Joint Base San Antonio, Hill Air Force Base, Corpus Christi Army Depot, and Tooele Army Depot. GAO also analyzed DOD monthly obligation data while under a CR from fiscal years 2013 through 2023; and reviewed information on the effects of CRs from fiscal years 2022 through 2024 collected through a survey of acquisition programs. For more information, contact Rashmi Agarwal at AgarwalR@gao.gov.

What GAO Found In fiscal year 2025, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) collected more than $5.3 trillion in taxes and paid out about $639 billion in tax refunds, credits, and other payments. Fiscal Year 2025 IRS Collections of Federal Taxes, by Type     In GAO’s opinion, IRS’s fiscal year 2025 financial statements are fairly presented in all material respects, and although internal controls could be improved, IRS maintained, in all material respects, effective internal control over financial reporting as of September 30, 2025. GAO’s tests of IRS’s compliance with selected provisions of applicable laws, regulations, contracts, and grant agreements disclosed no instances of reportable noncompliance in fiscal year 2025. System limitations and other deficiencies in IRS’s accounting for federal taxes receivable and other unpaid assessment balances continued to exist during fiscal year 2025. These control deficiencies affect IRS’s ability to produce reliable financial statements without using significant compensating procedures. These control deficiencies are significant enough to merit the attention of those charged with governance of IRS and therefore represent a continuing significant deficiency in internal control over financial reporting. Continued management attention is essential to fully addressing this significant deficiency. In commenting on a draft of this report, IRS stated that it was pleased to receive an unmodified opinion on its financial statements. IRS also commented that it is dedicated to promoting the highest standards of financial management and accountability and will continue to work to provide accurate reporting and improve internal controls. Why GAO Did This Study In connection with fulfilling GAO’s requirement to audit the consolidated financial statements of the U.S. government, and consistent with its authority to audit statements and schedules prepared by executive agency components, GAO has audited IRS’s financial statements because of the significance of IRS’s tax collections to the consolidated financial statements of the U.S. government. GAO annually audits IRS’s financial statements to determine whether (1) the financial statements are fairly presented and (2) IRS management maintained effective internal control over financial reporting. GAO also tests IRS’s compliance with selected provisions of applicable laws, regulations, contracts, and grant agreements. IRS’s tax collection activities are significant to overall federal receipts, and the effectiveness of its financial management is of substantial interest to Congress and the nation’s taxpayers. For more information, contact Dawn B. Simpson at SimpsonD@gao.gov.

Why This Matters The Department of Defense (DOD) has emphasized the importance of protecting students in the Junior Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (JROTC) from instructor sexual misconduct. DOD reported more than 100 misconduct allegations from 2013—2023. Legislation established new JROTC requirements in fiscal year 2024, in part to address concerns about sexual misconduct involving instructors and students. GAO Key Takeaways The military services partner with high schools to provide leadership training to students through JROTC, which DOD oversees. In response to statutory requirements, DOD developed policies and procedures to prevent sexual misconduct in JROTC and respond to misconduct allegations. We identified issues that, if addressed, would aid DOD’s efforts: The standardized memorandum of agreement (MOA)—which the military services sign with school districts—incorporates seven of 10 required provisions but does not fully incorporate three (see figure). For example, the MOA does not require schools to certify that they provide student training. Instructor training does not consistently address Title IX, a law prohibiting sex-based discrimination in education. This makes instructors less likely to be aware of Title IX requirements. Information provided to students on how to report misconduct is unclear and could be improved. Gaps in DOD’s oversight of JROTC programs also exist. For example, DOD guidance does not clearly define how the military services’ regional officials are expected to coordinate and communicate with partner schools. Clarifying these responsibilities would improve program oversight and better ensure students’ safety. Areas of Misalignment Between Requirements and the Military Services’ Agreement with School Districts Note: For more details, see figure 2 in GAO-26-107524. How GAO Did This Study We analyzed relevant statutes, documents, and policies on DOD’s prevention of and response to sexual misconduct in JROTC; reviewed the most recent 5 years of data on allegations; visited 11 high schools with JROTC programs in four states; and interviewed school officials, instructors, and DOD officials.

What GAO Found GAO found (1) the Bureau of the Fiscal Service’s Schedules of Federal Debt for fiscal years 2025 and 2024 are fairly presented in all material respects and (2) Fiscal Service maintained, in all material respects, effective internal control over financial reporting relevant to the Schedule of Federal Debt as of September 30, 2025. GAO’s tests of selected provisions of applicable laws, regulations, contracts, and grant agreements related to the Schedule of Federal Debt disclosed no instances of reportable noncompliance for fiscal year 2025. Over the past 10 years, from fiscal year 2015 through fiscal year 2025, total federal debt managed by Fiscal Service has increased from $18.1 trillion to $37.6 trillion. Total Federal Debt Outstanding, September 30, 2015, through September 30, 2025 Note: A small amount of total federal debt is not subject to the debt limit. During fiscal year 2025, total federal debt increased by about $2.2 trillion, with about $2.0 trillion of the increase in debt held by the public. Debt held by the public is increasing mainly because the federal government continues to spend more than it collects in revenue, resulting in annual budget deficits that must be financed through borrowing. The budget deficit for fiscal year 2025 was $1.8 trillion. Additionally, interest on debt held by the public has increased significantly, nearly doubling over the last 3 fiscal years, from about $500 billion in fiscal year 2022 to about $1.0 trillion in fiscal year 2025. On June 3, 2023, the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023 was enacted, suspending the debt limit through January 1, 2025. Effective January 2, 2025, the statutory debt limit was set at $36.1 trillion. Extraordinary measures began on January 21, 2025, to prevent the U.S. government from defaulting on its obligations. Extraordinary measures continued until Monday, July 7, 2025, after the debt limit was increased on July 4, 2025, by $5.0 trillion to $41.1 trillion. The current approach to the debt limit has created uncertainty and disruptions in the Treasury securities market and has increased borrowing costs. In early 2025, the Congressional Budget Office projected that federal deficits will exceed $2 trillion annually over the next decade and remain historically large for the following 30 years under current law. The federal government remains on an unsustainable long-term fiscal path. Why GAO Did This Study GAO audits the consolidated financial statements of the U.S. government. Because of the significance of the federal debt to the government-wide financial statements, GAO audits Fiscal Service’s Schedules of Federal Debt annually to determine whether, in all material respects, (1) the schedules are fairly presented and (2) Fiscal Service management maintained effective internal control over financial reporting relevant to the Schedule of Federal Debt. Further, GAO tests compliance with selected provisions of applicable laws, regulations, contracts, and grant agreements related to the Schedule of Federal Debt. Federal debt managed by Fiscal Service consists of debt held by the public and intragovernmental debt holdings. Debt held by the public primarily represents the amount the federal government has borrowed to finance cumulative cash deficits and is held by investors outside of the federal government. Intragovernmental debt holdings represent federal debt owed by the Department of the Treasury to other federal government accounts that typically have an obligation to invest their excess annual receipts (and interest earnings) over disbursements in federal securities.