What GAO Found In 2009, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) began a comprehensive effort to revise its disability rating schedule, which is criteria VA uses to determine veterans’ eligibility for disability compensation. This effort involves updating two sets of information. The first set—medical information—includes disabilities veterans may have, organized into 15 body systems. The second set—earnings loss—is the average decrease in expected earnings caused by those disabilities. Medical information. As of December 2025, according to VA officials, VA has updated medical information for 11 of the 15 body systems and planned to complete updates for the remaining four systems in fiscal year 2026—10 years after its originally planned completion date. Earnings loss information. Since May 2023, VA has been testing how to produce data from its earnings loss studies and update the rating schedule with this information. Past VA and external studies have evaluated the average loss of earnings for veterans with service-connected disabilities and suggest that certain veterans were not being equitably compensated (e.g., those with mental health conditions may be undercompensated). However, as of January 2026, VA has not updated its rating schedule with earnings loss information from any of its studies. Consequently, ratings determinations for all earnings loss calculations remain based on information from 1945. Since 2019, VA has taken steps to demonstrate progress on this high-risk area. For example, in 2024 VA issued an action plan that identified the root causes of the challenges it faces in updating the rating schedule, the actions it plans to take to address them, and metrics and milestones to monitor progress. VA has fully met three of the five criteria for disability rating schedule updates to be removed from GAO’s High-Risk List: Leadership Commitment, Action Plan, and Monitoring. To have this area removed from the list, VA must continue to meet these three criteria and fully meet two more: Capacity and Demonstrated Progress. VA has not fully defined the resources needed for, nor demonstrated adequate progress in, updating its medical and earnings loss information. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Progress Addressing Criteria for Removing Disability Rating Schedule Update from GAO High-Risk List VA must be able to accurately compensate veterans commensurately with the impact of their service-connected disabilities. Without a rating schedule that fully reflects present-day medicine and changes in the labor market since 1945, VA may overcompensate some veterans while undercompensating others. Why GAO Did This Study Veterans with injuries or illnesses incurred or aggravated during their military service may receive monthly disability payments from VA. VA administers one of the largest disability compensation programs in the nation. The department reported providing $195 billion in compensation to over 6.9 million veterans and their families in fiscal year 2025. Yet determinations of veterans’ eligibility for disability compensation are partially based on criteria that have not been updated in over 80 years. Partly due to the need to update the disability compensation criteria comprehensively, VA’s management of the disability compensation program has been on GAO’s High-Risk List since 2003. GAO was asked to testify on VA’s efforts to update its eligibility criteria for disability compensation. This testimony summarizes the status of VA's efforts and steps VA must take for the disability compensation program to be removed from the High-Risk List. This GAO testimony is based on findings from selected GAO reports issued from 2012 to 2025, particularly GAO’s High-Risk List updates. Information about the scope and methodology is available in the underlying reports. For more information, contact Elizabeth H. Curda at curdae@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The federal government has tools and resources to help agencies combat fraud and improper payments. GAO has recommended improvements to the use of these tools and resources. For example, Congress should consider making permanent the Social Security Administration’s requirement to share its full death data with the Do Not Pay system to help prevent fraud and improper payments. Further, GAO has identified leading practices for managing fraud risks at federal agencies and has made recommendations to agencies to implement these practices. For example, in 2024, GAO recommended that the Department of Defense revise its Fraud Risk Management Strategy to include data analytics as a method to address fraud. Further, by implementing GAO’s recommendation, the Small Business Administration identified $4.7 billion in loans from the Paycheck Protection Program that were made before September 2020 and that went to ineligible recipients or were used for unauthorized purposes. Programs Reporting the Largest Estimates of Improper Payments in Fiscal Year 2024 Artificial intelligence (AI) and data analytics have the potential to enhance efforts to combat fraud and improper payments but also have challenges. For example, data analytics and AI could help agencies sift through large volumes of data. However, agencies need solid, reliable data and a human in the loop to ensure data reliability and appropriate application of the technology. GAO’s AI Accountability Framework for Federal Agencies and Other Entities includes key practices for ensuring data used in AI systems are high quality, reliable, and appropriate for the intended purpose. Further, to improve the use of data analytics in identifying fraud and improper payments, GAO recommended in 2022 that Congress establish a permanent analytics center of excellence. Additionally, the federal government requires an AI-ready workforce if AI is to help combat fraud and improper payments. However, GAO has identified mission-critical gaps in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics skills within the federal workforce and has reported on challenges agencies face in attracting and developing individuals with AI expertise. Why GAO Did This Study The distinct, yet interrelated, problems of fraud and improper payments are long-standing and pervasive. Fraud involves obtaining something of value through willful misrepresentation. Improper payments are payments that should not have been made or that were made in the wrong amount. GAO estimated that the federal government loses between $233 billion and $521 billion annually due to fraud, based on data for fiscal years 2018 through 2022. Since fiscal year 2003, cumulative improper payment estimates reported by executive branch agencies have totaled about $2.8 trillion. In fiscal year 2024, five programs accounted for most improper payments. These issues impact the integrity of federal programs and erode public trust. The advancement of AI and other innovative technologies presents opportunities and challenges for combatting fraud and improper payments. This statement discusses (1) examples of tools and resources Congress and federal agencies can leverage to improve existing efforts to combat fraud and improper payments without the use of AI, (2) opportunities and challenges for using data analytics and AI to combat fraud and improper payments, and (3) challenges in developing an AI-ready federal workforce. This statement is based on a body of work GAO issued between 2015 and 2025 including GAO-25-108172, GAO-25-107508, GAO‑21‑519SP, and GAO-25-107653.

What GAO Found The Coast Guard, a multi-mission military service within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), uses its resources—including assets such as vessels and aircraft—to conduct its drug and migrant interdiction missions. Given limited resources, the Coast Guard made tradeoffs to address a significant increase in maritime migration levels that began in 2021. Specifically, it redirected assets to migrant interdiction that it had originally allocated to other missions, such as drug interdiction. This impacted its ability to conduct those other missions. The Coast Guard did not meet its primary drug interdiction performance target in fiscal years 2015 through 2024, and did not meet its primary migrant interdiction target for 6 years during the same period. See figures below. Coast Guard officials said neither primary measure effectively assesses its efforts. Thus, it began to implement new drug interdiction measures in fiscal years 2021 and 2022 to better assess its performance. As of July 2025, the Coast Guard had identified which would be its new primary drug interdiction measures. In addition, the Coast Guard is in the initial stages of developing new migrant interdiction performance measures, but as of July 2025 had not yet implemented them. Doing so would better position the Coast Guard to provide decision makers with relevant information to make future resource decisions. Coast Guard Annual Drug and Migrant Interdiction Primary Performance Measures The DHS Operation Vigilant Sentry task force provides a key coordination mechanism for the Coast Guard and about 10 federal partners responsible for maritime migrant interdiction. The Coast Guard and its federal partners generally followed seven of GAO’s eight leading collaboration practices identified in prior work. However, the task force did not fully share information on lessons learned. By implementing a process to identify and address lessons learned from events and sharing related reports with relevant federal partners, the task force would better address areas for improvement. This process could also help better manage fragmentation by ensuring all partners operate with similar information to support the migrant interdiction mission. Why GAO Did This Study The Coast Guard is the lead federal maritime agency responsible for interdicting illicit drug traffic and enforcing U.S. immigration laws and policies at sea. In fiscal years 2022 and 2023, it responded to the highest maritime migration levels in over 30 years. It has been conducting a migrant interdiction surge operation since August 2022. As of November 2025, the surge operation was ongoing. GAO was asked to review the Coast Guard’s drug and migrant interdiction missions. This report examines, among other things: (1) the extent the Coast Guard met its drug and migrant interdiction mission performance targets in fiscal years 2015–2024, (2) how its maritime migration surge operation in fiscal years 2022–2024 affected its ability to perform its other statutory missions, and (3) the extent it coordinated with federal partners to conduct maritime migrant interdiction. GAO analyzed Coast Guard drug and migrant interdiction performance data, and reviewed relevant policies and documentation. GAO also conducted in-person site visits to Miami, Florida and San Diego, California and interviewed Coast Guard officials and DHS partner agencies to discuss drug and migrant interdiction operations and related coordination efforts.

What GAO Found The Coast Guard employs assets—including aircraft and vessels—and personnel to conduct law enforcement operations. In prior work, GAO identified longstanding challenges that have hindered the Coast Guard’s ability to meet its law enforcement mission demands. GAO made recommendations to help address asset availability, acquisitions, and workforce challenges, which the Coast Guard has yet to fully address. The Coast Guard’s vessels and aircraft have faced availability challenges and have been in a state of decline for decades. In June 2025 GAO found that the Medium Endurance Cutters availability to conduct missions declined from fiscal year 2020 through fiscal year 2024. GAO recommended that the Coast Guard address maintenance challenges and operational availability issues with these cutters, which it relies on for law enforcement missions. The Coast Guard’s declining asset availability is exacerbated by persistent and longstanding challenges managing its planned $40 billion acquisition programs to modernize its vessels and aircraft. In November 2025, GAO found that continued delays and cost overruns with the Offshore Patrol Cutter program—one of its highest priority acquisitions—is likely. GAO made four recommendations to address these issues GAO has identified longstanding staffing shortfalls and poor workforce planning, which have challenged the Coast Guard’s ability to meet its mission needs. For example, in June 2025, GAO reported that cutter crew vacancy rates increased from fiscal year 2017 through fiscal year 2024, according to the most recent Coast Guard data at the time. GAO recommended that the Coast Guard develop a clear plan to support its workforce retention initiatives, among other recommendations. Coast Guard Migrant Interdiction Why GAO Did This Study The U.S. government has identified transnational and domestic criminal organizations as a significant threat to the public, law enforcement, and national security. The Coast Guard is the nation’s lead federal maritime law enforcement agency. It received nearly $25 billion in supplemental funding in fiscal year 2025 for various acquisitions and in support of efforts to modernize operations and capabilities. The Coast Guard is a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). It conducts maritime law enforcement, including: drug interdiction, migrant interdiction, and other missions (which include fisheries law enforcement work to prevent illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing). This statement discusses Coast Guard challenges GAO previously identified related to its law enforcement missions. This statement is based primarily on six GAO reports published from June 2023 to January 2026.

What GAO Found Nonfederal law enforcement officers query encountered individuals against the terrorist watchlist during routine police interactions, such as traffic stops. After encountering a potentially terrorist watchlisted individual, nonfederal law enforcement officers receive instructions, via the National Crime Information Center (NCIC), to contact the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Threat Screening Center to determine whether the individual is a positive or negative match to the terrorist watchlist. GAO found that almost half of the law enforcement entities GAO interviewed in four states (12 of 26 entities, including police and sheriff’s departments) reported that officers were not consistently reporting encounters with potentially terrorist watchlisted individuals in instances where it is warranted. Seeking information to understand the extent to which nonfederal law enforcement entities are consistently reporting terrorist watchlist encounters could improve the accuracy of watchlist records. Nonfederal Law Enforcement Steps When Responding To Terrorist Watchlist Encounters aDispatchers may be used by police departments to query the National Crime Information Center instead of the responding officer. The Threat Screening Center uses outreach efforts to communicate terrorist watchlisting policies to nonfederal law enforcement entities that use the terrorist watchlist. However, GAO found that FBI has not ensured nonfederal law enforcement entities are aware of terrorist watchlist policies and has not taken steps to develop a communication plan for its outreach efforts. Developing a communication plan with goals and measures as well as periodic assessments of progress would help accomplish this. Additionally, FBI’s Criminal Justice Information Services does not ensure states train NCIC users on terrorist watchlist policies. Without developing a process to review states’ efforts to do so, FBI cannot ensure that state training programs instruct nonfederal law enforcement to properly protect and respond to terrorist watchlist information. Why GAO Did This Study The Threat Screening Center, administered by FBI, is responsible for managing the terrorist watchlist. In recent years, Members of Congress have raised questions about how nonfederal entities use the terrorist watchlist. GAO was asked to examine the use of the terrorist watchlist by nonfederal law enforcement entities. This report examines (1) nonfederal entities’ reporting of terrorist watchlist encounters to FBI and opportunities for improvement and (2) steps FBI has taken to ensure nonfederal entities’ awareness of watchlist policies through outreach and state-led trainings. GAO reviewed watchlist policies and training resources for nonfederal entities and collected encounter data for fiscal years 2019 through 2024. GAO interviewed nonfederal law enforcement officials in four states selected based on the number of encounters and other factors. While not generalizable, these interviews provided insights into officials’ awareness of policies and training. This is the public version of a sensitive report GAO issued in August 2025. Information on encounter data and official FBI instructions on handling watchlist encounters that FBI deemed sensitive has been omitted.

What GAO Found Between 2018 and 2024, the U.S. Department of State (State) provided an estimated $375 million to support the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East’s (UNRWA) educational activities in the West Bank and Gaza. These funds supported UNRWA’s education system, including teacher salaries, facilities, and maintenance. Because the Palestinian Authority provides textbooks to UNRWA free of charge, no U.S. funds went toward the purchase of textbooks. Until July 2025, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) also supported education-related projects in the West Bank and Gaza, such as providing vocational training handbooks. United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) School in the West Bank UNRWA and State took steps to identify and address problematic content in educational materials used in UNRWA schools. UNRWA reviewed textbooks and provided guidance to teachers on addressing identified content that did not align with UN values. However, UNRWA has faced some challenges in implementing its approach to address problematic content, such as teacher and community resistance. In addition, audits have found weaknesses in UNRWA’s educational activities and use of Palestinian textbooks, while also noting its commitment to principles such as neutrality. UNRWA has taken certain steps to address the issues raised in these audits. In the years that State provided funding to UNRWA, it monitored UNRWA’s actions to identify and address problematic content such as reviewing UNRWA reports and conducting field visits to schools. Since 2018, annual appropriations acts required State to report on certain UNRWA issues, including steps UNRWA took to ensure its educational materials are consistent with the values of human rights, dignity, and tolerance, and do not induce violence. State submitted six reports since 2018, three of which were submitted after the statutory deadline. This includes the 2019 report, which was submitted 92 days late. State also did not always address all the reporting requirements that Congress established. For example, in its 2022 report, State did not report on steps that UNRWA took to ensure that its educational materials did not induce incitement. Finally, although State developed standard operating procedures for ensuring report accuracy in response to a 2019 GAO recommendation, it did not always follow these procedures. Given the U.S. no longer funds UNRWA and State is no longer required to report to Congress on UNRWA, GAO is not making recommendations for improving State’s reporting. Why GAO Did This Study In the West Bank and Gaza, UNRWA schools use textbooks developed by the Palestinian Authority to educate students and prepare them for post-secondary education. However, UNRWA has identified problematic content in these textbooks, such as material that is counter to UN values of neutrality, nonviolence and nondiscrimination. The October 7, 2023 Hamas attack on Israel heightened concerns about UNRWA, including Israeli allegations that the textbooks radicalized youth and that UNRWA employees had connections to Hamas and other terrorist organizations. The U.S. is historically the largest source of funds to UNRWA, but additional funding was paused in January 2024 and subsequently all funding ended. In June 2019, GAO reported that State had taken actions to address potentially problematic content in UNRWA educational materials but that its reporting to Congress omitted required information and contained inaccurate information. GAO was asked to update these findings. This report addresses (1) U.S. funding for educational assistance in the West Bank and Gaza for calendar years 2018 through 2024, (2) the extent to which UNRWA and State identified and addressed potentially problematic educational materials, and (3) the extent to which State submitted required related reports, and how it developed the reports and ensured their accuracy. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed State and UNRWA financial data, reviewed relevant documents, analyzed State’s annual reports to Congress, and interviewed U.S. government officials. GAO also conducted fieldwork in Israel, the West Bank, and Jordan to visit an UNRWA school and interview Israeli, Palestinian Authority, and UNRWA officials, among others. For more information, contact Latesha Love-Grayer at LoveGrayerL@gao.gov.

What GAO Found Some communities facing water scarcity are turning to water recycling as a strategy to replenish and conserve their existing water sources. Water recycling (reuse) involves treating wastewater or other unusable water so that it can be used by the public. In addition to replenishing and conserving existing water sources, water recycling can reduce the need to import water from other regions and improve resilience to droughts and other disasters, such as wildfires. In 2021 the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) directed the Secretary of the Interior to establish the Large-Scale Water Recycling Program. This program awards grants to fund up to 25 percent of a project with an estimated total cost of at least $500 million. In 2024 Interior’s Bureau of Reclamation selected five projects to receive grants totaling about $308 million of the $450 million appropriated for the program. The selected projects will serve rural, suburban, and urban communities in Southern California and Utah. Project documents describe multiple potential benefits to their communities once the projects are completed, including reduced strain on the Colorado River by millions of gallons per day, assistance in providing water to millions of customers, and the creation of at least an estimated 24,000 jobs. Projects the U.S. Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Reclamation Selected for the Large-Scale Water Recycling Program in 2024 Project (State) Grantee Estimated production of recycled water (in millions of gallons per day) Agency-selected grantsa (in millions) Chino Basin Resiliency Project (California)b Inland Empire Utilities Agency 13.4 $10.9 Los Angeles Groundwater Replenishment Project (California) Los Angeles Department of Water and Power 18.4 60.0 Pure Water Southern California Program Metropolitan Water District of Southern California 115.0 125.5 VenturaWaterPure Program (California) City of San Buenaventura 3.2 90.5 Washington County Regional Reuse System (Utah) Washington County Water Conservancy District 4.5 21.2 Total   154.5 $308.0 Source: GAO analysis of Bureau of Reclamation and grantee information. | GAO-26-107888 aReclamation obligates (or awards) funding when a financial assistance agreement is executed; funding disbursed to the project grantee is considered expended. GAO refers to the amounts that Reclamation assigns to projects before the funds are obligated as “agency-selected grants.” bThe full name of this project is Advanced Treatment of Recycled Water to Enhance Chino Basin Resiliency Project. Sites in California and Utah for Large-Scale Water Recycling Projects As of December 2025, Reclamation had obligated $236.5 million for three of the projects. Reclamation officials said the agency would obligate the remaining $71.5 million for the other projects after Interior approves the execution of the grant agreements. Officials said, as of December 2025, Interior was continuing to review the other grants. Also, Reclamation has not yet selected projects for the remaining $142 million because of a department-level review of the grants and program. Reclamation's grant selection process and the selected projects aligned with the relevant IIJA criteria for the Large-Scale Water Recycling Program. Reclamation officials identified some challenges implementing the program as described below: The IIJA does not include project feasibility study costs as an eligible use of funds. All five grantees told GAO that they needed to develop or update these studies to apply for project funding. Reclamation addressed this challenge by developing a separate funding opportunity to fund the feasibility studies. The IIJA does not address how a law requiring Interior to fund all approved projects for insular areas (e.g., Guam) affects grant funding. Reclamation decided to exclude projects from insular areas from the selection process to ensure that grants from other areas could be considered. Reclamation’s efforts to identify challenging external factors and to implement strategies to address these challenges are consistent with key practices for evidence-based policymaking, such as assessing the environment. Reclamation officials said these strategies could help the agency distribute the funding sooner and manage the federal government’s investment. By reporting its experience with the program, Reclamation could provide decision-makers such as Congress with information that can be used to improve how the Large-Scale Water Recycling Program or future water recycling programs are implemented. Why GAO Did This Study Population growth and drought are among the factors that place increasing demands on the U.S. water supply. In 2021 the IIJA directed the Secretary of the Interior to establish the Large-Scale Water Recycling Program. The IIJA includes a provision for GAO to submit a report to Congress about the grant selection process for the program. This report examines the extent to which Reclamation’s grant selection process and selection criteria aligned with relevant IIJA criteria, and examines the projects selected and the challenges Reclamation and grantees experienced with the program’s implementation. GAO compared program and project documentation, including Interior’s guidance, with IIJA criteria and federal grant regulations. GAO also assessed Reclamation efforts against key practices for evidence-based policymaking. GAO developed these practices based on federal laws and guidance and past GAO work. In addition, GAO conducted site visits with each project grantee in California and Utah. GAO also interviewed Reclamation officials about the application and selection processes, stakeholders about the intended benefits of the projects, and both officials and grantees about any implementation challenges.

What GAO Found Since 2020, the Department of Defense’s (DOD) telework and remote work policies have changed to reflect federal guidance on the use of these flexibilities by federal employees. In January 2025, DOD directed the return to in-person work for all employees in compliance with a presidential memorandum requiring all executive branch employees to work in-person on a full-time basis, with limited exceptions. According to officials, as of July 2025, about 8 percent (62,000 of 780,000) of DOD employees had not returned to in-person work, with 6 percent (45,000) of those due to deferred resignation status or other exemptions and another 2 percent (17,000) due to reasonable accommodations. DOD data for pay periods ending in calendar year 2024 shows that most work was conducted in person. Percentage of DOD Civilian Employee Hours by Work Type in Calendar Year 2024 GAO reviewed data for 13 selected dates from December 2021 through February 2025 and found that, although between 65 and 68 percent of DOD civilian employee positions were eligible for telework or remote work, data on actual employee eligibility were incomplete. Therefore, data on the number of teleworkers and remote workers DOD previously reported are likely inaccurate. For example, in May 2024, DOD publicly reported it had 61,549 remote employees. One month later in June 2024, DOD told GAO that it had 35,558 remote employees. The Office of Personnel Management and DOD policy require the collection of data about position and employee eligibility for telework and remote work, but DOD officials told GAO there is no formal process in place to ensure eligibility data are accurate, timely, or complete. Without formal processes for collecting data on employee eligibility, DOD lacks visibility into the use of these flexibilities and may not be able to ensure compliance with DOD policy to collect accurate and reliable data on use of these flexibilities. DOD has not formally evaluated the effects of telework and remote work programs in relation to its agency goals, but officials reported perceived benefits and challenges. For example, officials told GAO their use of these flexibilities maintained or improved mission productivity and efficiency and supported employee recruitment and retention. Conversely, officials said that telework reduced opportunities for collaboration and information sharing and decreased morale and retention of employees ineligible for telework or remote work. Without clear and specific requirements for the formal evaluation of telework and remote work programs, DOD cannot determine if these programs help meet agency goals, including those related to recruitment and retention. Why GAO Did This Study DOD’s use of telework and remote work flexibilities has evolved since the department first issued its policy over a decade ago, with peak usage during the COVID-19 pandemic. In January 2025, the President issued a memorandum directing all agencies to require employees to return to in-person work on a full-time basis, essentially ending widespread use of these flexibilities at DOD, with limited exceptions as approved by the Secretary of Defense. The Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024, includes a provision for GAO to review the status of DOD’s telework and remote work programs. This report (1) describes DOD policies since 2020; and assesses the extent to which DOD (2) collected data on civilian employee telework and remote work eligibility from December 2021 through February 2025 and used these programs in 2024, and (3) has evaluated the effects of using telework and remote work in meeting agency goals. GAO reviewed federal and DOD telework and remote work policies; analyzed data on DOD employee telework and remote work eligibility and use; and interviewed officials from DOD and from 19 DOD components.

What GAO Found Since 2015, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has issued nine rules (regulations) that establish a framework for preventing foodborne illness under the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) enacted in 2011. Separately, FDA has completed most but not all requirements that GAO identified in the law. The nine rules are significant because they help clarify the specific actions that industry must take at different points in the global supply chain to prevent contamination of human and animal food. For example, one rule sets standards for businesses that grow, harvest, pack, or hold fruits and vegetables. Another rule addresses hazards that could cause illness, death, or economic disruption of the U.S. food supply. In addition to issuing the rules, FDA has completed 41 of 46 requirements GAO identified in FSMA. For example, FDA has issued guides that are intended to describe in plain language what businesses need to do to comply with rules, and conducted various studies FSMA required. The requirements FDA has not completed are to issue guidance on hazard analysis and preventive controls for human food; issue guidance to protect against the intentional adulteration, or tampering, of food; report on the progress of implementing a national food emergency response laboratory network; publish updated good agricultural practices for fruits and vegetables; and establish a system to improve FDA’s capacity to track and trace food that is in the U.S. FDA officials cited competing priorities and an October 2024 agency reorganization as reasons for not fully completing these requirements. In March 2025, FDA officials told GAO they intend to establish the system FSMA requires to help track and trace food by July 2028. However, they did not provide specific time frames for completing the other requirements. Doing so, and then taking action to complete them, would help ensure that industry and others have the information they need to effectively implement FSMA’s preventive framework. FDA’s efforts to assess how the nine rules are helping to prevent foodborne illness have largely focused on monitoring industry compliance with three rules. This includes overseeing hazards that could affect food safety. However, FDA has not developed a performance management process to guide the agency’s efforts to assess the results of the nine rules. Key practices for federal performance management emphasize the need for agencies to define what they are trying to achieve, collect relevant information, and use that information to assess how well they are performing and identify how they could improve. FDA officials said the agency prioritized implementing the rules over assessing the results. But developing a performance management process would better position FDA to assess the results of the rules, with the ultimate goal of helping prevent foodborne illness. Why GAO Did This Study Each year, foodborne illnesses sicken millions of Americans and cause thousands of deaths. In 2011, Congress enacted FSMA, which shifted the focus of FDA’s food safety program from reacting to, to preventing those illnesses. FDA helps ensure the safety of 80 percent of the U.S. food supply, including fruits and vegetables, processed foods, dairy products, and most seafood. GAO was asked to review FDA’s efforts to implement FSMA’s preventive framework. This report examines the extent to which FDA has (1) issued rules and completed requirements included in selected sections of FSMA and (2) assessed how the rules are contributing to preventing foodborne illness. GAO focused on sections of FSMA that provide a foundation for creating a modern, risk-based framework for food safety. GAO compared FDA’s efforts with requirements in FSMA and key practices for federal performance management, which GAO developed based on federal laws, guidance, and past GAO work. GAO also interviewed agency officials and 17 selected stakeholders, representing industry associations, consumer advocacy groups, and state and local regulators.