What GAO Found When communities are hit by a major disaster—such as a flood, hurricane, or wildfire—a key first step is removing large quantities of debris so that they can begin to recover. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), a component within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers can help them respond quickly by awarding contracts before disasters strike. Tribes, states, and localities may also award their own advance contracts for debris removal. GAO found that six of 16 selected governments had awarded advance contracts for debris removal and identified benefits of having them, such as speed of debris removal. GAO also found confusion among FEMA’s procurement training group and its regional offices about roles and responsibilities for encouraging governments to award advance debris removal contracts. Clarifying roles and responsibilities would improve information sharing to encourage advance contract use. Uncleared Fire Debris in Pacific Palisades, California (May 2025) GAO found that the Army Corps’s processes for reporting debris removal data to those affected by the Los Angeles wildfires (January 2025) and Hurricane Helene in North Carolina (September 2024) differed. In Los Angeles, the Army Corps publicly shared an online interactive map with real-time debris removal data within about 6 weeks after the wildfires began. In contrast, it did not share county-specific infographics for those in North Carolina affected by the hurricane until 4 months after the disaster. Because the Army Corps has not completed an analysis of the reasons for the differences in data sharing, it may miss opportunities to improve its approach to providing timely and consistent data, including real-time debris removal data, during future disasters. FEMA put controls in place to mitigate the risks of fraud, waste, and abuse in its debris removal program. For example, it requires that grant applicants ensure that debris removal quantities are accurate to avoid incurring unnecessary costs. But, FEMA is not well positioned to obtain and evaluate information about new or evolving fraud, waste, and abuse risks in its debris removal program because its efforts do not align with fraud risk management leading practices. Conducting regular risk assessments and developing a process to address risks would help FEMA more strategically manage risks across its entire debris removal program. Why GAO Did This Study FEMA and the Army Corps spend billions of dollars annually to respond to major disasters. Using advance contracts can help quickly start the recovery because contractors may be able to start work soon after a disaster. The Disaster Contract Improvement Act includes a provision for GAO to review several areas related to debris removal. This report, among other objectives, examines (1) selected governments’ perspectives on the use of advance contracts for debris removal, and the extent to which FEMA encouraged the use of advance contracts; and the extent to which (2) the Army Corps developed processes for reporting advance contract debris removal efforts during the responses to two disasters, and (3) FEMA mitigated risks in its debris removal program. To conduct this review, GAO reviewed FEMA and Army Corps policies, data, and other documents and conducted site visits to observe ongoing debris removal in Los Angeles and North Carolina. GAO also interviewed FEMA and Army Corps officials, and officials from 16 governments, selected based on obligation amounts and geographic variation, among other factors.

What GAO Found The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its components spend billions annually on programs to acquire systems and capabilities that support national security. In fiscal year (FY) 2025, GAO reviewed 27 DHS major acquisition programs—generally, those with total costs over $300 million. To support timely delivery of capabilities and minimize cost growth, DHS policy requires programs to get DHS approval for their baseline cost, schedule, and performance goals. Of the 27 programs reviewed, 19 had received this approval while the other 8 had not yet reached the stage where this was required. As of September 30, 2025, 15 of the 19 programs had revised their baseline goals since initially setting them, some of them multiple times. Most programs with revised baselines delayed their plans to deliver full capabilities. Baselined costs collectively increased a projected $11.4 billion, or 26 percent, since they were first set. Of those 19 programs, 18 were meeting their most recent baseline goals. One program—the Coast Guard’s Offshore Patrol Cutter—has ongoing efforts to revise its baseline to reflect recent schedule delays and cost increases. DHS’s programs face a continually changing environment, which affects their ability to manage cost and schedule risks. For example: Staff. Uncertainties around staff could risk programs’ ability to achieve future milestones. Specifically, in FY 2025, eight programs experienced at least a 20 percent or more reduction in staff, resulting in lost subject matter expertise and technical skills. Acquisition oversight. In October 2025, DHS decided to dissolve the office responsible for department-level oversight of major acquisition programs. DHS officials stated some of the oversight responsibilities had been moved to other parts of DHS. However, as of January 2026, DHS officials were unsure what level of oversight DHS would continue to provide. In May 2026, at least one part of that office was reconstituted, according to DHS officials. Funding. Twelve of the 27 programs expect to receive at least $14 billion in funding from the 2025 Budget Reconciliation Act. GAO will continue to monitor DHS’s updated acquisition oversight structure as well as DHS’s portfolio of major acquisition programs. Why GAO Did This Study DHS plans to invest over $55 billion to acquire systems for its current portfolio of major acquisition programs—over $11 billion more than DHS had initially planned. The Explanatory Statement accompanying a bill for the DHS Appropriations Act, 2015 includes a provision for GAO to review DHS’s major acquisitions on an ongoing basis. This report assesses (1) how DHS major acquisition programs have performed since establishing their baseline cost, schedule, and performance goals; and (2) the status of DHS’s acquisition portfolio, including any cost and schedule risks. GAO selected 27 of DHS’s largest acquisition programs to determine program status as of the end of FY 2025. Of these, GAO identified 19 with DHS-approved acquisition baselines for further analysis. GAO reviewed key documents; collected cost, schedule, and performance information; and interviewed DHS officials. For more information, contact Travis J. Masters at masterst@gao.gov.