What GAO Found In fiscal year 2025, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) collected more than $5.3 trillion in taxes and paid out about $639 billion in tax refunds, credits, and other payments. Fiscal Year 2025 IRS Collections of Federal Taxes, by Type     In GAO’s opinion, IRS’s fiscal year 2025 financial statements are fairly presented in all material respects, and although internal controls could be improved, IRS maintained, in all material respects, effective internal control over financial reporting as of September 30, 2025. GAO’s tests of IRS’s compliance with selected provisions of applicable laws, regulations, contracts, and grant agreements disclosed no instances of reportable noncompliance in fiscal year 2025. System limitations and other deficiencies in IRS’s accounting for federal taxes receivable and other unpaid assessment balances continued to exist during fiscal year 2025. These control deficiencies affect IRS’s ability to produce reliable financial statements without using significant compensating procedures. These control deficiencies are significant enough to merit the attention of those charged with governance of IRS and therefore represent a continuing significant deficiency in internal control over financial reporting. Continued management attention is essential to fully addressing this significant deficiency. In commenting on a draft of this report, IRS stated that it was pleased to receive an unmodified opinion on its financial statements. IRS also commented that it is dedicated to promoting the highest standards of financial management and accountability and will continue to work to provide accurate reporting and improve internal controls. Why GAO Did This Study In connection with fulfilling GAO’s requirement to audit the consolidated financial statements of the U.S. government, and consistent with its authority to audit statements and schedules prepared by executive agency components, GAO has audited IRS’s financial statements because of the significance of IRS’s tax collections to the consolidated financial statements of the U.S. government. GAO annually audits IRS’s financial statements to determine whether (1) the financial statements are fairly presented and (2) IRS management maintained effective internal control over financial reporting. GAO also tests IRS’s compliance with selected provisions of applicable laws, regulations, contracts, and grant agreements. IRS’s tax collection activities are significant to overall federal receipts, and the effectiveness of its financial management is of substantial interest to Congress and the nation’s taxpayers. For more information, contact Dawn B. Simpson at SimpsonD@gao.gov.

Why This Matters The Department of Defense (DOD) has emphasized the importance of protecting students in the Junior Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (JROTC) from instructor sexual misconduct. DOD reported more than 100 misconduct allegations from 2013—2023. Legislation established new JROTC requirements in fiscal year 2024, in part to address concerns about sexual misconduct involving instructors and students. GAO Key Takeaways The military services partner with high schools to provide leadership training to students through JROTC, which DOD oversees. In response to statutory requirements, DOD developed policies and procedures to prevent sexual misconduct in JROTC and respond to misconduct allegations. We identified issues that, if addressed, would aid DOD’s efforts: The standardized memorandum of agreement (MOA)—which the military services sign with school districts—incorporates seven of 10 required provisions but does not fully incorporate three (see figure). For example, the MOA does not require schools to certify that they provide student training. Instructor training does not consistently address Title IX, a law prohibiting sex-based discrimination in education. This makes instructors less likely to be aware of Title IX requirements. Information provided to students on how to report misconduct is unclear and could be improved. Gaps in DOD’s oversight of JROTC programs also exist. For example, DOD guidance does not clearly define how the military services’ regional officials are expected to coordinate and communicate with partner schools. Clarifying these responsibilities would improve program oversight and better ensure students’ safety. Areas of Misalignment Between Requirements and the Military Services’ Agreement with School Districts Note: For more details, see figure 2 in GAO-26-107524. How GAO Did This Study We analyzed relevant statutes, documents, and policies on DOD’s prevention of and response to sexual misconduct in JROTC; reviewed the most recent 5 years of data on allegations; visited 11 high schools with JROTC programs in four states; and interviewed school officials, instructors, and DOD officials.

What GAO Found GAO found (1) the Bureau of the Fiscal Service’s Schedules of Federal Debt for fiscal years 2025 and 2024 are fairly presented in all material respects and (2) Fiscal Service maintained, in all material respects, effective internal control over financial reporting relevant to the Schedule of Federal Debt as of September 30, 2025. GAO’s tests of selected provisions of applicable laws, regulations, contracts, and grant agreements related to the Schedule of Federal Debt disclosed no instances of reportable noncompliance for fiscal year 2025. Over the past 10 years, from fiscal year 2015 through fiscal year 2025, total federal debt managed by Fiscal Service has increased from $18.1 trillion to $37.6 trillion. Total Federal Debt Outstanding, September 30, 2015, through September 30, 2025 Note: A small amount of total federal debt is not subject to the debt limit. During fiscal year 2025, total federal debt increased by about $2.2 trillion, with about $2.0 trillion of the increase in debt held by the public. Debt held by the public is increasing mainly because the federal government continues to spend more than it collects in revenue, resulting in annual budget deficits that must be financed through borrowing. The budget deficit for fiscal year 2025 was $1.8 trillion. Additionally, interest on debt held by the public has increased significantly, nearly doubling over the last 3 fiscal years, from about $500 billion in fiscal year 2022 to about $1.0 trillion in fiscal year 2025. On June 3, 2023, the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023 was enacted, suspending the debt limit through January 1, 2025. Effective January 2, 2025, the statutory debt limit was set at $36.1 trillion. Extraordinary measures began on January 21, 2025, to prevent the U.S. government from defaulting on its obligations. Extraordinary measures continued until Monday, July 7, 2025, after the debt limit was increased on July 4, 2025, by $5.0 trillion to $41.1 trillion. The current approach to the debt limit has created uncertainty and disruptions in the Treasury securities market and has increased borrowing costs. In early 2025, the Congressional Budget Office projected that federal deficits will exceed $2 trillion annually over the next decade and remain historically large for the following 30 years under current law. The federal government remains on an unsustainable long-term fiscal path. Why GAO Did This Study GAO audits the consolidated financial statements of the U.S. government. Because of the significance of the federal debt to the government-wide financial statements, GAO audits Fiscal Service’s Schedules of Federal Debt annually to determine whether, in all material respects, (1) the schedules are fairly presented and (2) Fiscal Service management maintained effective internal control over financial reporting relevant to the Schedule of Federal Debt. Further, GAO tests compliance with selected provisions of applicable laws, regulations, contracts, and grant agreements related to the Schedule of Federal Debt. Federal debt managed by Fiscal Service consists of debt held by the public and intragovernmental debt holdings. Debt held by the public primarily represents the amount the federal government has borrowed to finance cumulative cash deficits and is held by investors outside of the federal government. Intragovernmental debt holdings represent federal debt owed by the Department of the Treasury to other federal government accounts that typically have an obligation to invest their excess annual receipts (and interest earnings) over disbursements in federal securities.

What GAO Found GAO found (1) the United States Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) and its Investor Protection Fund's (IPF) financial statements as of and for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2025, are presented fairly, in all material respects, in accordance with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles; (2) SEC maintained, in all material respects, effective internal control over financial reporting for SEC and for IPF as of September 30, 2025 and (3) no reportable noncompliance for fiscal year 2025 with provisions of applicable laws, regulations, contracts, and grant agreements GAO tested. In commenting on a draft of this report, SEC stated that it is pleased that GAO found that its financial statements and notes were presented fairly, in all material respects, in conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles. Why GAO Did This Study SEC is required by law to annually prepare and submit audited financial statements covering all accounts and associated activities of the agency to Congress and the Office of Management and Budget. Further, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended in 2010 by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), requires SEC to annually prepare and submit a complete set of audited financial statements for its IPF to Congress. In accordance with its authority to audit statements and schedules prepared by executive agencies and their components, GAO audited the SEC and IPF financial statements. Section 963 of the Dodd-Frank Act further requires that (1) SEC annually submit a report to Congress describing management's responsibility for internal control over financial reporting and assessing the effectiveness of such internal control during the fiscal year; (2) the SEC Chair and Chief Financial Officer attest to SEC's report; and (3) GAO assess the effectiveness of SEC's internal control over financial reporting and evaluate, attest to, and report on SEC's assessment. Accordingly, this report also includes GAO's reporting in response to the requirement under the Dodd-Frank Act. For more information, contact M. Hannah Padilla at padillah@gao.gov.

What GAO Found Operational testing—used to evaluate the capabilites of a new vessel to perform in realistic and relevant conditions—is critical to the Navy’s understanding of a vessel’s ability to counter the advances of its adversaries. Test Firing of a Navy Aircraft Carrier’s Ship Self-Defense System GAO found that Navy test and evaluation policy does not ensure consistent participation in test and evaluation working-level integrated product teams by key organizations representing the warfighter. Uncertainty about how warfighter organizations are represented in these teams—which are critical to test planning and execution for each shipbuilding program—poses challenges for ensuring that operational testing decisions reflect the current needs and interests of the fleet. GAO also found that the Navy does not have a plan to replace the test capability provided by its aging self-defense test ship. The Navy uses this remotely operated vessel to test the self-defense systems that protect ships from incoming missiles. The Navy lacks a clear plan for replacing the unique capabilities of its test ship, as intended. This creates uncertainty for how the Navy will fulfill future operational testing requirements. A gap in, or loss of, such test capability could increase the risk to warfighters and ships in conflicts with adversaries. In addition, while high-level Navy plans identify the need to invest in digital test infrastructure, GAO found that the Navy has yet to take coordinated action to respond to this need. For example, while some organizations had robust digital tools, GAO found that the Navy’s program-centric approach to fund, develop, and maintain digital test tools impedes investments in tools that could be widely used across shipbuilding programs. This program-centric approach also impairs the Navy’s ability to improve the timeliness and usefulness of operational testing. Without a cohesive plan for investing in the development and sustainment of its digital capabilities, the Navy risks not having the testing tools and infrastructure that it says it needs to confront an increasingly digital future—putting at risk U.S. warfighters’ ability to counter rapidly advancing adversaries. Why GAO Did This Study The U.S. Navy’s shipbuilding programs must deliver vessels with the capabilities needed to outpace new threats in an evolving maritime environment. Operational testing is central to the Navy demonstrating such capabilities. A Senate report contains a provision for GAO to examine operational testing for Navy shipbuilding programs. GAO’s report addresses the extent to which (1) the Navy’s operational test and evaluation practices provide timely and useful information to acquisition decision-makers and warfighters, and (2) the Navy is developing and maintaining physical and digital test assets to support operational test and evaluation of its vessels. This is the public version of a sensitive report GAO issued in September 2025. GAO reviewed operational test and evaluation documentation related to Navy vessels, interviewed officials from the Navy and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and conducted site visits to three naval warfare centers and the Navy’s self-defense test ship.

What GAO Found Scams occur in a variety of forms and are a growing risk to consumers. Examples of a Scam Execution Process Note: Other types of contact methods, scams, and payment methods exist. At least 13 federal agencies engage in a range of activities related to countering scams. The agency activities cover a spectrum of roles intended to prevent, detect, and respond to scams. However, each agency largely carries out these activities independently. None of the 13 federal agencies that GAO spoke with were aware of a government-wide strategy to guide efforts to combat scams, nor did GAO independently identify such a strategy. In its April 2025 report, GAO recommended that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) lead a federal effort, in collaboration with other agencies, to develop and implement a government-wide strategy to counter scams and coordinate related activities. The FBI recently outlined actions to address this recommendation. The Consumer Protection Financial Bureau (CFPB), the FBI, and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) collect and report on consumer complaints both directly and from other agencies. Data limitations prevent agencies from determining a total number of scam complaints and financial losses. Accordingly, there is no single, government-wide estimate of the total number of scams and financial losses. Similarly, federal agencies have not produced a common, government-wide definition of scams. A government-wide estimate would capture the scale of scams, and a common definition is necessary for producing such an estimate and for developing a government-wide strategy. In its April 2025 report, GAO made separate recommendations to CFPB, the FBI, and FTC to (1) develop a common definition of scams, (2) harmonize data collection, (3) report an estimate of the number of scam complaints each receives and (4) produce a single, government-wide estimate of the number of consumers affected by scams. In a recent update, the FBI and FTC outlined various concerns with these recommendations, such as differing authorities and mandates among agencies. However, GAO maintains that these recommendations remain valid. In October 2025, CFPB stated that it will monitor FBI and FTC actions before determining if any actions of its own are warranted. Why GAO Did This Study Scams, a method of committing fraud, involve the use of deception or manipulation intended to achieve financial gain. Scams often cause individual victims to lose large sums—in some cases their entire life savings. Federal agencies such as the FBI and FTC have responsibilities that include preventing and responding to scams against Americans. This statement discusses (1) federal agencies’ activities to prevent and respond to scams and the need for a comprehensive, government-wide strategy to guide their efforts and (2) federal agencies’ activities to compile scam-related consumer-complaint data and estimate the total number of scams and related financial losses. It also provides updates on the status of 3 agencies’ actions to address applicable recommendations. This statement is based on GAO’s April 2025 report on federal efforts to combat scams (GAO-25-107088). For that report, GAO analyzed publicly available information (including prior GAO reports) and relevant agency documents. GAO also interviewed officials from 13 different federal agencies involved in countering scams.

What GAO Found Before the Civil War, the Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw, Muscogee (Creek), and Seminole Nations—known as the Five Tribes—had citizens who enslaved people. In 1866, each Tribe entered a treaty with the U.S. that abolished slavery and addressed tribal citizenship rights of the formerly enslaved people living among the Tribes. Historically, these people are referred to as “Freedmen.” Territories of the Five Tribes and Oklahoma, 1890 GAO estimates that the population of descendants of the Freedmen could have ranged from 146,400 to 395,400 in 2022. Since the 1800s, several courts have considered whether the Freedmen and their descendants are entitled to tribal citizenship or other rights under the 1866 treaties. In part because of those cases, Freedmen descendants are eligible to enroll as tribal citizens in the Cherokee and Seminole Nations, but not the Chickasaw or Choctaw Nations. Further, the Muscogee (Creek) Supreme Court recently ruled that the Muscogee (Creek) Nation must begin to permit its Freedmen descendants to enroll. Federal agencies administer a range of services, such as health care, education, and housing assistance, for the benefit of Tribes and their citizens, including enrolled Freedmen descendants. However, most of the 19 enrolled Freedmen descendants GAO interviewed said they encountered barriers accessing such services. Agencies have taken some actions to address these barriers, such as by clarifying enrollment eligibility. In addition, enrolled Freedmen descendants are regarded differently than other tribal citizens under certain federal statutes concerning land ownership and criminal jurisdiction. Why GAO Did This Study To better understand the status of Freedmen descendants, the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs held a hearing in 2022 on selected provisions of the 1866 treaties between the U.S. and the Five Tribes. The committee subsequently requested that GAO provide related information. This report (1) estimates the population of Freedmen descendants of the Five Tribes, (2) describes key court decisions on Freedmen descendants’ eligibility for tribal citizenship, (3) describes barriers to certain federal services identified by enrolled Freedmen descendants and agency actions to address them, and (4) describes how Freedmen descendants are regarded differently than other citizens of the Five Tribes under certain federal statutes. GAO conducted demographic modeling to estimate the population of Freedmen descendants of the Five Tribes as of 2022, the most recent year for which data were available. GAO reviewed the 1866 treaties, the Five Tribes’ constitutions, federal statutes, and key court cases from tribal and federal courts related to the tribal citizenship rights of the Freedmen descendants. GAO interviewed officials from the Cherokee Nation, an association that represents Freedmen descendants, 19 Freedmen descendants enrolled as tribal citizens in the Cherokee and Seminole Nations, and federal agency officials. For more information, contact Anna Maria Ortiz at ortiza@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The problems of sexual assault and sexual harassment at the U.S. Coast Guard are not new. In its most recent report to Congress on this issue, covering fiscal year 2022, the Coast Guard reported 226 incidents of sexual assault and 88 incidents of sexual harassment. This report is required by law but fully included only 5 of the 11 required elements, partially included 4 of them, and did not include 2. Further, the Coast Guard submitted this report about 1 year late. The report covering fiscal year 2023 was due on January 15, 2024 and the report covering fiscal year 2024 was due on January 15, 2025. Both remained unissued, as of December 2025. Comparison of U.S. Coast Guard’s Fiscal Year 2022 Annual Report on Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment to Statutory Reporting Requirements The Coast Guard’s process for compiling the annual report did not fully follow its own procedures. According to these procedures, cognizant program and legal offices are to conduct reviews. The service used outdated statutory language and templates with deficiencies over multiple years, raising questions about whether the legal review was sufficient. By ensuring that it addresses all required sexual assault and sexual harassment reporting requirements and meets the statutory deadline, the Coast Guard could better communicate complete and quality information for decision-making and oversight, and increase transparency to Congress on incidents of sexual assault and sexual harassment. Why GAO Did This Study Since 2010, the Coast Guard has been required by law to submit an annual report to Congress on reported incidents of sexual assault and, since 2018, sexual harassment involving members of the Coast Guard. GAO was asked to review the Coast Guard’s process for annually reporting on sexual assault and sexual harassment to Congress. This report examines (1) the Coast Guard’s processes to identify and compile sexual assault and sexual harassment data, and (2) the extent to which the Coast Guard ensures that it reports on instances of sexual assault and sexual harassment to Congress as required. GAO reviewed Coast Guard documentation on its processes for identifying and compiling sexual assault and sexual harassment data. GAO analyzed the extent to which the sexual assault and sexual harassment report for fiscal year 2022—the most recent year available—incorporated required elements by comparing them to the law (14 U.S.C. § 5112). GAO also interviewed Coast Guard officials from headquarters and from 5 of 9 Coast Guard districts.

What GAO Found The Coast Guard identified 49 actions to implement as part of its reform effort to address sexual misconduct since July 2023. As of September 2025, the service reported implementing 32 of them. These actions include revising policy to improve accountability for sexual misconduct and developing new training. Coast Guard officials cited several reasons why the 17 remaining actions are incomplete, including their complexity and transitions in the service’s leaders. The Coast Guard has taken steps to incorporate aspects of leading practices to support its reform efforts, but gaps in key areas may affect its ability to maintain progress and achieve lasting results to address sexual misconduct. Extent to Which the Coast Guard’s Reform Effort to Address Sexual Misconduct Followed Selected Leading Practices for Agency Reforms Specifically, GAO identified gaps in these areas: Involving employees and key stakeholders. The Coast Guard engaged employees and stakeholders (e.g., the Department of Defense) when developing its reforms but does not have a dedicated method for collecting feedback from its personnel. Establishing a two-way communication strategy would better ensure the Coast Guard has opportunities to collect and respond to employee feedback regarding the effects of the reforms. Leadership focus and attention. The service established a steering committee, but it has not met since November 2024. An active reform implementation team would help the Coast Guard maintain momentum. Managing and monitoring. The Coast Guard has not updated timelines or outlined clear next steps for incomplete reform actions. Developing a clear implementation plan with key milestones and updated time frames could help the Coast Guard pinpoint performance shortfalls and address challenges. Establishing goals and outcomes. The Coast Guard has not developed an evaluation plan to assess the effectiveness of its efforts, as GAO recommended in March 2024. Officials have begun to develop a service culture index to measure progress; however, it is incomplete. Strategic workforce planning. The service has added staff to support its reform efforts (e.g., 16 personnel at the Academy) but has not fully assessed workforce needs. Addressing GAO’s 2020 recommendation on workforce assessment planning would better ensure the Coast Guard has the right people in the units responsible for implementing the reform efforts. Why GAO Did This Study Sexual assault and sexual harassment (i.e., sexual misconduct) are serious offenses that can have lasting, harmful effects on victims. Incidents of sexual misconduct in the Coast Guard—a maritime military service within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—have generated congressional and media attention for nearly 2 decades. In July 2023, after media reporting on the mishandling of sexual assault cases, the Coast Guard directed a review to identify areas for organizational improvement and to counter sexual misconduct. GAO was asked to review the Coast Guard’s effort to address sexual misconduct. This report examines (1) the reform actions the Coast Guard has taken since July 2023 to address sexual assault and harassment and (2) the extent to which the Coast Guard has followed selected leading agency reform practices to implement and sustain its reform efforts. GAO reviewed Coast Guard documentation on its reform actions and assessed them against selected leading practices for agency reform. GAO also interviewed Coast Guard officials from headquarters and from five of nine districts (selected based on size and geography) and visited one of these districts (New England) as well as the Coast Guard Academy.

What GAO Found In 2015, GAO issued A Framework for Managing Fraud Risks in Federal Programs (Fraud Risk Framework). The Fraud Risk Framework provides a comprehensive set of leading practices, organized into four components, for program managers to use when developing or enhancing efforts to combat fraud in a strategic, risk-based manner. These four components include (1) committing to combat fraud by creating an organizational culture, (2) planning and conducting risk assessments, (3) designing and implementing a strategy with specific control activities, and (4) evaluating and adapting fraud risk management activities. As noted in the Fraud Risk Framework, program managers need to understand the effectiveness of their fraud risk management activities and adjust their efforts to better protect their resources against fraud. However, our work has shown that agencies face challenges in effectively implementing leading practices, particularly those found in Component 4 of the Fraud Risk Framework. Agencies continue to face these challenges, despite requirements to use the Fraud Risk Framework's leading practices to manage fraud risks. To aid program managers in these efforts, we developed this technical appendix to GAO's Fraud Risk Framework, which focuses on the implementation of Component 4: Evaluate Outcomes Using a Risk-Based Approach and Adapt Activities to Improve Fraud Risk Management. This appendix highlights various approaches that program managers have used, or could use, to evaluate and adapt fraud risk management activities described in the first three components of the Framework. These approaches can be modified to fit the circumstances and conditions relevant to different programs and activities. While the primary target audience is program managers in the U.S. federal government, the approaches may also be applicable to state, local, and foreign government agencies, as well as nonprofit entities, that are responsible for fraud risk management. Why GAO Did This Study Demonstrating strong internal controls and program integrity is important to protect taxpayer dollars and maintain public trust. In this way, evaluations can help agencies show the value of their fraud risk management activities. Program managers also need to understand the effectiveness of their fraud risk management activities so they can adjust their efforts to better protect their resources against fraud. Component 4 of GAO's Fraud Risk Framework describes how agencies can use robust evaluations that are comprehensive in scope, incorporate a range of metrics and outputs beyond financial returns, and use stakeholder input to better understand program outcomes. While agencies may have varying levels of resources, program managers can tailor evaluations to align with available capacity and the specific activities being assessed. To assist program managers with these efforts, we developed this technical appendix, which supplements and complements the Fraud Risk Framework. Specifically, we identified examples, methods, and considerations that can be used to help evaluate the effectiveness of fraud risk management activities. For more information, contact Rebecca Shea at shear@gao.gov.